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SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the effects of a collection of policies that determine the 
mandatory distribution of mining, gas and oil revenues between national and sub-
national governments, and the greater involvement of mining companies in local 
development. I have labelled this set of policies, which aims to reduce social 
conflict and promote local development, the New Extractive Industry Strategy 
(NEIS).  
Chapter 1 describes the implementation of these policies in Peru and highlights 
their significance to the mining industry worldwide. Chapter 2 describes the 
methodology of the thesis and introduces the three field research regions. Chapter 
3 outlines the national socio-political context for the implementation of the NEIS.  
Chapters 4–6 deal with the effects of the NEIS on social conflict. I argue that the 
implementation of the NEIS has not only failed to reduce conflict but has actually 
exacerbated it. After reviewing the debates linking extraction and conflict (Chapter 
4), Chapter 5 demonstrates that conflict is strongly associated with the volume of 
mining revenue received by sub-national governments.  
Chapter 6 presents a typology of conflicts that helps to explain the correlation 
between mining revenue and unrest. In addition to well-known conflicts that are 
related to the adverse impact of mining on livelihoods and the environment, the 
study identifies two other types. In the first, peasant communities employ social 
conflict to increase their bargaining power with the mining companies for material 
compensation. In the second, the large volume of mining revenue generates 
disputes over access to or use of these financial transfers.  
Chapters 7–8 show that the NEIS has not delivered its development promises. 
Chapter 7 illustrates how regional and municipal governments in receipt of high per 
capita volumes of mining revenue transfers did not improve their economic and 
welfare indicators any more than the rest of the country. Chapter 8 proposes that a 
combination of obstructive political factors trapped regional and municipal 
authorities and local populations in a myopic political game that prioritised quick 
short-term spending over any long-term benefits to be gained from better planned 
expenditure. Finally, Chapter 9 draws some conclusions and makes some 
suggestions.  
  
− iii − 
 
Acknowledgments  
The completion of this thesis was only made possible due to the cooperation and 
support of a number of people and organisations. I embarked upon my DPhil 
because Professor Mick Moore helped me discover that I had a relevant topic. I 
continued to enjoy Mick’s help during the three years I spent researching and 
writing the thesis, and owe both him and Professor Fiona Wilson a debt of gratitude 
for their wise guidance. During my field research, they encouraged me to embrace 
the unexpected and not to be held back by preconceived notions and 
predetermined methodologies. This advice allowed me to go beyond the original 
scope of the study, prompting me to learn and employ different methodologies. In 
writing up the thesis, I also benefited from their insightful comments on various 
drafts. Sometimes, I felt overwhelmed at having two demanding supervisors but I 
very much appreciated their frankness and trust in my ability to improve the thesis.  
Thanks are due to the Government of Navarre for the doctoral scholarship that 
made this study possible, and to the Society of Jesus (Loyola Province) for financial 
support in the initial stages. I am also grateful to the Centre for the Future State at 
IDS for supporting my participation in international seminars on The political 
management of natural resource revenues in Lima and Quito; for giving me the 
opportunity to attend the Institute for Qualitative and Multi-method Research at the 
University of Syracuse; and for facilitating the publication of my findings on conflict 
in mining regions.  
The research behind this thesis would not have been possible without the 
cooperation of all the interviewees who graciously gave up their time and granted 
me the benefit of their knowledge. I am especially indebted to those who helped me 
identify the right people and obtain their contact details, and those who assisted me 
in planning the practicalities of travelling around the mining areas of Pasco, 
Ancash, and Moquegua.  
In Lima, José de Echave (Cooperacción), Nilton Quiñones and Epifanio Baca 
(Propuesta Ciudadana), and Edgardo Cruzado facilitated access to the relevant 
people and organisations. In Cerro de Pasco, Cesar López Jurado and Andrés 
Avelino (Labor) were immensely helpful in providing background information, 
− iv − 
 
facilitating contact with mayors and peasant communities, and advising on travel 
and accommodation in the region.  
In Ancash, Richard Moreno and Manuel Huaray (CEPES) provided vital information 
about the region and contact details for its authorities. Alfredo Gamio, Elena 
Marquina, Jaime Mendoza, Hernan Pacha, and Silvia of CEOP-Ilo were wonderful 
hosts during my field research in Moquegua. Here, I also enjoyed fascinating 
conversations and a most useful seminar with Denis Rojas, Juan Zúñiga, and other 
colleagues at Labor.  
Thanks are due to the mining companies that were willing to discuss their 
perspectives of the situation: Antamina, Barrick, Atacocha, Milpo, El Brocal, 
Buenaventura, Volcan, Pan American Silver, Southern Peruvian Cooper 
Corporation, and Anglo American.    
During my stay in Peru, I was an associate member of the Institute of Peruvian 
Studies and the Catholic University. I am most grateful to Marisa Remy of the 
former for her openness in sharing her knowledge of regional and local politics, and 
for organising a mesa verde (green table) in September 2008 for the discussion of 
the preliminary findings of my field research. The comments of colleagues who 
participated in this seminar were very helpful in identifying threads in the data I had 
collected.  
At different times, Javier Iguiñiz, Alejandro Diez, Federico Helfgott, Martin Scurrah, 
María Burneo, and Bruno Revesz provided information, bibliographies and helpful 
reflections on my research. I also owe a special debt of gratitude to Miguel Zegarra 
for helping me compile the municipal figures dataset that I use in Chapters 7 and 8.  
At IDS, I am most grateful to Angela Dowman for her help with all the administrative 
formalities, and her genuine interest in the well-being of each individual DPhil 
candidate. Thanks are also due to Diana Conyers, David Leonard, Anu Joshi, 
Andrés Mejía, Peter Houtzager, Richard Crook, Mark Berenson, Lindan Waldman 
and other colleagues who made helpful comments during and after my research 
outline and work in progress seminars.  
During my time in Brighton, I learnt a lot through participating in Governance Team 
reading groups and seminars, with the additional advantage of the sessions being 
− v − 
 
more fun than spending long hours by myself. I also enjoyed the kindness and 
efficiency exhibited by the Governance Team administrators – thanks to Caroline, 
Camila, Adam, Chris, and a particular tribute to the late Linda Bateman.  
At IDS, I also met a wonderful group of fellow DPhil candidates. I was fortunate 
enough to enjoy discussions with, receive advice from, and share time, concerns 
and joy with Santhosh Mathew, Louise Tillin, Julian Salazar, María Teresa Armijos, 
Will Pritchard, Phemo Kgomotso, Linnet Taylor, Florence Dafe, Machiko Tsubura, 
Marika Djolai, Suchi Pande, Ronald Adamtey, Dario Debowicz, Pedro Martin, 
Sunita Abrahams, Tobias Denskus, Shandana Mohmand, and Rehab Osman.  
I am grateful to Tony Bebbington for his invitation to participate in the Territory, 
Conflict and Development in the Andes seminars organised by the School of 
Environment and Development at the University of Manchester; and I would like to 
thank the participants of these seminars for stimulating discussions and insightful 
comments on data that I used in some chapters of my thesis.  
Santiago Manuin (see Chapter 1), Carlos Diharce, and Mimi Cuq reinforced my 
motivation to conclude this thesis by making me appreciate that the study was 
important for other people as well; and their encouragement and friendship fortified 
me during the long months of writing. I would also like to thank Javier and Jenny, 
Manolo and Amelia, Nilton and Lucía, and Edgardo Cruzado for making us 
welcome at their homes during our visits to Lima.  
Above all, I am grateful to Noemí. We began our journey together in Cerro de 
Pasco, during the initial stage of my field research. Living in the self-proclaimed 
highest city in the world proved to be a tough beginning, but she took it in good 
spirit, helped me cope with the harsh conditions, and collaborated in the 
compilation of data on the municipalities of the region. Unfortunately, I could not 
repay her when it came to writing up the thesis in Brighton. The need to devote 
longer hours than expected to analysis and composition ruined our plans for a 
quiet, enjoyable life. Nevertheless, she not only overcame the initial frustration but 
generously continued to offer her support during the final stressful months.  
  






Chapter 1: The New Extractive Industry Strategy (NEIS): the Peruvian 
testing ground .......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 The Peruvian testing ground .................................................................... 1 
1.2 The NEIS: making a virtue out of necessity? ........................................ 12 
1.2.1 Conflicts, ‘new mining’ and ‘going local’ .............................................. 12 
1.2.2 The  legitimising logic: radical polycentrism ........................................ 14 
1.3 The Peruvian version of the NEIS ........................................................... 15 
1.3.1 The canon minero ................................................................................ 17 
1.3.2 The Mining Programme of Solidarity with the People (MPSP) ............ 21 
1.4 The current debate on extractive industries, conflict and 
development ............................................................................................. 23 
1.5 Thesis outline ........................................................................................... 28 
Chapter 2: The research journey ......................................................................... 30 
2.1 Thesis methodology ................................................................................ 31 
2.1.1 What did I want to know? .................................................................... 31 
2.1.2 How did I set about finding the answers? ............................................ 33 
2.1.3 Selection of the field research sites ..................................................... 36 
2.2 The research sites .................................................................................... 38 
2.2.1 Pasco ................................................................................................... 39 
2.2.2 Ancash ................................................................................................. 42 
2.2.3 Moquegua ............................................................................................ 44 
Chapter 3: Where the mines are: the socio-political landscape of the 
Peruvian countryside ............................................................................................ 46 
3.1 Changes in state-citizen relations in the countryside .......................... 48 
3.1.1 The revolutionary experiment of Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975) ....... 49 
3.1.2 The restoration of democracy and the internal war (1980-1990) ........ 52 
3.1.3 Fujimori (1990-2001): authoritarianism and neo-liberalism. ................ 53 
3.1.4 The new democratic era (2001–2008): political reform straitjacketed 
by an untouchable economic model. ................................................... 56 
3.2 The unsatisfactory outcomes of neoliberal policies: territorial 
inequalities and lack of trust in public institutions .............................. 58 
− vii − 
 
3.2.1 The poverty gap between rural and urban population ......................... 59 
3.2.2 Erosion of public’s trust in political institutions .................................... 63 
3.3 Economy of extraction in its historical perspective: political 
dynamics and social outcomes .............................................................. 64 
3.3.1 Economic cycles and political dynamics ............................................. 64 
3.3.2 Social outcomes of the extractive economy ........................................ 67 
3.4 The emergence of new and more dispersed political actors ............... 69 
3.4.1 Peasant communities .......................................................................... 69 
3.4.2 Regional movements and other local actors ....................................... 71 
Chapter 4: Perspectives on social conflict in mining areas .............................. 74 
4.1 What do different Peruvian actors think about social conflict and 
mining? ..................................................................................................... 75 
4.2 What does the academic literature say about the relationship 
between mining and social conflict? ..................................................... 79 
4.2.1 The comparative literature ................................................................... 80 
4.2.2 Literature on Peruvian cases ............................................................... 81 
4.3 A new analytical framework for the study of the relationship 
between mining and conflict. .................................................................. 83 
4.3.1 The identification of new mining-related conflicts ................................ 85 
4.3.2 The relationship between intentions and legitimising discourses ........ 86 
Chapter 5: More money, more conflict ................................................................ 89 
5.1 The dataset ............................................................................................... 90 
5.2 Main features of social conflict in Peru (2004-2008): the growing 
importance of mining ............................................................................... 92 
5.3 What factors explain regional and temporal variations in 
conflict? .................................................................................................... 96 
Chapter 6: How the NEIS multiplied conflicts: a local perspective ................ 107 
6.1 A typology of mining-related social conflicts ..................................... 109 
6.2 Anti-mining conflicts: showing the way .............................................. 111 
6.2.1 Actors and motives ............................................................................ 113 
6.2.2 Mobilisation structures and alliances ................................................. 114 
6.2.3 The development of an attractive and flexible narrative .................... 115 
6.2.4 The adaptation of the repertoire ........................................................ 116 
6.2.5 The influence of the NEIS on emblematic anti-mining conflicts ........ 117 
− viii − 
 
6.3 Communities enhancing their bargaining power to negotiate the 
redistribution of mining benefits .......................................................... 120 
6.3.1 Peasant communities and companies interacting in a changing 
environment ....................................................................................... 121 
6.3.2 Triggers of ‘distributive’ conflicts ........................................................ 122 
6.3.3 The case of Pierina ............................................................................ 123 
6.3.4 Cases around Antamina .................................................................... 125 
6.3.5 Cases in Pasco .................................................................................. 129 
6.3.6 How do communities and companies engage in social conflict? ...... 133 
6.4 Canon minero transfers at local level: pouring oil on the flames ..... 135 
6.4.1 The Moqueguazo: the curious path from the hills to the bridge ........ 137 
6.4.2 The domino effect in Ancash: from pressuring the mayors to 
enlisting the whole region in the battle against national policies ....... 140 
6.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 143 
Chapter 7: Fiscal transfers and local welfare ................................................... 147 
7.1 What does the literature say about development in mining and 
oil regions? ............................................................................................. 150 
7.2 Regional level analysis .......................................................................... 154 
7.3 Municipal level analysis ........................................................................ 159 
7.3.1 The application of propensity score matching methods .................... 161 
7.3.2 The results: canon transfers had very little impact ............................ 164 
7.3.3 Checking the robustness of the results ............................................. 167 
Chapter 8: Why has the New Extractive Industries Strategy (NEIS) 
failed? ................................................................................................................... 170 
8.1. Decision-making mechanisms for public capital investment in 
sub-national governments .................................................................... 171 
8.1.1 Rules for the utilisation of different types of revenue ........................ 172 
8.1.2 The budgeting schedule .................................................................... 173 
8.1.3 Distribution of functions among levels of government ....................... 174 
8.1.4 Participatory mechanisms for decision-making at sub-national level 176 
8.1.5 Quality control of capital expenditure ................................................ 178 
8.2 Influence of canon transfers on municipal capital expenditure 
patterns ................................................................................................... 179 
8.2.1 Variables and method specification ................................................... 179 
8.2.2 Results: less spending on basic services and more on concrete ...... 182 
− ix − 
 
8.3 Lack of technical capacity does not explain everything .................... 186 
8.3.1 The technical capacity of municipal government: putting the concept 
into action .......................................................................................... 187 
8.3.2 The non-correlation between capacity and quick spending .............. 192 
8.4 Political survival, canon transfers, jobs, mafias, and popular 
participation in Conchucos Valley (Ancash) ....................................... 193 
8.4.1 The tolerance of corruption ................................................................ 195 
8.4.2 The distortion of participatory mechanisms ....................................... 200 
8.4.3 The limitations of transparency and capacity building ....................... 204 
8.5 Variations on the same theme: higher technical capacity and the 
promotion of clientelism in Moquegua ................................................ 207 
8.6 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 211 
Chapter 9: Conclusion ........................................................................................ 214 
9.1 What does this study say about the implementation of the NEIS? ... 214 
9.1.1 The main argument ........................................................................... 215 
9.1.2 Limitations of the analysis ................................................................. 217 
9.2 Lessons from the Peruvian case .......................................................... 220 
 
REFERENCES ...................................................................................................... 225 
 
APPENDIX I: Change in production and international prices for principal 
Peruvian minerals (2000–2008), taking 2000 as the base year ............................ 243 
APPENDIX II: Poverty levels and income per capita in different geographical 
regions of Peru ...................................................................................................... 244 
APPENDIX III: Summary of principal mining companies in the field research 
regions ................................................................................................................... 245 
APPENDIX IV:  Main features of municipalities included in the field study ........... 246 
APPENDIX V: Criteria for the definition of categories in the three different 
classifications of conflict ........................................................................................ 247 
APPENDIX VI:  Summary of variables used in the regression analysis of 
conflicts .................................................................................................................. 248 
APPENDIX VII:  Quantitative analysis of the impact of mining on economic 
and welfare indicators in Peruvian regions ............................................................ 250 
APPENDIX VIII:  Variables used in the regression analysis of mining-related 
variables over changes in economic and welfare indicators at regional level ....... 263 
− x − 
 
APPENDIX IX:  Summary of variables used in the analysis of differences in 
welfare indicators between canon-rich and canon-poor Peruvian localities 
(1993–2007) .......................................................................................................... 266 
APPENDIX X:  Robustness of PSM results ........................................................... 268 
APPENDIX XI: Summary of variables used in the regression analysis of 
canon minero transfers and other socio-economic variables for the allocation 
of capital investment in municipalities with more than 3,000 inhabitants .............. 271 
APPENDIX XII: Summary of the percentage of the capital investment budget 
allocated to main sectors in researched municipalities by municipality and 
year (2005–2008) .................................................................................................. 272 
APPENDIX XIII  Summary of welfare indicators in researched municipalities 




− xi − 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1 Relationship between social conflict and poor developmental 
performance in mining regions: two competing conceptual overviews ..................... 8 
Figure 1.2  Per capita fiscal transfers to sub-national governments in 
Peruvian Nuevos Soles (2007) ................................................................................ 16 
Figure 1.3 Canon minero and royaltya transfers to sub-national governments 
(1997−2008) ............................................................................................................ 21 
Figure 2.1 The six main Peruvian mining regions (the three regions selected 
for the study are shaded in orange) ......................................................................... 39 
Figure 2.2 Field research sites in Pasco ................................................................. 40 
Figure 2.3 Field research sites in Ancash ............................................................... 43 
Figure 2.4 Field research sites in Moquegua ......................................................... 45 
Figure 3.1 Net inflow of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP for 
Peru and other groups of relevant countries, 1970–2007 ....................................... 55 
Figure 3.2 Change in GDP and GDP per capita, 1950–2008 (PEN at 1994 
rates) ........................................................................................................................ 65 
Figure 3.3 Peruvian exports per capita, 1950–2008 (USD at 1950 rates) / 
minerals and fuel as a percentage of total Peruvian exports, 1950–2008 .............. 67 
Figure 5.1 Comparison of the number of new conflicts breaking out year by 
year with those reported to be in progress in the last month of each year 
(2004–2008) ............................................................................................................ 93 
Figure 5.2 Conflicts by principal actor 2004−2008 (number of conflicts and 
percentage of total) .................................................................................................. 95 
Figure 5.3 Conflict by motive 2004−2008 (number of conflicts in each 
category and percentage of total) ............................................................................ 96 
Figure 5.4 Correlation between canon minero transfers per capita and ACII at 
regional level in the period 2005–2008.................................................................. 102 
Figure 5.5 Correlation between poverty and ACII at regional level in the 
period 2005–2008 .................................................................................................. 103 
Figure 7.1 Map of Peruvian districts according to different levels of total 
canon transfers per capita during the period 2001-2007 ....................................... 163 
 
  
− xii − 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1.1 Changes in the criteria for the distribution of the canon .......................... 20 
Table 2.1 Statistics for Pasco, Ancash, and Moquegua ......................................... 38 
Table 3.1 Evolution of Gini coefficient, 1986–2003 ................................................. 59 
Table 3.2 Percentage of population below the poverty line in different 
geographical regions of Peru, 2008 ......................................................................... 60 
Table 3.3 Average monthly per capita income in different geographical areas 
of Peru, 2008 ........................................................................................................... 60 
Table 3.4 Relative importance of the main metropolitan area in relation to the 
rest of the country, and the poverty gap with respect to different geographical 
areas in various Latin American Countries .............................................................. 62 
Table 3.5 Level of trust in political institutions: a comparison between Peru 
and Latin America (LA) as a whole .......................................................................... 63 
Table 5.1 Number, intensity and duration of social conflicts in Peru, by year of 
outbreak and connections with mining .................................................................... 94 
Table 5.2  Regression of poverty levels and mining-related variables on the 
incidence of conflict by region (2005–2008) .......................................................... 101 
Table 5.3 Complementary regression models of canon minero transfers, 
poverty levels and other variables on the incidence of conflict by region 
(2005–2008) .......................................................................................................... 105 
Table 6.1 Typology of social conflicts in Peruvian mining regions ........................ 110 
Table 6.2  Per capita canon minero transfers (US dollars) in the three Andean 
municipalities of Mariscal Nieto-Moquegua (2004–2008) ..................................... 138 
Table 6.3  Percentage of the 2007 capital expenditure budget actually spent 
and percentage of the vote secured by the winning candidate in the 2006 
municipal elections, in the main municipalities around Antamina ......................... 141 
Table 7.1 Distribution of actual public capital expenditure according to 
different levels of government (2001-2008) ........................................................... 148 
Table 7.2  Summary of panel regressions of mining-related variables on the 
annual change in economic and welfare indicators in Peruvian regions ............... 158 
Table 7.3 Estimate of the average effect of high canon transfers to Peruvian 
municipalities (2001-2007) on the change in the percentage of people 
between 15 and 24 year old with secondary education over the period 1993-
2007 ....................................................................................................................... 165 
− xiii − 
 
Table 7.4 Estimate of the average effect of high canon transfers to Peruvian 
municipalities (2001-2007) on the change in the percentage of households 
with drinking water supply at home over the period 1993-2007 ............................ 166 
Table 7.5 Estimate of the average effect of high canon transfers to Peruvian 
municipalities (2001-2007) on the change in the percentage of households 
with sanitation facilities at home over the period 1993-2007 ................................. 166 
Table 7.6 Estimate of the average effect of high canon transfers to Peruvian 
municipalities (2001-2007) on the change in the percentage of households 
with electricity supply at home over the period 1993-2007 ................................... 167 
Table 8.1 Percentage of actual capital expenditure by sector and year in 
Peruvian municipalities with between 3,000 and 200,000 inhabitants .................. 181 
Table 8.2 Regression of canon minero transfers and other socio-economic 
variables on the allocation of capital investment in municipalities with more 
than 3,000 inhabitants, by sector according to annual budget execution 
(2005–2008) .......................................................................................................... 184 
Table 8.3 Municipal capacity index (MCI) for 18 municipalities and 
comparative proportional execution of the capital investment budget (2007–






− xiv − 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS  
 
 
ACII Annual Conflict Incidence Index 
AMF Antamina Mining Fund 
APRA American Popular Revolutionary Alliance 
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency 
CONACAMI National Confederation of Communities Affected by Mining − 
Confederación Nacional de Comunidades Afectadas por la Minería. 
CPCC Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation 
CSR Corporate Social Responsability 
DFID United Kingdom Department for International Development 
ECOSERM Communal Multiple Services Company − Empresa Comunal de 
Servicios Multiples de la Comunidad de Rancas 
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
FEDIPM Front for the Defence of the Interests of the People of Moquegua − 
Frente de Defensa de los Intereses de Moquegua 
GMI Global Mining Initiative 
HDR Human Development Report 
ICMM International Council on Mining and Metals 
IDS Institute of Development Studies 
IFC International Financial Corporation 
IFI International Financial Institutions 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
MCI Municipal Capacity Index 
MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance 
MEM Ministry of Energy and Mining 
MIB Modified Institutional Budget 
− xv − 
 
MMP Medium-term Municipal Plan 
MMSD Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development 
MP Member of Parliament 
MPSP Mining Programme of Solidarity with the People (MPSP) − Programa 
Minero de Solidaridad con el Pueblo 
NEIS New Extractive Industry Strategy 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NICS National Institute of Computing and Statistics − Instituto Nacional de 
Informática y Estadística (INEI) 
NOEP National Institute of Computing and Statistics − National Office of 
Electoral Processes (ONPE) 
NPIS National Public Investment System 
NSMOE National Society for Mining, Oil, and Energy − Sociedad Nacional de 
Minería, Petróleo y Energia (SNMPE) 
OIB Opening Institutional Budget 
OIMI Organisation for the Improvement of Municipal Investment − 
Mejorando la Inversión Municipal (MIM) 
OLS Ordinary Least Squared 
PEN Peruvian New Sol 
PSM Propensity Score Matching 
RE Random Effects 
REI Resource Endowment Initiative 
SINAMOS National System of Social Mobilisation 
SPCC Southern Peru Copper Corporation 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USD United States Dollar 
VAT Value Added Tax 
 
− 1 − 
 
Chapter 1 
The New Extractive Industry Strategy (NEIS): the Peruvian testing ground 
 
1.1 The Peruvian testing ground   
On the 5th of June 2009, as I was reading the Peruvian newspapers on the internet, 
I got quite a jolt. A serious clash in the northern town of Bagua between riot police 
and a crowd of Awajun and Wampis indigenous people dominated the front-page 
headlines. The pictures showed a fierce battle, and the name of the spot, the 
Devil’s Curve, did not augur well. I immediately thought of my Awajun friends, 
knowing that some of them were involved in the protest. A frantic online search for 
further details confirmed my fears; there had been a bloodbath with the police firing 
on protesters. Santiago Manuin, the respected Awajun leader and a very close 
friend of mine, was among the victims. After several phone calls I managed to 
piece together what had happened: a bullet had hit Santiago in the abdomen while 
he was attempting to negotiate the withdrawal of the protesters with the police. His 
condition was critical but the doctors hoped to save him.   
The protest in Bagua challenged a new law1 that made it easier for private 
investors to acquire and lease communal land in the Amazon. The new law aimed 
to facilitate new investment in mining and oil exploration. Indigenous groups in the 
Peruvian Amazon had opposed this law for more than a year, convinced that it 
eroded their capability to manage their territories according to their needs. The 
Awajun and Wampis people vigorously supported the protest because the oil and 
mining companies had intruded into their homeland and the new law made this 
even easier (ODECOFROC, 2009).  
In September 2009, I flew to Peru and went to meet Santiago, who was still in 
hospital in the coastal town of Chiclayo, a long way from his home. After more than 
three months, he was still trying to make sense of what had happened in Bagua, 
and the implications for the future of the Awajun people. Santiago knew that I had 
spent many months researching into issues of social conflict and development in 
different mining regions of Peru. He was interested to learn what was happening in 
other parts of the country. I told him that although the level of casualties was 
                                                            
1 Legislative decree Nº 1015 
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unusually high in Bagua, conflict was not unusual. The rapid increase in mineral 
prices (2004–2008) had been accompanied by an upsurge in the incidence of 
social conflict in mining regions (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2009). However, as I 
explained to Santiago, not all disputes over mining were the same. In fact, the 
social conflicts I had studied were different from the one in which he had been 
engaged. 
To illustrate my point, I told Santiago the stories of Antonio and Isabel, who I had 
met during my research.2 Antonio was a veteran social leader in one of the 
communities close to the Antamina mine in the highlands of Ancash. He had 
recently been involved in a dispute between his community and the Antamina 
Company about the planned expansion of the mining operation. Back in the 1990s, 
Antonio had been strongly opposed to large-scale mining in his region, but his 
position had since softened. His current struggle no longer focused on the outright 
rejection of mining, but on seeking fairer compensation for selling community land 
to the mining company.  
Isabel was a young woman from a landless family living in an Andean district in 
Moquegua. She had been among the protesters who in July 2008 blockaded the 
Montalvo Bridge in Moquegua and took more than 70 policemen hostage in an 
attempt to force the national government and Parliament to change the rules 
guiding the distribution of mining revenue between Moquegua and the neighbouring 
region of Tacna (El Comercio, 2008d). When she told me her story two months 
later, she said that she still felt frightened at the thought of the risks they had taken. 
However, she did not seem to regret what she had done. On the contrary, 
participating in the demonstration had helped her get a job in her municipality 
employed in public works financed by mining revenue transferred from central 
government to her municipality. 
Santiago, Isabel and Antonio expressed different views on to the benefits and costs 
that the expansion in mining could bring to their lives, and all three had become 
involved in mining-related social conflicts. During the period 2002−2008, mining 
appears to have been mainly responsible for the exceptional rates of economic 
growth and the upsurge in social conflict that threatens Peru’s political stability (The 
Economist, 2008). The Peruvian economy grew at an annual average rate of 7 per 
                                                            
2 I have changed names and some contextual references to preserve anonymity.  
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cent (INEI, 2009d) and some international pro-market analysts suggested Peru was 
likely to become one of the new Latin-American ‘dragons’ (The Economist, 2009). 
The expansion of the extractive sector was the reason (Macroconsult, 2008).3 By 
2007, mining and oil constituted 70 per cent of Peru’s exports and almost 30 per 
cent of the internal tax revenue (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2009a). The 
economic upturn appeared to have positive welfare effects with the overall poverty 
level declining from an estimated 54 per cent of the population in 2001 to 36 per 
cent in 2008 (INEI, 2009a).  
Yet despite these positive aspects of mining expansion, social conflicts, often 
violent ones, multiplied. According to the Ombudsman’s office4, from February 
2004 to December 2008 the number of conflicts in the country increased from 47 to 
197 (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2009). The majority were either directly related to 
mining or took place in mining regions (Apoyo, 2009b; Panfichi, 2009). 
The assertion that there is a close connection between mining and social conflict is 
not surprising, as experiences of large scale mining in other poor countries has 
shown. This relationship has been widely studied in Peru and elsewhere (see 
Chapter 4). At first glance, therefore there would seem to be nothing unusual or 
puzzling about Peru’s recent experience.  
Yet it is my contention that there is a puzzle. This is because conflicts multiplied 
during a period when the Peruvian authorities implemented a set of policies 
deliberately designed to reduce social unrest related to mining. These policies were 
a response to social mobilisation in the early 2000’s that raised questions about the 
political feasibility of further expansion of the mining sector. The government and 
                                                            
3 From 2001 to 2008 the importance of mining to the national economy grew steadily. In 2001-
2004, there was an important increase in the production of copper and gold, the two main 
minerals in the Peruvian mining sector (see appendix I). In 2005-2008, although the production 
of most minerals tended to remain stable, the boom in international prices multiplied the 
importance of mining in terms of exports and tax revenue. A report commissioned by the 
National Society for Mining, Oil, and Energy (NSMOE) estimated that, taking 2006 as the 
baseline, a decrease in mining activity or mineral prices would have had a critical negative 
impact on economic growth and the balance of public finances (Macroconsult, 2008).  
Despite this rising dependency of the economy on mining production, the government kept 
control of the fiscal balance, the balance of international payments and inflation; they reduced 
the external debt, increased the foreign currency reserves and maintained a reasonable foreign 
currency exchange rate (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2009a).  
4 The Ombudsman’s office − called Defensoría del Pueblo in Spanish − is an state institution 
created to protect citizens’ fundamental and constitutional rights, and to oversee the state 
government, its administration, and the public services provided to the population. In contrast to 
most state institutions, the Ombudsman’s office is widely trusted by the public.  
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the mining companies faced massive local opposition to the expansion of the 
Yanacocha mine in Cajamarca, and to the construction of new mines in 
Tambogrande (Piura) and Quellaveco (Moquegua).  
In response, the government and mining companies addressed this opposition by 
formulating a set of policies designed to convince local people that mining could 
benefit them, and to project a more benevolent image of the mining companies. 
Two policy innovations are especially important. The devolution of a substantial 
volume of mining revenue from central government to sub-national governments in 
mining areas means sub-national governments in the mining areas now have 
incomes many times higher than those of sub-national governments elsewhere in 
the country. The second policy innovation is the promotion of greater involvement 
by mining companies in developmental activities at local level. Companies have 
increased their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)5 budgets and apparatuses in 
order to spend these funds locally in the areas of the country where they operate.  
These policies are not unique to Peru. They are part of the attempt of the 
International Financial Institutions (IFI) and transnational mining companies to 
project a more responsible and developmental image of the mining industry 
worldwide. Accordingly, I have labelled these policies the ‘New Extractive Industries 
Strategy’ (NEIS).  
The result of the implementation of this strategy in Peru is especially important for 
the international mining companies because the mining industry has planned 
further massive investments in the country. At the end of 2009, Peru had a pipeline 
of mining projects valued at over USD 31 billion, representing 6 per cent of the total 
mining investment forecast worldwide.6 Peru is thus fifth in the global ranking of 
mining investment, below only the mining giants of Canada, Australia, Brazil and 
Russia. This means that Peru is the highest among the so-called ‘developing 
countries’, and also the smallest and most dependent economy among the top ten 
nations on the list (Raw Material Group, 2010).  
                                                            
5 In this thesis I use the term CSR in a quite restricted sense to refer to corporate philanthropy -  
mining companies donate some of their profits or resources to promote local development. 
Donations may come from the company directly or through a separate, company-sponsored 
foundation or public charity. 
6 The Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mining is even more optimistic, reporting a project 
pipeline valued in excess of USD 35 billion at the beginning of 2010 (Ministerio de Energía y 
Minas, 2010a). 
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Second, the result of the new policies is also important because Peru has become 
a testing ground for their implementation. The steadily growing demand for 
commodities by emerging economies and the resultant high price of minerals has 
boosted the investments made by mining companies worldwide (UNCTAD, 2007). 
As in Peru, the expansion of mining activities has been frequently met by 
opposition from local communities who remain unconvinced that mining will benefit 
them (Ballard & Banks, 2003; Bebbington, Hinojosa, Humphreys-Bebbington, 
Burneo, & Warnaars, 2008; Evans, Goodman, & Lansbury, 2002; Filer & Macintyre, 
2006; Hilson, 2002; IIED, 2002; MacIntyre & Foale, 2002; Mate, 2002; Moody, 
2007). A similar set of NEIS-like policies  has been promoted in different countries 
(ICMM, 2006c:57-58). Therefore, the outcome of NEIS in Peru constitutes a 
potential template for a new strategy that the mining industry could adopt for the 
intensification of mining activities in other developing countries.  
When I met my friend Santiago after the Bagua clash, I had already spent two 
years researching the impact of the implementation of the NEIS in Peruvian mining 
regions. I set out to answer two main questions: (i) why did social conflict escalate 
so dramatically in the Peruvian mining regions after the implementation of the 
NEIS? (ii) is there evidence to suggest that the implementation of NEIS has 
improved the economic and social wellbeing of people in mining areas?  
The short answers to these questions are as follow: 
(i) The new rules for the distribution of the profits from the mining operations 
provide incentives for local actors to resort to strategies of conflict in order to 
maximise their share in these profits.  
(ii) The NEIS has not had any significant effect on measurable changes in 
economic and welfare indicators in the sub-national jurisdictions whose 
governments receive high volumes of mining revenue transfers.  
The methodology I chose to answer these questions was the following. Firstly, I 
compiled two comprehensive datasets relating to welfare, economy, budget, politics 
and mining at regional and municipal levels. I used these datasets to compare 
different regions and municipalities. Secondly, I undertook detailed field research in 
some of the most remote mining areas of the country to get to know the local 
dynamics generated by the implementation of the NEIS. Thirdly, I interviewed, 
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company representatives and government officials in an attempt to understand the 
complexities of the situation. 
In this thesis I argue that the implementation of the NEIS has not only failed to 
reduce social conflict but has increased it. I first show the association between such 
conflict and the mining revenue received by the sub-national governments of the 
region (Chapter 5). Second, I explain the local political processes behind this 
association (Chapter 6). My findings significantly modify the conventional accounts 
of conflicts and mining that focus predominantly on the adverse impacts of mining 
on livelihoods and the environment. Although I do not deny the harmful effects that 
mining can have on the environment and local people’s livelihoods, I find that 
mobilisation around these issues was not responsible for the dramatic increase in 
conflict in the period 2005 to 2008. Instead, conflict became increasingly 
concentrated in the regions with the most profitable mines, which had therefore 
received the highest per capita transfers of mining revenue from the central 
government. I argue that two different mechanism account for this ‘income’ effect. 
First, as part of the NEIS, the Peruvian government allowed the mining companies 
to retain the largest proportion of the windfall profits generated by the dramatic 
increase in mineral prices and depicted them as key actors with a moral duty to 
promote local development. This reinforced the popular perception of both state 
capture by mining companies and the companies’ obligation to take better care of 
the local population. In the absence of other effective institutional mechanisms, 
local populations, especially the peasant communities closest to the mines, used 
social conflict to negotiate for greater monetary compensation and employment 
opportunities with the companies. The second mechanism I discovered is even 
more unexpected: the large volume of mining revenues accruing to the sub-national 
governments generated new disputes over access to or use of these financial 
transfers. Local populations and sub-national governments engaged in protracted 
conflicts to maximise any advantage they could gain from these transfers. 
The strategy did not deliver its developmental promises. Despite the significant 
amount of revenue allocated to the regional and municipal governments in mining 
areas and the increase in the money spent by mining companies in social projects, 
my analysis reveals that over the period 2002-2008, economic and welfare 
indicators did not improve more in those areas than in the rest of the country. 
Official accounts explain this as a lack of managerial capacity in the sub-national 
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governments. However, my investigation into the processes involved in the 
allocation of resources in mining municipalities reveals a more complex story in 
which political incentives for short-term spending and rent seeking rather than ‘lack 
of capacity’ played a central role.  
Sub-national governments receiving high levels of mining revenue transfers had to 
operate in a political context not conducive to the efficient spending of large capital 
investment budgets. Three factors were especially problematic. First, sub-national 
governments needed to comply with a welter of centrally imposed regulations on 
capital spending that were originally designed not to facilitate spending, but to deal 
with scarcity. Second, the population in rural areas of the country do not trust 
political institutions, whether national or local. They have historical reasons to be 
sceptical about the stability of public policies and the management of financial 
resources, thus, they demanded quick spending of the mining revenue transfers 
because they feared that delay would lead to a loss of resources due to the 
corruption of sub-national authorities or confiscation by the central government. 
Moreover, the introduction of participatory governance mechanisms in Peru’s 
decentralisation policy increased popular power to enforce quick spending while 
failing to tackle corruption. Third, the escalation of conflicts in mining regions 
caused the national government and mining companies to put pressure on local 
authorities to speed up the implementation of the capital investment budgets. They 
wanted to reduce the incidence of disturbance by demonstrating that mining could 
bring real benefits to the population. The combination of these three political 
circumstances trapped regional and municipal authorities and local populations in a 
myopic political game that prioritised the short-term redistributive advantage of 
creating jobs in the public sector over any long-term benefits from better planned 
expenditure.   
The government and mining companies have drawn their own conclusions as to the 
connection between increased social conflict and the use of financial resources 
transferred to sub-national governments. They argue that inefficient spending by 
sub-national governments was a major cause of conflict in mining areas. While I 
agree that it is part of the explanation, it is far too simplistic and takes no account of 
the context in which sub-national governments have to operate. I argue that the 
opposite is also the case: the threat of violence in combination with other features 
of the Peruvian polity, exacerbated the inefficient use of mining revenue by sub-
national governments. In Figure 1.1, I summarise these two competing narratives 
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on the relationship between conflict and the poor developmental performance of 
sub-national governments in mining regions. 
Figure 1.1 Relationship between social conflict and poor developmental 
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Some key terms 
In some chapters my analysis becomes technical. This is mainly where I deal with 
large quantitative data sets and undertake econometric analysis. I do my best to 
explain the technical issues clearly and have chosen to relegate the more complex 
tables and explanations to annexes and footnotes. In this thesis I use frequently 
three terms: conflict, rent and sub-national government. Although they are not 
especially technical terms, I use them with particular meanings. 
In ordinary language the meaning of ‘conflict’ is very wide. The term refers to highly 
dissimilar realities, from wars with thousands of casualties to personal 
psychological processes. I am in general talking of a middle ground: social conflicts 
that involve confrontation and dispute, but may or may not involve violence. I have 
started with an official data base on social conflict compiled by the Peruvian 
Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2009), and have thus accepted the official 
definition of what constitutes a social conflict. Since 2004 the Ombudsman has 
reported  monthly on incidents in which a group of protesters resorted to at least 
one of the following practices: (i) threats to the integrity of life or health; (ii) damage 
to private or public property; (iii) obstruction to freedom of movement; (iv) 
impediment of the exercise of public authority; and (v) obstruction of public service 
delivery (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2009). Violent demonstrations, roadblocks and 
assaults on premises, buildings and land are the most frequently reported events. 
These activities tend to involve peasant and indigenous communities, and the 
inhabitants of small urban settlements in remote areas of the country (Chapter 5). 
Despite the diverse nature of their demands, they always ask for some official level 
of involvement in seeking a solution. These type of conflicts conform to the 
definition of contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001:5) as ‘…episodic, 
public collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (i) at 
least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and 
(ii) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.’ 
Rent or ‘economic rent’ is a second concept central to my argument. I use it in its 
economic meaning as the difference between (i) the price obtained from using a 
factor of production in the market and, (ii) the price needed to persuade the 
entrepreneur to use that factor rather than simply hoard it. For example, a taxi 
driver in a remote small town in the mountains, far from cities and good roads 
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normally charges one dollar per km for out-of-town trips. However, there is a major 
natural disaster not far away and vast numbers of aid workers, journalists etc all 
want to hire the taxi at almost any price. The taxi driver can now charge 10 dollars 
per kilometre although he would be willing in principle to drive for one dollar per km, 
but following this artificially inflated market charges 10 dollars, hence his economic 
rent is 9 dollars per km. 
A similar logic applies to the income of mining companies and the effect of the 
increase in international mineral prices. An example is Antamina, a large mine that I 
analyse at various points in this thesis. In 1998, a feasibility study estimated that at 
international copper prices of 0.90 USD/lb, Antamina would yield a rate of return of 
14 per cent for the capital invested in the construction of the mine.7 Antamina’s 
parent companies and the banks financing the operation considered that it was a 
good enough return to take the risk. However, during the period 2006-2008, the 
average international price of copper was 3.2 USD/lb (Ministerio de Energía y 
Minas, 2010c). As a result, more than 70 per cent of Antamina’s income from the 
sale of copper during that period was economic rent. In addition to Antamina, the 
dramatic increase in international mineral prices in the period 2004-2008 multiplied 
the size of mining rents in general.8  
The distribution of economic rents is highly political. Rents are an economic surplus 
that is not necessary for the profitable survival of enterprises. Thus, they often 
attract the interest of people who can use political power to extract that rent. Take 
the taxi example above. Seeing how much money the taxi drivers are making, a 
local criminal gang might move in and establish a protection racket, allowing only 
taxis that pay protection money to continue to operate. If they immediately establish 
                                                            
7 Presentation of Mr. Augusto Baertl to the parliamentary commission on mining and energy (29 
September 1998).  
8 Four types of factor determine the size of rents in the mining sector. First, there are the 
geological and geographical conditions that influence the cost of extraction: the size, the 
metallurgical composition, and the location of the deposit are all important features. Second, the 
initial capital investment and the technology used in the construction of the mine also affect the 
cost of production − usually, the larger the scale the lower the production cost. This means big 
international mining companies with large financial capacity tend to construct and operate more 
cost-effective mines. Public policy is the third factor influencing the size of the surplus. 
Government influences both the production costs and the companies’ perception of what a 
reasonable level of profit is. The regulation of prices of key inputs, such as energy, and the 
provision of transport infrastructure are among the factors influencing production costs. 
Regarding the calculation of a reasonable profit, investors reward political and regulatory 
stability by demanding a low risk premium which, consequently, increases the surplus (Eggert, 
2001:47). Finally, the international price of minerals determines company profits.  
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their undisputed authority, this gang might ‘persuade’ the taxi drivers to hand over 
most of their 9 dollars per kilometre rent. Much as they might resent it, the taxi 
drivers would still be running an economically viable business. In such cases, the 
distribution of rents is determined not by the operation of competitive markets, but 
by power and force. Large rents motivate people to engage in political action to 
obtain a share. To extend the example further, the taxi drivers’ union, the local 
police force and local political leaders may all compete with the criminal gang to get 
a share of the taxi hire rents. In the case of mining activity, mining companies, 
unionised miners, different levels of government and local communities all seek to 
capture a larger share of the rent (Eggert, 2001:47). During recent years, access to 
and control over mining rents has become a big political game not only in 
‘developing countries’. In June 2010 the Australian government introduced a 
Resource Super-Profits Tax to collect 40 per cent of mining profits above a ‘normal’ 
rate of return. BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, Xstrata, and other big mining companies 
furiously opposed the new policy and played an important role in forcing the 
resignation of the Prime Minister (The Economist, 2010a, 2010b). 
In Peru, the national government has allowed mining companies to retain the 
largest proportion of these rents through fiscal policies based on flat-rate taxes. The 
government collect 30 per cent of the corporate profit whatever this amount is. 
However, municipalities and regional governments close to the mines have also 
benefited substantially through the introduction of revenue-sharing mechanisms. 
The third term is sub-national government. Since 2002, there have been three 
levels of democratically elected territorial government in Peru: (i) the national 
government; (ii) 25 regional governments that rule over the regions – previously 
called departments; and, (iii) 1,834 municipal governments. I use ‘sub-national 
government’ to refer jointly to municipal and regional governments. Accordingly, I 
will use ‘regions’ and ‘municipalities’ to refer to the territories over which these 
governments have jurisdiction.9  
                                                            
9 According to the law, the municipal tier is disaggregated into two different levels: provinces 
and districts. There are 195 provinces that comprise 1,834 districts. In theory, the provincial 
governments should coordinate the work of the district governments within their jurisdiction, but 
this rarely happens because each municipal government receives most of their financial 
resources directly from the national government. From a functional perspective, provincial 
governments have become the government of the district where the capital of the province is 
placed. Thus, in this thesis I use the term municipal government to refer to the 1,834 district 
municipalities. 
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I now set out the conceptual foundation of the thesis. After analysing the features of 
the NEIS and its implementation in Peru, I review the main literature, especially on 
the resource curse, which constitutes an important background to my analysis.  
1.2  The NEIS: making a virtue out of necessity?   
I use NEIS to refer to a collection of policies that determine the mandatory 
distribution of mining, gas and oil revenues between national and sub-national 
governments and the greater involvement of firms in local development. These 
policies aimed to counteract the popular hostility towards extractive industries 
worldwide. However, I am not suggesting that a group of institutions and 
corporations intentionally came together at a single point in time to propose a 
precise policy framework. Rather, the NEIS reflects the confluence of a number of 
political pressures, interests, opportunities and ideas that diverse actors use to 
promote similar types of policy in different countries. In the following subsections, I 
analyse how mining companies, governments and international financial institutions 
have managed these factors and generated the NEIS in order to improve the 
prospects for a long-term viable mining industry. 
1.2.1 Conflicts, ‘new mining’ and ‘going local’ 
There is nothing new about the link between mining and conflict. However, the 
causes of disputes around mining and their social and political relevance have 
changed over time. For centuries, labour was the main productive factor. 
Exploitative working conditions were the rule of the day and demarcated the 
predominant types of conflict: labour versus capital.  
In the second half of the 20th century, the convergence of two mutually reinforcing 
factors imposed a change in the productive model of the mining industry and 
therefore the prevalent type of dispute. First, the emergence of trade unions with 
the subsequent expansion of workers’ consciousness of their rights and second, 
the formulation of national and international regulations for labour standards 
increased company overheads. The combination of these two factors along with the 
long-term decline in metal prices made traditional mining unprofitable (Sullivan, 
Sznopek, & Wagner, 2001). A revolutionary change in technology and scale was 
the way out of this troubled situation. Intensive mechanisation gave birth to a 
modern mining industry able to operate with a much smaller workforce to obtain 
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much larger quantities of minerals. This transformation in turn affected the nature of 
the conflicts surrounding mining. Larger open pit mines required more land and 
water. They generated mountains of potentially lethal tailings that polluted streams 
and rivers. Thus, modern mining employed fewer local workers but, in contrast, its 
activities affected the lives far more ordinary people than before. The result was 
that conflicts between large and powerful companies and local communities came 
to the fore in this new era.  
This is demonstrated by the case of the Bougainville rebellion, which led to the 
forced closure of the Panguna mine in Papua New Guinea – the then largest 
copper mine in the world – (Filer, 1990), and the evidence of a mining induced 
environmental disaster at the Ok Tedi mine in the same island group. These two 
episodes shook the foundations of the mining industry (Filer & Macintyre, 2006). 
Under pressure from civil society activists in their home countries, mining 
companies grew increasingly concerned about the impact of their operations on 
people living in the extraction areas and the potential for a backlash unless they 
could demonstrate more convincingly that these people also benefited (Ballard & 
Banks, 2003). The world’s largest mining companies thus felt that they were losing 
the battle for legitimacy and facing the risk of stricter, externally imposed 
regulations that could harm their long term interests (Szablowski, 2007:77).  
In the mid-1990s, the industry started to tackle the problem through the promotion 
of self-regulation. It adopted the discourse of benevolent ‘new mining’ as opposed 
to the irresponsible ‘old mining’. The ‘new mining’ industry would be considerate 
towards local people, environmentally responsible and promote local development 
as one of its main objectives. This shift was powerful, as mining switched from 
being the villain to being the hero: the new mining was going to solve the evils that 
the old mining had caused.  
Both the mining industry and the World Bank undertook internal reviews and 
commissioned research (McMahon & Remy, 2001). In 1999, nine of the largest 
mining companies launched the Global Mining Initiative (GMI); and the following 
year, they inaugurated the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) 
project, which heralded the way forward for the sector. The results were crucial in 
the light of the past social and environmental behaviour of the mining companies 
(IIED, 2002) and led to an agenda for the complete overhaul of the sector. At the 
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same time, the World Bank was facing mounting criticism of its financial support for 
extraction activities. The bank also undertook a complete revision of its policies for 
the industry and  promoted the scrupulous observance of human rights, sustainable 
development and poverty reduction (Weber-Fahr, 2002; World Bank, 2003).  
The result is that ‘promoting local development’ has become the leitmotif of the 
mining industry worldwide (IIED, 2002:198-229; 2003). Mining companies and 
international institutions have pursued a double strategy. First, they have proposed 
revenue-sharing mechanisms that privilege the producing localities (IIED, 
2002:209-212; UNCTAD, 2007:89-90). In recent years, the governments of Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, 
Madagascar, Nigeria, the Philippines, Russia and South Africa have all reallocated 
oil and mining revenue to sub-national levels of government (E. Ahmad & Mottu, 
2003; Brosio, 2003; Morgandi, 2008). Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is the 
second component of this corporate strategy. Mining companies have 
enthusiastically embraced the cause of CSR to show that they are now ready to 
operate for the good of local populations, overcoming their disgraceful past records 
(ICMM, 2006d; IFC, 2000; IIED, 2003; Yakovleva, 2005). Mining companies 
generally enjoy tax exemptions in exchange for the expansion of their CSR 
activities.  
1.2.2 The  legitimising logic: radical polycentrism 
The implementation of the NEIS requires the collaboration of governments in order 
to reform public policies. However, companies do not normally need to negotiate 
these policies directly with governments as part of a sector-specific agenda. The 
NEIS fits perfectly within the fashionable agenda of good governance and with the 
need of governments to respond to the worldwide emergence of a new political 
ethos demanding greater local control over natural resources (Larson, 2004; Ribot, 
2004). 
Since the early 1990s until very recently, a set of political ideas, labelled ‘radical 
polycentrism’ by Houtzager (2003:4-7), have strongly influenced opinions about 
how polities should be structured. The main feature of this ideological standpoint is 
a deep suspicion of large-scale, authoritative political institutions, especially the 
centralised state. The response has been consistent attempts to disperse power 
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towards the sub-national levels of government, the public, and to non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) of all kinds, whether commercial or not-for-profit. This set of 
ideas appeals both to ideological supporters of market competition and private 
enterprise (neo-liberals) who wish to minimise the role of the state, and to 
enthusiasts of decentralisation, empowerment of the people, and radical 
participatory democratisation who aspire to the attainment of a space for greater 
social engagement (Houtzager, 2003:7).  
Moreover, as I will reveal later in this chapter, in most interpretations of the politics 
behind the resource curse, the core problem is that resource revenues empower 
the central state apparatus. Therefore, it seems to follow that a combination of 
devolution of decision-making to the sub-national governments and the populations 
of the areas from which natural resource revenues originate, together with the 
involvement of companies and civil society organisations in decision-making should 
counter the adverse effects of the centralised appropriation of resource rents. The 
latter includes rent-taking at central level, lack of downward accountability, secrecy 
over the use of public finances, and the limited capability of the central bureaucratic 
apparatus to reach remote areas of developing countries (IIED, 2002).  
Thus, the mining companies have gained the support of a collection of disparate 
and, at times, unexpected allies in fostering the policies that constitute the NEIS. 
Local authorities of different types; local populations around mines and oil wells; 
civil society organisations; technocrats in the official apparatus; regional 
movements seeking greater autonomy from the centre; and international institutions 
advising on improved governance have all supported the same vague policies, 
regardless of the fact that they might have different standpoints and motives.10 The 
next section examines how the NEIS has been implemented in Peru. 
1.3 The Peruvian version of the NEIS   
Since 2002, 50 per cent of the profit taxes paid by mining companies to the national 
government have been transferred to sub-national governments, mainly to those of 
the regions and municipalities where the mines are located. These 
                                                            
10 In Latin America, these policies have been challenged by the ‘heterodox’ left-wing 
governments of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, which have tended to recentralise the 
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The changes in the rules for the distribution of these canon minero transfers are 
one of the two institutional innovations of the Peruvian version of the NEIS. The 
second, known as the Mining Programme of Solidarity with the People (MPSP), 
fosters greater involvement of the mining companies in the promotion of local 
development in exchange for the national government’s undertaking not to 
introduce a windfall tax. These two innovations were used to respond to existing 
local pressure and to convince the population of the benefits of mining.13  
1.3.1 The canon minero 
The introduction of the canon to compensate for the extraction of natural resources 
can be traced back to 1976. The discovery of important oil fields in the Amazonian 
region of Loreto prompted social mobilisation demanding that a portion of the oil 
revenue be directly transferred to regional institutions. The central government 
decided to give 10 per cent of the value of the regional oil production to Loreto, 
labelling this revenue transfer ‘canon oil’. In 1992, in line with the new General 
Mining Law designed to attract foreign investment in the sector,14 the government 
introduced the concept of the canon minero, allocating 20 per cent of the profit tax 
paid by mining companies to the territory in which the profits were generated.  
In 2001, the legislature approved the canon law − Law Nº 27506 − that extended 
these policies beyond oil and mining to other extraction industries and increased 
the canon minero from 20 per cent to 50 per cent of the taxes paid by the 
companies.15 Two factors influenced this reform. On the one hand, this policy fitted 
perfectly into the decentralisation process prompted by the fall of the Fujimori 
regime and the subsequent reinstallation of democracy in 2001. On the other hand, 
                                                            
13 The creation of trusts (fideicomisos) from the proceeds of the sale of state-owned mineral 
deposits to private firms is a third mechanism following the same logic. The most important 
trusts are in Las Bambas (Huancavelica − USD 59 millions − Xstrata), Michiquillay (Cajamarca – 
USD 201 millions − Anglo American), and La Granja (Cajamarca – USD 11 millions − Rio Tinto).  
The state and the mining companies agreed to use 50 per cent of the money paid to the state 
by the companies to create trusts. The companies assume an important role in the 
management of the trusts that should spend their funds on the promotion of local development. 
The idea is to gain popular support during the initial phases of the presence of the companies. 
In this thesis I do not analyse the influence of these trusts because the majority of them had 
little activity during the period of my study.  
14 The new law simplified the fiscal regime for mining companies, eliminated differences 
between national and foreign capitals, conferred the government with the power to sign fiscal 
stability agreements with the companies, and removed restrictive foreign exchange rate 
policies. 
15 In practice the canon was restricted to 50 per cent of the corporation tax. 
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the recent conflicts at Tambogrande (Piura), Cerro Quilish (Cajamarca) and 
Quellaveco (Moquegua), in which local populations successfully opposed new 
mining operations, jeopardised the hitherto good prospects for the revitalisation of 
the mining sector. 
The new law had a basic design flaw because the formula for the distribution of 
revenues did not give enough weight to proximity to the mine. Thus, the main towns 
of the mining regions ended up receiving more resources than the rural 
municipalities closest to the mines (Zavalla, 2004). Additionally, the government 
was unhappy with the ambiguity of the law regarding the calculation of the total 
amount of revenue to be distributed. Article nº 9 of the law seemed to imply that tax 
exemptions granted to mining companies should not be deducted from canon 
transfers. Thus, the central government worried that a strict interpretation of the law 
opened the door to demands from regional and municipal governments for 
additional transfers. Immediately following the introduction of the new law, the 
government and parliamentarians in the mining regions started to draft 
amendments. From November 2001 to the first quarter of 2003, they submitted 
more than 20 reform proposals that according to their objectives can be grouped 
into three different categories.16  
First, the government proposals intended to make it clear that only the mining 
companies’ actual payments under their official contract to the state were to be 
taken into account in the calculation of the canon. Second, taking an opposing 
stance, a sector of the legislature representing the mining regions asked for all the 
resources that the state would have received if Fujimori’s government had not 
signed legal stability contracts with the mining companies locking in the favourable 
tax status granted to them during his administration to be included in the canon.17 
These proposals called into question the legitimacy of the mining agreements 
signed during the Fujimori regime and demanded their repeal. Finally, 
representatives of the mining regions demanded a modification to the rules for the 
                                                            
16 A summary of the proposals can be found in the parliamentarian report that the Energy and 
Mining Commission submitted to the Plenary of the Parliament for a debate on the amendments 
(Congreso de la República - Perú, 2003b).  
17 MPs from Cajamarca, Ancash, Pasco, Cusco, Moquegua, Huancavelica, La Libertad and 
Piura were especially active in their submission of proposals and in voicing their opinions during 
parliamentary debate.  
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distribution of the canon in order to benefit the municipalities closest to the mines, 
thus overcoming the flaw in the previous law.  
The proposals were put before Parliament in August 2003. The debate did not 
follow ideological lines but loyalty to regional constituencies.18 In the context of a 
weak party system, parliamentarians from mining regions saw an opportunity to 
gain popular support. Thus, they demanded an increase in transfers and a fairer 
distribution of them (Congreso de la República - Perú, 2003a).  
After five sessions, parliamentarians from the mining regions gave up their 
demands for the revision of the legal stability contracts and focused the debate on 
the criteria for the distribution of the canon minero. This change signalled an 
agreement between the government and these parliamentarians: the executive 
would endorse any reform approved by parliament in exchange for their 
renunciation of modifications related to fiscal stability contracts.19 Finally, 
parliament approved a twofold reform.20 First, it agreed on a new set of criteria for 
the distribution of the canon to the jurisdictions in which the mineral was extracted. 
Second, the new law deleted a paragraph in the previous version that could be 
understood as the central government’s obligation to include in the calculation of 
the canon transfers the full amount that the state would have received if the stability 
agreements had not existed.21  
The government and the mining companies were both satisfied with the new law: 
firstly, the amendment did not question the tax regime and secondly, they 
anticipated that additional revenue would now be allocated to those municipalities 
close to mining operations, thus calming the growing social unrest (Zavalla, 
2004:162).  
                                                            
18 Personal interviews with Eduardo Carhuaricra (2008-024; Lima, 17-04-2008) and Ernesto 
Herrera (2008-151; Lima, 08-08-2008), who at the time were Members of Parliament (MP) 
representing Pasco and Moquegua respectively. 
19 Personal Interview with Javier Diez Canseco (2007-009, Lima, 12-06-2007) 
20 Law Nº 28077 
21 Only two MPs voted against the approval of the new law, although they did so for quite 
different reasons. Javier Diez Canseco of the Socialist Party opposed it because it did not 
address the tax privileges of the mining companies. Juan Valdivia Romero (Minister of Energy 
and Mines from July 2006 to October 2008) of the APRA (American Popular Revolutionary 
Alliance) voted contrary to the opinion of his party colleagues because he wanted the law to be 
more explicitly restrictive about the type of taxes that could be taken into account in calculating 
the canon.  
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However, assigning resources to different sub-national governments without a 
preliminary technical study resulted in an unexpected absurdity when, in 2004, 
some municipalities hosting the operations received lower per capita transfers than 
their neighbours. Consequently, another round of reform proposals flooded 
Parliament, demanding greater prioritisation for the producing municipalities in the 
distribution of resources (Congreso de la República - Perú, 2004b). The resulting 
new law (Nº 28,332) was unanimously approved in July 2004 (Congreso de la 
República - Perú, 2004a). Table 2.1 summarises the successive changes in the 
rules for distribution of the canon transfers.  
Table 1.1 Changes in the criteria for the distribution of the canon.a  
Law Nº 25,506 
(Approved in 2001) 
Law Nº 25,007 
(Approved in 2003) 
Law Nº 28,332 
(Approved in 2004) 
Beneficiary % Beneficiary % Beneficiary % 
Regional government. 20 
Regional government 
plus 5% for public 
universities of the region. 
25 
Regional government plus 
5% for public universities of 
the region. 
25 
Municipalities of the 
provinceb in which the 
resource is extracted. 
20 
Municipality of the district 
in which the resource is 
extracted. 
10 
Municipality of the district 
in which the resource is 
extracted. 
10 
Municipalities of the 
province in which the 
resource is extracted, 
excluding the district of 
the mine 
25 
Municipalities of the 
province in which the 
resource is extracted. 
25 
Municipalities of the 
region in which the 
resource is extracted. 
60 
Municipalities of the 
region in which the 
resource is extracted. 
40 
Municipalities of the region 
in which the resource is 
extracted. 
40 
a With the exception of oil 
b For an explanation of the relationship between provinces and districts see footnote nº 9.  
 
In addition to these changes in the canon law, in December 2004, the President 
issued a decree regulating the payment and distribution of mining royalties for new 
mines.22 It represented a change in the previous policy because the fiscal stability 
contracts had exempted mining operations starting between 1992 and 2004 from 
the payment of royalties. The decree stated that all the royalties should be 
                                                            
22Supreme Decree Nº 157-2004-EF. Royalties are usage-based payments that compensate the 
state for the extraction of its mineral assets. In the Peruvian case, payments range from 1 per 
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1992 and 2004 were the most common and popular demands. The successful 
presidential candidate, Alan Garcia, adopted these concerns as part of his 
electoral platform. However, as soon as he took office, he backed down and 
acquiesced to the mining companies, stating that some palliative measures would 
be implemented instead of the payment of royalties or windfall taxes.  
In December 2006, Garcia published the MPSP, popularly christened the ‘mining 
alms’. It was an agreement between the government and the mining companies 
that exempted the companies from paying windfall taxes in exchange for a 
commitment to invest a predetermined amount of money in social development 
projects in the mining regions for the following five years. Private trusts under 
company control were to be responsible for the allocation of these resources 
according to a loose set of rules. This agreement fuelled popular discontent and 
criticism because it indicated the clear subordination of the government to mining 
interests.24 
The president of the powerful NSMOE was exultant because the agreement killed 
two birds with one stone: the companies avoided paying higher taxes and could 
also use some of the savings to boost their investment in development at local 
level. Another leader of the mining industry declared that the “companies were 
passing from being defensive regarding environmental conflicts to becoming 
proactive in the development of communities”.25   
Both mechanisms, the canon minero and the MPSP, affect the distribution of 
mining rents. While the canon minero allocates a proportion of the rent to the sub-
national governments closest to the mines generating it, the introduction of the 
MPSP allows the companies to retain most of the economic surplus produced by 
the boom in mineral prices. This thesis claims that this distribution of rents is 
responsible for both the increase in conflicts and the ineffective way in which the 
money is spent at local level. Before I analyse the impact of the implementation of 
the NEIS, I review what the academic literature says about the relationship 
between extractive industries, conflict and development.  
                                                            
24 Amazingly, Alan Garcia was more of a royalist than the King in supporting companies’ 
interests. In a personal interview (2008-199; Lima, 16-09-2008), the president of the NSMOE 
confirmed that although the companies would have opposed the introduction of new royalties 
because they were not tied to profit, they were ready to discuss a reasonable windfall tax. 
25 Personal interview with Raúl Benavides (2007-005; Lima, 11-06-2007). 
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1.4 The current debate on extractive industries, conflict and development 
The NEIS was a practical response to the growing social unrest generated by the 
large-scale extraction of oil and minerals. While companies and governments were 
developing the NEIS, social scientists were more interested in these issues and 
developed an argument now generally labelled the ‘resource curse’. It refers to a 
collection of different observable negative outcomes that a country highly 
dependent on the exploitation of its natural resources may experience. So-called 
‘point source’ (geographically concentrated) natural resources, especially minerals 
and fuels, correlate more strongly with the generation of economic and social 
problems than do other kinds of geographically diffuse resources (Isham, 
Woolcock, Pritchett, & Busby, 2005). 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Latin American structuralism and dependency theory 
schools were already warning about the dangers of the primary sector-led 
development due to a long-term decline in the terms of trade and the subordination 
of the economies of the region to foreign capital (Graulau, 2008:137-149; Ross, 
1999:301-302). However, it was still widely argued that natural resource 
endowment provided comparative advantages that poor countries could use to 
advance their economic development (Rosser, 2006b:7). Thus, in 1993, when 
Richard Auty originally coined the term ‘resource curse’ (Auty, 1993), the concept 
was still considered to be counterintuitive and triggered further research into the 
topic. Subsequently, four types of potential problems have come to dominate the 
literature.  
The negative impact of the intensive exploitation of minerals and oil deposits on 
economic growth is the first problem that attracted researchers’ attention (Auty, 
1993; Sachs & Warner, 1997; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2003). Their findings 
signalled the the existence of the ‘curse’ and provided a general explanation for the 
paradoxical situation.  A boom in investment in extraction industries or increase in 
international commodity prices generates an inflow of capital that tends to increase 
exchange rates, create high levels of consumption, soaring public spending and, as 
a result, inflation. The combination of these factors promotes the imports while 
hindering the country’s capacity to export and, therefore, the national production of 
tradable goods.26 Moreover, the concentration of capital investment and skilled 
manpower in the extraction industries deprives other sectors of scarce resources, 
                                                            
26 This set of negative outcomes has been traditionally labelled ‘Dutch disease’. 
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weakening the economy still further and increasing dependency on the extractive 
sector (Shafer, 1994). In turn, this increases vulnerability to external shocks 
because international commodity prices are traditionally volatile, and a boom today 
turns into a bust tomorrow. When this happens, private and public spending dries 
up and the country’s economy is ill-equipped to deal with the new situation.  
Authoritarianism and lack of state responsiveness to the needs of the population 
are the second possible manifestation of the resource curse. Ross (2001) argues 
that oil and mineral wealth impede the democratic process through three different 
mechanisms: 
…a rentier effect, through which governments use low tax rates and high 
spending to dampen pressures for democracy; a repression effect, by which 
governments build up their internal security forces to ward off democratic 
pressures; and a modernization effect, in which the failure of the population to 
move into industrial and service sector jobs renders them less likely to push for 
democracy (pp. 356–357). 
Moreover, even in formally recognised democracies, dependence on income from 
natural resources provides the state with autonomy from its citizens, which, in turn, 
leads to poor responsiveness, corruption and the inappropriate use of state 
revenue (Karl, 1997; Moore, 2004).  
The difficulty of translating mineral riches into the reduction of poverty levels is the 
third problem (Pegg, 2006b; Ross, 2004b, 2007). To some extent, this is a 
consequence of the two previous problems. On the one hand, lack of economic 
growth makes the reduction of poverty levels virtually impossible. Moreover, high 
inflation rates hit poor people more severely than the rest of the population. On the 
other hand, the lack of state responsiveness to its citizens tends to reduce public 
spending in social sectors (Gylfason, 2001; Stijns, 2006). In addition, Ross 
(2004b:32-35) and Auty (2006) argue that the lack of non-skilled or even semi-
skilled jobs in the modern extractive sector and weak linkage with other economic 
activities are also important factors in the persistence of poverty in mineral-rich 
countries.  
An increase in social unrest is the fourth problem linked to the intensive exploitation 
of natural resources. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) argue that primary commodity 
exports are significant determinants of the duration and probability of internal 
armed conflict. Their subsequent work (P. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004a, 2004b) framed 
the debate around the question of ‘grievance or greed’ as the major drivers of civil 
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strife. Their main contribution was to highlight the notion that the rent generated 
and the ways in which it can be controlled – rather than pure economic 
dependence – is an important variable in explaining the association between 
resources and conflict (P. Collier & Hoeffler, 2005).27  
The resource curse hypothesis has not gone uncontested. Some challengers deny 
the existence of a curse altogether on the basis of a misleading conceptualisation 
of resource dependence and the subsequent use of inappropriate indicators 
(Brunnschweiler, 2008; Davis, 1995; Lederman & Maloney, 2006). However, this 
categorical denial is not common. Most recent studies corroborate the existence of 
a resource curse, but stress that negative outcomes are probable, not guaranteed. 
Pre-existing socio-economic conditions, the quality of institutions, and the 
implementation of appropriate policies all matter. This approach accounts more 
convincingly for the significant performance variation among natural resource-rich 
countries, and the existence of what were previously considered to be positive 
exceptions such as Chile, Botswana, Indonesia and Malaysia (Rosser, 2006a). The 
work of Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) points to institutional deterioration 
as the causal link connecting resource abundance with economic stagnation.  
In the ensuing years, different authors came up with more sophisticated 
explanations of how resource dependency affects economic growth (Auty, 2007; 
Bosschini, Petterson, & Roine, 2005; Hausmann & Rigobon, 2003; Mehlum, 
Moene, & Torvik, 2006; Van der Ploeg, 2008) and increases poverty and inequality 
(Bulte, Damania, & Deacon, 2005; Goderis & Malone, 2008; Ross, 2007) and the 
likelihood of conflict (Basedau & Lay, 2009; Fearon, 2005; Humphreys, 2005) and 
authoritarianism (Auty, 2007; Dunning, 2008).  
These more nuanced explanations highlight the importance of institutions and 
governance, opening a window of opportunity for the extraction companies and IFIs 
to exploit the developmental potential of the sector. After admitting the  existence of 
problems (IIED, 2002), companies quickly focused on the positive side, advertising 
the benefits that mining could bring to poor countries and communities if some 
conditions are met (ICMM, 2006b, 2006d; Wise & Shtylla, 2007).  
                                                            
27 However, the exclusive dichotomy ‘greed or grievance’ seems to be too simplistic to grasp the 
intricate dynamics behind most of the armed conflicts. Studies of Indonesia (Murshed & 
Tadjoeddin, 2009) and the Philippines (Holden & Jacobson, 2007) reveal that actually, these 
two factors are not mutually exclusive but complementary.  
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The International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), which represents the 
world’s largest mining companies, has been especially active in commissioning 
studies. This corporate literature tends to propose ideal policies that the companies 
themselves and their host countries should pursue in order to promote 
development. Strict respect for human rights, building constructive partnerships 
with authorities and communities, and scaling up CSR activities are the industry’s 
main commitments (ICMM, 2006d, 2009, 2010a). Regarding governance, the 
ICMM adheres to the Word Bank good governance agenda, adding the importance 
of building technical capacity in municipal and regional governments (ICMM, 
2006a:14-19). In addition, the main companies endorsed the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI, 2005), agreeing to disclose their payments to the 
governments implementing the initiative. 
In the academic sphere, there has also been an upsurge in research into potential 
policy solutions for ‘escaping’ the resource curse. The collections edited by 
Humphreys (2007) and Khodeli (2009) agree that “domestic institutions make a 
significant difference: with good governance the exploitation of resources can 
generate revenues that will foster growth and reduce poverty” (Khodeli, 2009:6). 
Their recommendations include state capacity building to facilitate negotiations with 
private companies and enable the management of revenue; sound macroeconomic 
and fiscal policies; institutional arrangements fostering transparency and 
anticorruption safeguards; reform of state bureaucracy in order to reinforce efficient 
service delivery and the setting up of natural resource funds to sterilise revenue 
windfalls.28  
This thesis relates to this rich body of literature on the resource curse in three 
different ways. First, I complement the existing literature by examining the 
existence of a sub-national version of the curse. The studies of the resource curse 
have traditionally focused on national aggregate figures, processes, institutions and 
policies, paying little attention to local dynamics. However, in the context of the 
implementation of the NEIS and increasing international emphasis on 
                                                            
28 In recent years, proposals for the direct distribution of state revenue from the exploitation of 
natural resources to the inhabitants of mining areas also resonate as a radical method of 
bypassing the problems associated with the appropriation of rent by the state (Birdsall & 
Subramanian, 2004; Moss & Young, 2009; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2003; Sandbu, 2006; 
Segal, 2009). 
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decentralisation in developing countries, analysis at the sub-national level becomes 
crucial to the understanding of new problems associated with these new strategies.  
Second, I challenge the common assumption that institutional reforms and the 
pursuit of new policies to deal with the resource curse are largely technical issues 
that can be resolved by means of following the advice of experts and the 
implementation of capacity building activities. My research highlights how the 
outcomes of purely technical proposals are frequently unable to live up to 
expectations (Bebbington, Hinojosa et al., 2008; Pegg, 2006a) because they do not 
consider sufficiently the political dimensions of the  resource curse (Karl, 1997, 
2007). More specifically, these proposals do not take into account how dependence 
on extraction shapes the nature of the state (Moore, 2004) and the process of 
institutional reform itself (Stevens & Dietsche, 2008).  
Finally, I find that the size of the rent generated by extractive activities is a key 
factor for a better understanding of the resource curse, whose earliest 
conceptualisations had already signalled the different problems mineral/oil rents 
caused (Ross, 1999:312-319). However, lack of consistent data on the size of rents 
on a cross-national basis has made academics use alternative economic 
aggregates to test the theory at the macro level.29 Very recently the World Bank’s 
Adjusted Saving Project published a dataset of oil rents that allowed researchers to 
test directly the influence of oil and mineral rents on the outset of civil wars and 
political instability (P. Collier & Hoeffler, 2005; De Soysa & Neumayer, 2007; 
Omgba, 2009). This ‘rent-effect’ accounts for local differences and highlights the 
importance of specific conditions in the exploitation of natural resources. These 
approaches highlight that it is the rent that matters , not just the relative importance 
of natural resources production and exports (Dunning, 2010; Weyland, 2009). In 
this thesis I also test this ‘rent-effect’ and find a convergence between the results in 
my sub-national research and the more widespread cross-national analyses.  
                                                            
29 Until very recently, a measure of mineral/oil dependency, defined as the proportion of 
production in relation to GDP as a percentage of total exports or as a combination of both, has 
been used to examine statistically the effect of natural resource wealth on different social and 
political outcomes. 
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1.5 Thesis outline 
The next chapter describes the research methodology and presents the field sites. 
After discussing the research process as a three-dimensional journey through 
emotions, intellectual challenges, and unfamiliar geographies, the chapter sets out 
to answer the three key methodological questions: (i) what did I want to know?; (ii) 
how did I set about finding the answers?; and (iii) how did I select the most 
appropriate places to undertake field research? It concludes by presenting the 
three regions where I conducted field research. 
Chapter 3 sets the implementation of the NEIS in context by analysing four factors 
of the Peruvian political economy affecting the rural population: (i) the change in 
state-citizens relations promoted by the implementation of neoliberal policies after 
the 1980s, (ii) the uneven distribution of the benefits of the recent economic growth 
that excludes, to a large extent, the Andean and Amazonian rural populations; (iii) 
the experience of previous historical cycles of extraction in Peru, their related 
political dynamics and the repercussions on the population close to the mines; and 
(iv) the recent emergence of local actors in the countryside who challenge the 
state’s authority. 
Chapters 4-6 examine the relationship between social conflict and the 
implementation of the NEIS in Peruvian mining regions. The overall conclusion is 
that the NEIS has not only failed to reduce conflict, but in fact has increased the 
number of disturbances. The three chapters substantiate this claim through a three 
step analysis. Chapter 4 reviews what different Peruvian actors and the academic 
literature say about the relationship between mining and social conflict. Chapter 5 
presents the results of the quantitative analysis of the factors affecting the 
variations in the incidence of social conflict across the Peruvian regions. It 
concludes that there is a clear correlation between the increase in conflict and the 
amount of canon minero transfers received by the sub-national governments of the 
region. The result is puzzling because previous studies of the topic did not 
anticipate that these transfers could cause social conflict. Chapter 6 presents the 
results of my field research on conflict in Pasco, Ancash, and Moquegua regions. 
The analysis confirms that the level of mining rents is the dominant driver of conflict 
and provides information about the causal mechanism linking ‘money’ to social 
disturbances.  
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Chapters 7 and 8 deal with the impact of the NEIS on economic and wellbeing 
indicators. Chapter 7 shows that the implementation of the NEIS has not led to the 
improvement of economic and wellbeing indicators at regional or municipal level. 
The econometric analysis helps to distinguish the effect of the NEIS from that of 
potential spill over effects of mining activity per se. Chapter 8 sets out to respond to 
the puzzle posed by the results of the previous chapter: how is it possible that in 
regions and municipalities receiving high volumes of canon transfer the living 
standards of their inhabitants do not improve more than in the rest of the country? 
First, the chapter presents the results of a quantitative investigation into the 
expenditure patterns of Peruvian municipalities, showing that canon-rich 
municipalities have a specific, less developmental way of spending money.  
Second, the chapter provides detailed information from my field research in 18 
canon-rich municipalities to clarify the local processes that lie behind this pattern of 
expenditure. It concludes that ‘lack of capacity’ is usually overstated in official 
accounts of local governance problems, and proposes an alternative and more 
plausible explanation for the poor use of public money: the implementation of the 
NEIS provides incentives for municipal authorities to pursue short-term spending. 
Finally, Chapter 9 summarises the main findings regarding the effects of the 
implementation of the NEIS on social conflict and development in Peruvian mining 
regions. It also draws some conclusions about the relevance of the Peruvian case 
to other resource-rich countries that might pursuit similar policies.   
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Chapter 2 
The research journey 
 
The process of researching this thesis has been a three-dimensional journey: 
geographical, intellectual and emotional. From the beginning I was aware that the 
research would involve extensive travelling in different parts of the country. I also 
realised quite early on that I should venture into some areas of knowledge and 
research methodologies that were previously unknown to me. However, I did not 
expect that this research would also test my personal emotions.  
Mining has proved to be a highly controversial topic and I have needed 
continuously to take stock of my own feelings on the subject. During my field 
research, I heard accounts of conflicts, suffering and frustration that aroused 
differing reactions in me. Almost everywhere I met people with strong opinions who 
demanded my endorsement of their views. The mining companies and the 
authorities were frequently suspicious of an academic going around in the mining 
areas. I also faced the scepticism of some of my friends in social movements 
because they thought that my emphasis on the role of rents (Chapters 5 and 6) as 
a cause of the conflicts downplayed what they saw as the direct responsibility of 
mining companies. They, like many others during the research period, asked me to 
make it clearer whether I was for or against mining. 
I had to explain to the people I met, and frequently I had to repeat to myself, that I 
was not looking for confirmation of any personal conviction about the topic. I did not 
prejudge whether mining and/or canon minero transfers may or may not bring 
development and prosperity to the Peruvian people, especially those living in the 
remote areas of the country where many of the mines are located. Indeed, given 
the natural endowment of the country, I would be delighted if the road from natural 
resource exploitation to generalised human well-being was smoothly paved. This 
would provide a better prospect for lot of my friends and many other people I had 
met in recent years. However, I discovered through my research that such a 
positive outcome is unlikely. On the contrary, there are clear signs of serious 
obstacles. Thus, in this thesis, I first try to ascertain the magnitude of these 
problems and second, I attempt to comprehend the dynamics behind them. I hope 
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that a better understanding of these forces will help the government, mining 
companies, and social movements make better informed decisions.   
This kind of analytical distance does not imply lack of passion and commitment. 
The encounters with people in remote parts of the country during the field research 
encouraged me to be even more rigorous. Some people asked me how my 
research was going to help them. I tried to be honest and explained to them that it 
was very unlikely that it could help them in the short term. However, I hoped that 
my work would make a contribution, even if a very small one, to the improvement of 
their lives by gaining a better understanding of the processes hindering 
development in their localities. This hope gave me extra motivation during the 
research process. It also pushed me to go further geographically and deeper 
intellectually. The energy to visit one more community when I was already tired, to 
endure the harshness of high altitude places, and to try some new analytical tools 
when I already had enough material to write a thesis came, at least partially, from 
this motivation.  
In this chapter I give details of key aspects of my research. First, I describe the 
research methodology, and then I present the field sites. The section on 
methodology emphasises the intellectual dimension of the research journey, while 
the presentation of the field research sites provides geographical information. 
However, the three dimensions of the journey − geographical, intellectual and 
emotional − frequently intertwine. 
2.1 Thesis methodology  
In this section I answer three questions: (i) what did I want to know?; (ii) How did I 
set about finding the answers?; and (iii) how did I select the most appropriate 
places to undertake field research? 
2.1.1 What did I want to know? 
It was almost by chance that I embarked on this study. In December 2006 I 
travelled to Peru to visit my Awajun friends. On my way to the jungle, I was stopped 
in the northern town of Jaen by a massive march of peasants protesting against 
mining exploration in their communities. This awakened my interest. At the end of 
my journey, back in Lima, I met two friends, an economist and a social activist. I 
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told them about the demonstration in Jaen. They had different opinions of mining. 
The economist perceived mining as a great opportunity for the country, while the 
activist informed me about the potential negative effects of mining on local 
populations. However, they both agreed that mining would be one of the main 
issues for the future of the country. I felt attracted to study the topic.    
In June 2007 I was back in Peru ready to carry out the first round of field research. 
Initially, I did not have a clear set of working hypotheses to test. I just wanted to 
know what was happening at the grass roots. Because I was interested in clashes 
between the mining companies and local populations, I chose to visit Cajamarca 
and Espinar, two mining hotspots. In Cajamarca there had been recurrent social 
conflict between Yanacocha, the largest gold mine in Latin America, and local 
communities (Lingan, 2008; Tanaka & Meléndez, 2009). In Espinar, a remote 
locality in Cusco, the Tintaya mine had also been plagued by disturbances, 
sometimes violent ones. In 2004, the company agreed with the local authorities to 
finance a fund to promote local development.30 However, the move did not prevent 
the outburst of new clashes.  
I expected to find a coherent story with good and bad guys, environmental damage, 
abuse of local people by powerful transnational companies, and popular resistance 
to mining. There was something of all this in both places, but it was not the whole 
picture. In fact, what was happening there was much more intriguing. Pollution of 
the environment, growing uncertainty over traditional livelihoods, a widespread 
sense of dispossession among the locals and other grievances co-existed with a 
popular acceptance of mining, substantial amounts of canon minero flowing to the 
municipal coffers and the generation of a large number of jobs in public works. My 
enquiries about the disagreement with mining activities were frequently met with 
surprise. Most of the people wanted more benefits, not less mining. But clearly, the 
existing canon transfers and corporate sponsored projects did not satisfy people’s 
aspirations.  
This preliminary research suggested that the implementation of the New Extractive 
Industries Strategy (NEIS) had locked sub-national governments, mining 
companies and local people into complex relationships that were difficult to 
                                                            
30 This agreement is seen as the precursor to the Mining Programme of Solidarity with the 
People (MPSP).  
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negotiate and into confrontations that could not easily be resolved (Arellano-
Yanguas, 2008). This initial insight helped me to focus my research on the two 
questions that are at the heart of this thesis:  
(i) Why did social conflict escalate so dramatically in the Peruvian mining regions 
after the implementation of the NEIS?  
(ii) Is there evidence to suggest that the implementation of NEIS has improved the 
economic and social wellbeing of people in mining areas? 
2.1.2 How did I set about finding the answers? 
Answering these questions demanded a multi-method approach to the analyses at 
both national and sub-national levels (Snyder, 2001). At national level, I reviewed 
secondary information, examined the parliamentary archives and interviewed 
relevant actors to get a better understanding of (i) the ways in which the NEIS was 
designed, and (ii) the political and institutional context affecting its implementation. 
In the investigation at the sub-national level, I used quantitative techniques to 
compare the incidence of conflict and differences in economic and welfare 
indicators between mining and non-mining jurisdictions.  
To make this comparison I built two comprehensive datasets. In the first, I 
assembled statistics from seven different sources for the 25 regions of Peru from 
2001 to 2008: (i) the monthly incidence of social conflicts from the Ombudsman’s 
office; (ii) geographical data from National Institute of Computing and Statistics 
(NICS); (iii) demographics from the national censuses of 1993 and 2007; (iv) 
electoral participation and results from the National Office of Electoral Processes 
(NOEP); (v) social and economic indicators from the NICS; (vi) data on mining 
production and investment from the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM); and (vii) 
data on canon transfers to regional and municipal governments from the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance (MEF).31 The second dataset includes data for the 1,834 
municipalities in the country collected from five different sources for the same 
period: (i) geographical data from the NICS; (ii) demographics from the national 
censuses of 1993 and 2007; (iii) electoral participation and results from the NOEP; 
                                                            
31  Budgetary statistics for the regional governments only include data for the period 2004–2008 
because they were created in 2003. 
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(iv) detailed budgetary data from the Ministry MEF; and (v) social indicators from 
1993 to 2007 from the national censuses for these years.  
I use these data in different ways. In the analysis at the regional level I combine 
panel data regression techniques and Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to 
elucidate (i) the correlates of the variation in the incidence of disturbances across 
the Peruvian regions (Chapter 5); and, (ii) the influence of different mining related 
variables - including canon transfers - on the change in economic and welfare 
indicators (Chapter 7). At municipal level, I used Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
analysis to compare differences in changes in welfare indicators between canon-
rich and canon-poor municipalities over the period 1993-2007 (Chapter 7). Second, 
through panel regression techniques I examined the spending patterns of municipal 
governments receiving high volumes of canon minero transfer in the period 2005-
2008 (Chapter 8). I give methodological details of how I conducted these analyses 
in the relevant chapters. 
These quantitative analyses helped me to find plausible explanations for 
differences across regions and municipalities that, in aggregate, made up the 
national picture of the results of the NEIS. However, statistical results alone do not 
provide sufficiently robust causal explanations. Consequently, I undertook detailed 
fieldwork to explore local politics in regions and municipalities receiving high 
volumes of canon minero transfers. I selected three mining regions – Pasco, 
Ancash, and Moquegua– in which to focus the field research in order to gain a 
better understanding of the processes and dynamics that lie behind the quantitative 
results.  
I conducted extensive field research in Pasco, Ancash and Moquegua between 
April and October of 2008, and between September 2009 and March 2010. I used 
four different methods of data collection. First, I conducted over 200 semi-
structured interviews. In Lima I interviewed 53 people: 15 academics and 
consultants, 7 politicians, 13 leaders of social movements and members of NGOs; 
8 senior government officials; 8 managers of mining companies, and 2 
representatives of donor institutions. In the three regions together I interviewed the 
three regional presidents, 20 mayors, 34 officials in regional and municipal 
governments, 18 representatives of peasant communities - mainly their presidents 
and members of the board -  23 local social leaders, including journalists, members 
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of social movements, and priests; 14 employees of the mining companies; 13 
members of NGOs; 7 consultants working for regional and municipal governments; 
the regional representatives of the Ombudsman and other relevant people including 
policemen, anticorruption prosecutors, and workers in the public works of the 
municipalities.    
Second, I collected information on management capacity in the 18 municipalities I 
studied. I followed a consistent strategy in all the municipalities in order to draw 
meaningful comparisons. First, I phoned the mayors and agreed a date for the 
personal interviews. In this first phone call I informed them that I would also like to 
interview the general manager of the municipality. I also asked them for their e-mail 
addresses to send a reminder of the appointment and a list of the data I would like 
to collect during my visit. In Chapter 8 I use this information to assess the 
managerial capacity of the 18 municipalities.  
Third, I participated in popular assemblies, negotiation processes between local 
communities and mining companies, participatory budgeting workshops, and public 
hearings with mayors and MPs. In a few cases, the meeting had so many 
participants that my presence went unnoticed. However, most of the time, in small 
villages and peasant communities, I needed to introduce myself as an academic 
interested in how they deal with local problems. In all cases I chose a discreet 
place and remained passive but attentive. Generally, I took notes that I transcribed 
at the end of the day including, separate contextual information and my own 
reflections, My participation in these gatherings gave me a wealth of information 
about local processes that frequently contrasted with what authorities expressed in 
formal interviews. I also deliberately used public transport to travel within the mining 
regions to differentiate myself from mining companies’ employees. This meant that 
I had to chase ‘group taxis’ (colectivos) at the crossroads and had to spend many 
hours waiting either for the arrival of the next taxi or for enough people to fill the 
car. However, these journeys turned out to provide great opportunities to interact 
with local people and to get opinions and information to complement those that I 
got in more formal meetings.  
Finally, I collected local newspapers, listened to local radio, and consulted web 
pages with regional information. With some exceptions, the local media were highly 
partisan. They supported the interests of those who paid them best. Thus, although 
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I could not rely on them for accurate information, a comparison of their different 
approaches offered valuable insights into the local power dynamics.   
At the end of the field research I had a wealth of information coming from different –
and frequently conflicting – perspectives. I cross-checked the different sources to 
have a better understanding of the mechanisms behind the escalation of conflicts 
(Chapter 6), and the processes driving the allocation of mining resources at local 
level (Chapter 8). In this thesis, I sometimes bring stories and direct quotations 
from my fieldwork into the discussion. I also have distilled much of this material to 
summarise different perspectives. When I do this, I use footnotes to link these 
syntheses with the source material, maintaining anonymity when necessary or 
required by the interviewees.  
It could appear that the qualitative analysis followed the quantitative one in a clear 
time order. In fact, the research process was far more iterative. I undertook some 
preliminary quantitative analysis of the data before the field research, and insights 
from my visits to the mining areas provided me with new information to select new 
variables and to check different hypotheses. Thus, most of the quantitative 
analyses that I present in this thesis were carry out after the field research.  
2.1.3 Selection of the field research sites 
The analysis of sub-national dynamics as a way to understand the wider national 
picture is the distinctive approach of this thesis. To capture both the fragmentation 
and interconnection of sub-national politics demanded analyses at two different 
levels −  regional and municipal − in order to address the two questions driving the 
research.   
First, social conflict in Peru frequently involves the interaction of local and regional 
actors. Although protests may begin in a small municipality, they are usually 
embedded in wider regional dynamics and build on coalitions with groups outside 
their municipal jurisdiction. Prolonged disputes demand the attention of regional or 
national bodies and the mediation of authorities from the outside. This meant 
regions were the most relevant units for analysing the influence of the NEIS on the 
incidence of social conflict, though not precluding more detailed analysis of local 
dynamics. 
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Second, the impact of the implementation of the NEIS on economic and social 
wellbeing needs to be addressed at both regional and municipal levels. In Peru, the 
central government transfers resources directly to each regional and municipal 
government’s bank account. Accordingly, municipal governments bypass the 
regional government when handling their budgets, resulting in a completely 
independent management process. Thus, a separate assessment of the 
performance of these two levels of government is crucial to understand the impact 
of the NEIS.  
Consequently, I was faced with the challenge of combining the two units of analysis 
− regional and municipal − in such a way that I could examine in the same region 
processes explaining the incidence of social conflict and the performance of 
municipal governments. In terms of choosing the regions in which to undertake my 
research, it was clear that I needed to select them from the six regions receiving 
the greatest volume of canon transfers: Ancash, Cajamarca, Cusco, Moquegua, 
Pasco and Tacna (Figure 1.2). As part of the selection process, I reviewed the 
Ombudsperson’s report on social conflict (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2009) and found 
that the six regions had also suffered a high incidence of social conflicts in recent 
years. Thus, I was left with the task of identifying the three regions that included the 
highest number of municipalities in receipt of significant canon minero transfers. 
This criterion allowed a consistent sample of municipalities in which canon transfers 
made a clear difference.  
In order to better understand the situation, I analysed all 6 regions, identifying the 
90 municipalities most affected by major mining operations32, ascertaining their 
populations and the level of transfer they received. Then, to determine the regions 
and municipalities most relevant to my research aims, I decided to select regions 
with the most municipalities that in 2007 met two conditions. First, the population 
should be over 3,000 inhabitants because municipal performance was more likely 
to depend on established institutional patterns and procedures than in very small 
localities.33 Second, the municipalities should be in receipt of canon minero 
transfers in excess of PEN 1,500 (USD 470) per capita. Ancash, with seven 
                                                            
32 I identified municipalities according to the extent of canon minero transfer they received in 
2007. These 90 municipalities accounted for 5 per cent of the country’s population, and 
received 46 per cent of the total canon transfers made to municipal governments that year. 
33 This criterion implies the omission of municipalities with the highest per capita transfer.  
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municipalities meeting the selected criteria, Pasco with six, and Moquegua with five 
seemed to be the appropriate regions.34  
2.2 The research sites 
The mining sector is extremely important to the economy and society of the 
Ancash, Moquegua and Pasco regions, but they are sufficiently different to ensure 
that they constitute a representative sample of the Peruvian mining sector. Table 
2.1 shows some of the main features of these regions and a discussion of the 
general dynamics around mining to which they are subject follows. I present the 
regions in the order in which I undertook the field research. In addition, the basic 
features of the mining operations and municipalities included in the fieldwork are 
tabulated in appendices III and IV. 
Table 2.1 Statistics for Pasco, Ancash, and Moquegua 
Region Populationa Rural populationa 
Mining as a percentage of 
regional GDPb Povertyc 
Poverty 
evolution 
2004–08 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Pasco 280,449 38 % 59% 64% 74% 61% 64% -8% 
Ancash 1,063,459 36 % 39% 38% 49% 42% 38% -15% 
Moquegua 161,533 15 % 36% 30% 43% 43% 30% -1% 






34 In my assessment of Ancash, I excluded Huantar from the study because the official figures 
when I carried out the field research (prior to the dissemination of the 2007 national census) 
indicated that it had less than 3,000 inhabitants (as opposed to 3,098 revealed by the census 
published in June 2008). On the other hand, in considering Pasco, I initially incorporated 
Ticlacayan, Paucartambo and Chaupimarca into the study because 2007 per capita canon 
minero transfers seemed to be higher than PEN 1,500. However, adjustments to both canon 
minero transfers and population rates resulted in actual transfers being below this amount. 
Then, although I conducted field research in these three localities, and in fact used data 
collected there for the analysis of conflict, I finally excluded them from my enquiry into the 
municipal dynamics surrounding the spending of the mining revenues. 
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Figure 2.1 The six main Peruvian mining regions (the three 





Mineral exploitation in Pasco stretches back to colonial times. More recently, the 
first modern international mining company in Peru located its operations in Pasco 
and American investors founded the Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation (CPCC) 
at the beginning of the 20th century, buying up nationally owned enterprises. As the 
famous novel Redoble por Rancas (Scorza, 1970) vividly portrays, the 
confrontations of the surrounding peasant communities with this company became 
legendary, becoming an early symbol of local resistance to international capitalist 
forces.  
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Figure 2.2 Field research sites in Pasco 
As the century progressed, new investors established another four middle-size 
operations in Pasco (Atacocha, Milpo, Huarón and Brocal).35 These ventures 
definitively shaped the economy of the region. Mining dynamism promoted 
migration and the expansion of the town of Cerro de Pasco around the pitheads of 
the old tunnels. In 1956, CPCC converted the traditional underground mine into an 
open pit operation, which had the distinctive feature of being virtually in the middle 
of the town. Since then, the mine has steadily encroached on the urban area in 
order to maintain output.36 Despite a long tradition of protest, the population has 
ended up tolerating this ‘parasitism’ because economic activity linked to mining is 
the only opportunity for making a living in the self-proclaimed highest city in the 
world (4,380 metres above sea level).  
I spent two and a half months in Pasco between April and June 2008. I was not 
surprised that organisations opposing mining activities across the country arranged 
excursions to Cerro de Pasco to show the damage that mining can cause. If the 
town ever had any kind of beauty, it has definitively been lost. A pit of more than 
                                                            
35 See appendix III for more details of these operations.  
36 Google Earth <Cerro the Pasco, Peru> contains photos of old buildings which have 
disappeared into the mine with their location.  
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1.5 km2 in area and 1 km deep now occupies the centre of the old town. Mountains 
of tailings, polluted streams, lead dust, and daily explosions in the pit combined 
with a lack of basic services, the high altitude and the extreme weather conditions 
make Cerro de Pasco one of the most inhospitable places on earth. During my first 
days in Cerro de Pasco, a national television station broadcast a documentary on 
the town with a revealing title: Cerro de asco (‘disgusting hill’)37. The environmental 
situation in the other mining municipalities was not so tragic, but there are still 
widespread signs of environmental damage.  
After some decades of mineral production decay, in recent years, mining has once 
again become crucial to the regional economy, rising to above 60 per cent of total 
GDP during the period 2005–2008 (Table 2.1). This means that in the 
municipalities in Pasco where the mines are concentrated, mining represents more 
than 90 per cent of local GDP.  
The development record of this long history of mining is not good. The region as a 
whole remains very poor. According to 2007 figures (INEI, 2009b), some 
municipalities are numbered among the poorest in the country. Moreover, during 
the mining boom of 2004–2008, poverty reduction was significantly below the 
national average (Table 2.1.). People in Pasco could not understand why, if the 
country had benefited so greatly for so long from the mineral riches of Pasco, they 
had received so little attention. Moreover, from the perspective of a government 
wanting to convince the population of rural areas of the benefits of mining, the 
situation in Cerro de Pasco is not helpful. 
As emerged from the previous description, I found research work in Pasco tough. I 
spent 70 days there but I never got really accustomed to the lack of oxygen, the 
cold, the pollution, and the black dust penetrating the nose.  Despite the caring 
support of some friends there and the opportunity to enjoy the beauty of some 
surrounding spots, I felt deeply relieved when I finished the field research in Pasco 




37 The documentary is posted at http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=ES&hl=es&v=gtVRgs83Ayo 
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2.2.2 Ancash 
Large-scale mining is a comparatively recent development in Ancash. Antamina 
and Pierina, the two companies operating in the region, are the epitome of the new 
mining sector, with modern operations and relatively high social and environmental 
standards.38 Both mines are situated in the highlands, at over 4,000 metres above 
sea level (MSL). Antamina, the main company, operates in the most 
underdeveloped area of the region, the Conchucos Valley, which has about 62,500 
inhabitants (INEI, 2008a). The company started production in 2001, after making 
the largest mining investment in the world in the previous 15 years39. The result is 
one of the biggest and most profitable mining operations ever undertaken40. Annual 
profits after reinvestment and taxation ranged between USD 1,383 and 1,822 
million for the period 2006–2008 (BHP Billinton, 2009:29). This means that with 
these windfall profits Antamina’s parent companies recouped their investment in 
less than two years. It also generated massive canon minero transfers to the 
region, especially to the districts surrounding the mine in the province of Huari. 
Moreover, Antamina’s social responsibility programme is the most ambitious in the 
country, and in 2007, amounted to nearly $USD 67 million for local development.41 
Unsurprisingly, despite the vastness of the region, Antamina has made a significant 
economic and political impact on Ancash.  
However, the poverty level in the region as a whole improved less − 15 percentage 
`points − than the national average from  2004–2008; and in 2007, the districts 
closest to the mine still appeared in the country’s lowest quintile in terms of the 
human development index, as recorded by the Human Development Report (HDR) 
2009 (UNDP, 2010).   
The Canadian company Barrick is exploiting the Pierina mine in the district of 
Jangas, Huaraz province. Pierina started its operations in 1998 and is currently 
approaching the end of its economic life. Although Pierina is much smaller than 
Antamina, its proximity to Huaraz, the regional capital, puts the operation at the 
                                                            
38 The main features of the mining companies in the study regions can be found in appendix III. 
39 USD 2,300 million. 
40 According to company sources, Antamina is the third largest mine in the world and the fifth 
most profitable. 
41 Including a USD 64.3 million contribution to the MPSP. Only a proportion of that budget was 
actually spent in 2007.  
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centre of public awareness. Figure 2.3 shows the locations of the two mines and 
districts where I conducted my field research. 
Figure 2.3 Field research sites in Ancash  
 
I used San Marcos, the capital of the district hosting Antamina, as my base during 
the field research in Ancash. From there I travelled to the communities surrounding 
the mine and to other municipalities. Despite hosting one of the biggest mines in 
the world and the high volume of canon minero transfers accruing to the 
municipality, public services in San Marcos were poor. Public transport to the 
smaller districts was scarce and erratic; telephone lines in the rural municipalities 
were faulty; internet connections in the cyber centres were desperately slow and 
frequently out of order; and there was neither a fully operational bank branch nor a 
cash machine within five hours travel. In sharp contrast, Antamina is one of the 
most technologically advanced mines in the world: a satellite system helps to 
choose the most efficient route for the gigantic trucks in the pit; the minerals travel 
directly from the mine to the seaport in Huarmey through a 300 km pipeline; and 
the 4,000 workers who live in the mining camp enjoy facilities and living standards 
that local people cannot even dream of.  
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2.2.3 Moquegua 
Moquegua has a well-established mining tradition. Since 1976, the Southern Peru 
Copper Corporation (SPCC) has been exploiting the Cuajone mine, which is 
currently among the three largest copper operations in the country. In addition to 
Cuajone, SPCC owns an important cluster comprising the Toquepala mine in the 
neighbouring region of Tacna, and a copper smelter and refinery in Ilo (Moquegua). 
As a result, SPCC has greatly influenced the economic, social and political life of 
this small region. In 1999, Grupo Mexico acquired the majority of the equity from 
the original North American owners. From2006–2008, SPCC reported net profits of 
USD 1,274 million, 1,415 million, and 1,092 million respectively for its Peruvian 
operations in Moquegua and Tacna (CONASEV, 2010). This considerable revenue 
meant that a significant amount of canon minero flowed to the regional government 
of Moquegua and to the municipalities around the mine, the average for the latter 
being approximately PEN 5,000  (USD 1,570) per capita in 2007. 
Since 2001, Anglo American has been trying to procure a social licence to exploit 
Quellaveco, a mineral deposit close to Cuajone. The new mine would double the 
copper production of the region. After popular rejection of the plan in 2001, in 2008, 
it looked as though Anglo American had finally got the green light to go ahead with 
its plans for Quellaveco.  
In contrast to other mining regions in the country, Moquegua ranks highly in terms 
of economic and social indicators, enjoying the second highest level of all 25 
Peruvian regions in the human development index. However, figures show that 
there are significant disparities between lowland and Andean localities (INEI, 
2009b, 2009c; UNDP, 2010). The districts of Moquegua42, Samegua and Torata 
rank among the 80 (out of 1,834) most developed in the country, while Carumas 
and San Cristobal are in the middle to low reaches of the table. Moreover, the 
region had a dismal record in terms of improving living standards between 2004–
2008, when the level of poverty dropped by  merely 1 percentage point cent, the 
lowest rate in the country and in sharp contrast to the national average.  
 
                                                            
42 The district of Moquegua is the capital of Moquegua region, however, it is located in the 
province of Mariscal Nieto.  
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Figure 2.4 Field research sites in Moquegua  
 
Moquegua was the last leg of my research journey. First, I visited the town of Ilo to 
have a better understanding of the innovative process of participatory local 
governance set up there during the 1980s and 1990s, and the long lasting conflict 
between the town and the SPCC due to the pollution from its smelter facility. From 
there I moved to Moquegua, the capital of the region, where I established my 
centre of operations. Life in Moquegua was much easier than in Ancash and 
Pasco, at least for a temporary visit. Yet journeys to the Andean districts of the 
region were physically demanding and revealed the existence of enormous 
economic and welfare differences between the capital and the rural areas. 
After this brief description of regions where I carried out my field research, the next 
chapter examines the historical, social and political context of life in the Peruvian 
countryside. It will provide the background necessary to understand the dynamics 
around the implementation of the NEIS.  
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Chapter 3 
Where the mines are: the socio-political landscape of the Peruvian 
countryside 
 
The old image of Peru as “a beggar sitting on a bench of gold” is still one of the 
most frequently quoted diagnoses of the country’s troubles.43 I have heard the 
same aphorism recounted in government offices and company headquarters, at 
meetings with members of the political opposition to the ruling party and radical 
activists, and at peasant community assemblies. In every case, the management of 
the nation’s natural resources is at the top of the agenda to explain the country’s 
problems and where to look for remedies. However, though using the same phrase 
there is no unanimity as to its meaning; different people use the same words to 
signal very different things.  
The economic elite, mining companies, and national government have long 
considered the mass of the Peruvian population to represent the beggar living on 
top of vast natural resource wealth who does not have the capacity to take 
advantage of it. They emphasise the need for entrepreneurial spirit and skills to 
develop this golden endowment. They argue that the lack of private initiative in the 
exploitation of the nation’s resources is responsible for the persistence of poverty 
and related social discontent in the country. Accordingly, they aim to generate 
better conditions to attract more private investment into the extraction sector. New 
mining, gas and oil operations could then provide financial resources for the 
country and bring modernisation, jobs, and much-needed ‘cultural’ improvement to 
the countryside.  
People living in the mining regions have a different interpretation of the situation. 
For them, the Peruvian government, in collusion with the economic elite, has 
throughout history condemned local people to penury, cheating them out of the 
benefits of the fabulous wealth of their homeland. The state and powerful elite living 
in Lima are seen to have benefited from the export of minerals, leaving local 
                                                            
43 The saying has been common in Peru since the end of the 19th Century. Although 
traditionally, one Antonio Raimondi, the famous Italian naturalist and traveller who explored the 
Peruvian regions from 1851 to 1869, is thought to have coined the phrase, recent research 
points to a more complex social evolution (Alcocer Martínez, 2006). 
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populations worse off than before the existence of mines. The current levels of 
canon minero transfer represent the bare minimum reparation for these long 
standing legitimate grievances.  
President Garcia has recently introduced a new twist to the elite’s old ancestral 
tale, adding to it a chapter that is more confrontational and unpalatable for a large 
section of the population. In his newspaper article El perro del hortelano (the dog in 
the manger)44 (García Pérez, 2007a), Garcia proposed increased exploitation of 
natural resources (minerals, oil, gas, timber, water for electricity, extensive 
industrial crop production in the Amazon, and fisheries) should drive Peruvian 
economic development. He argued that only big private investors can afford to 
invest in technology and provide the capital that modern firms require. 
Consequently, the government should surrender control of the land, water and 
other resources to them.  
At the same time, Garcia portrays the leftist opposition, environmental NGOs, 
defenders of indigenous rights, local populations resisting extraction activities, and, 
in general, anyone who opposes his vision of development as dogs in the manger 
who want to prevent progress in the country. Here is the twist: the beggar who once 
represented the whole population has been transformed into the dog, no longer a 
victim of underdevelopment, but an active opponent of development and, therefore, 
responsible for the backwardness of the country. This discourse has put Garcia at 
odds with the majority of the population in the rural areas of the Andean and 
Amazonian regions, who feel themselves both insulted and also threatened with 
being dispossessed of their most valuable assets. Even those who do not oppose 
the expansion of the mining sector fear that Garcia’s way of thinking will weaken 
their bargaining position vis-à-vis the mining and oil companies.  
Garcia has been more outspoken and tactless than his predecessors, but his policy 
proposals are not new. Since the end of the reforming military government under 
Juan Velasco Alvarado in 1975, and most intensively when Alberto Fujimori took 
power in 1990, Peruvian governments have engaged in market-oriented reforms 
that eroded the ‘corporatist citizenship regime’ developed between 1968 and 1975 
                                                            
44 A reference to Aesop’s fable about a dog that does not allow the cattle to eat hay because it 
cannot eat hay. 
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(Yashar, 2005).45 This erosion particularly affected the rural population in the 
Andean and Amazonian regions. The liberalisation of agriculture prices, eradication 
of agriculture subsidies, elimination of public credit programmes for peasants, and 
the promotion of free land markets hit the rural population (Yashar, 2005:67-68). 
The adoption of this neo-liberal agenda transformed the relationship between the 
state and citizens in rural areas.  
During Velasco’s regimen the state assumed the role of protector of collective 
rights and provider of social services. Although these policies did not last very long, 
they had an important impact on shaping public ideas about citizens’ entitlements. 
People in rural areas of the country learnt that they had the right to enjoy good 
public services. The subsequent neoliberal change in policies alienated once again 
the rural population from the state. They perceived that the state had no interest or 
presence in remote communities except when it needed to impose – frequently by 
violent means – the interests of the economic elite. The recent government support 
for mining and oil companies in their confrontations with local populations 
reinforced this perception.  
My aim in this chapter is to set the implementation of the New Extractive Industry 
Strategy (NEIS) in context by giving a brief historical account of this change in 
state-citizens relations. It then briefly reviews three aspects of Peru’s political 
economy that have affected the outcome of the NEIS. The first is the uneven 
distribution of the benefits of the recent economic growth and the widespread lack 
of trust in public institutions. The second is the experience of previous cycles of 
extraction in Peru, their related political dynamics repercussions on the populations 
close to the mines. The third is the emergence of local actors in the countryside as 
the main challengers to the state’s authority. The analysis of these three factors 
helps an understanding of the outcomes and political dynamics triggered by the 
implementation of the NEIS.  
3.1 Changes in state-citizen relations in the countryside 
The relationship between the state and the rural population in the Andean areas 
has been problematic throughout the history of the Republic of Peru. In 1928, 
                                                            
45 For an analysis of the installation and achievements of the corporatist regime of Velasco 
Alvarado in Peru see Stepan (1978). Collier (1995) offers a comparative perspective of 
corporatism in Latin America.  
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Mariategui argued that the persistence of a very unequal pattern of land ownership 
was responsible for the backwardness of the country and the miserable conditions 
of the rural population (Mariategui, 2007):  
The individualistic character of the Republic's legislation has favoured the 
absorption of Indian property by the latifundistas46. The appropriation of 
most communal and individual Indian property is an accomplished fact. 
(p. 30)  
There are two expressions of feudalism that survive: the latifundium 
model and servitude. Inseparable and of the same substance, their 
analysis leads us to the conclusion that the servitude oppressing the 
indigenous race cannot be abolished unless the latifundium is abolished. 
(p. 40) 
These problems remained unresolved for another 30 years. During the 1950’s 
increasing numbers of Andean people migrated to Lima to look for a better life and 
escape their grim fate.47 Massive migration changed the appearance and the social 
dynamics of the once aristocratic Lima and also contributed to the transformation of 
the countryside. Migrants in the capital maintained their links with their families in 
the countryside and  helped to diffuse new social, cultural and political customs in 
the rural areas (Cotler, 1968:241). These changes in rural societies, the 
peasantry’s per capita income stagnation, and the modernisation interests of an 
incipient bourgeois in the towns of the highland provinces combined to challenge 
the concentration of land in the hands of a few owners. In the early 1960’s Peru 
experienced one of the largest peasant mobilisations in Latin American history 
(Stepan, 1978:123). The invasion of land in Pasco, Junín and Cusco constituted 
the peak of this wave of contention, which preceded the appearance of ‘Cuban-
style’ guerrilla groups in Junín, Cusco and Ayacucho (Bourque & Palmer, 1975; 
Harding, 1975). The situation demanded reforms but the weak government of 
Belaunde (1963–1968) was incapable of providing them.  
3.1.1 The revolutionary experiment of Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975)  
The military government of Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975) made a serious attempt 
to overcome these problems. The Peruvian military knew at first hand the severity 
of the situation because they had had to deal with insurgency and social protest in 
                                                            
46 Owners of large rural states.  
47  The population of Lima grew from 645,000 in 1950 to 1,847,000 in 1960, and 3,300,000 in 
1970.  
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the pueblos jóvenes48 and during the peasant uprisings. The army also realised 
that lack of development was the main threat to national security (Stepan, 
1978:127-136). Thus, in contrast to the traditional military coalition with the 
oligarchy, the new government aimed to transform Peruvian social structure 
completely.   
The ‘Peruvian experiment’ received as much initial support as it has subsequent 
criticism. Setting aside the endless argument over its real achievements, both its 
successes and failures had a significant and long-lasting impact on the 
transformation of political actors and culture. Velasco Alvarado gave the non-white 
population – the majority of Peruvians – the opportunity to identify themselves with 
a president whose nickname, the chino, referred to his cholo [brown skinned] 
appearance. Moreover, the revolutionary rhetoric that spoke of forging the ‘new 
Peruvian’ through the extension of high quality education brought hope to the rural 
masses and the urban poor.  
The ‘revolutionary government’ undertook a series of far-reaching economic and 
social reforms – Peruvian land reform was the most comprehensive in Latin 
America. By 1979, the hacienda tenure system had disappeared. Approximately 
nine million hectares, which accounted for 60 per cent of total agricultural income, 
were distributed to 375,000 families, 25 per cent of the total farming population 
(Eguren, 2006:12; Klarén, 2000:347).  
In the economic field, the new regime promoted greater involvement by the state. 
The diagnosis was that the old provincial elite, or ‘gamonales’, and foreign 
companies had been capturing most of the economic surplus without reinvesting it. 
Thus, the solution was to nationalise the large foreign concerns in the oil and 
mining sectors and promote an autonomous model of economic development 
based on import-substituting industrialisation rather than on the export of 
commodities (Thorp & Bertram, 1978).  
The results were mixed.49 Land reform did not benefit the poorest peasants who 
lived outside the confines of the expropriated haciendas (Bourque & Palmer, 1975; 
                                                            
48 ‘New towns’: the name given to the shanty towns on the outskirts of Lima to project the idea 
of a more positive future.  
49 A comprehensive evaluation of the sectoral policies of the revolution can be found in 
Lowenthal (1975).  
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Harding, 1975). Moreover, the rapid growth of the population conflicted with the 
scarcity of fertile land in the Andes and few opportunities in other economic 
activities (Sheahan, 1999:172). People continued flowing into the cities, searching 
for jobs, but the state could not offer them a basic infrastructure or services (D. 
Collier, 1975). The industrialisation process achieved some initial success in 
expanding the manufacturing sector, but foreign investment soon dried up and the 
state had to subsidise private initiatives. The failure to run state-owned companies 
on profitable lines and the expansion of public expenditure led to an unsustainable 
fiscal deficit that reached a critical level in 1975, when the international banks 
curtailed their previously generous lending policies (Thorp & Bertram, 1978).  
Furthermore, the inability of the state to meet popular expectations spawned social 
mobilisation that ran out of control. The government tried to tame these 
spontaneous movements, launching the National System of Social Mobilisation 
(SINAMOS), which promoted and managed popular organisations (Stepan, 1978). 
It also sought to create a social basis for the revolution, eroding the popular support 
for political parties. However, the attempt to mobilise the populace came too late. 
Economic problems and social unrest – in combination with Velasco’s ill health – 
led to a change in leadership and a complete revision of policies.  
A group of conservative army officers took power in 1975, restoring orthodox 
economic policies under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Although it was relatively easy to reverse a highly centralised ‘top-down’ revolution, 
the new ‘counterrevolution’ faced mounting popular opposition from an array of 
groups and social organisations that had blossomed in the shadow of the 
revolutionary impulse (Klarén, 2000:359-361). This process initiated a very 
unstable period. Realising that they were unable to steady the polity, the army 
prepared for the transition to democracy, calling for free elections in 1980.  
Despite Velasco’s apparent failure, his tenure had important and long-lasting 
consequences in terms of the advent of new political actors. His government 
fostered the emergence of hitherto unseen processes, so that new entrepreneurs, 
middle class professionals, peasant and popular organisations, and labour unions 
increased their political visibility (Morón & Sanborn, 2006:14-15). In the 
countryside, the land reform transformed the social landscape and the self-image of 
the peasantry. The revolutionary government used the term ‘peasant’ to include 
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both the mestizo and the indigenous population. However, the prescriptive rhetoric 
echoed the words of the indigenous leader, Túpac Amaru II, who had fought for 
independence “Peasant, the landlord will eat no more from your poverty” (Klarén, 
2000:346).  
This combination of discourses and historical figures prompted a threefold process 
of awareness among the peasants of the Andean provinces of their: (i) indigenous 
identity - their rights as the original population; (ii) class identity - their rights 
because they work the land; and, (iii) nationalist identity -  their rights as  Peruvian 
citizens. These three aspects of identity were weighted differently according to the 
group, time or political opportunity.  
3.1.2 The restoration of democracy and the internal war (1980-1990) 
The restoration of democracy in 1980 did not improve the situation. The two 
subsequent governments of Belaunde (1980–1985) and Garcia (1985–1990) 
implemented a mixture of orthodox and populist policies. Their economic strategies 
were at least partially responsible for the grim legacy of political violence, 
hyperinflation, fiscal bankruptcy and discredited institutions (Crabtree, 1992; 
Sheahan, 1999). Public foreign debt increased from USD 6.9 billion (28 per cent of 
GDP) in 1982 to USD 16.27 billion (69 per cent of GDP) in 1988 (Ministerio de 
Economía y Finanzas - Perú, 2009). Moreover, GDP per capita fell by 25 per cent 
between 1980 and 1989; and inflation escalated from an already high 59 per cent in 
1980 to 7,482 per cent in 1990 (Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, 2009).  
Furthermore, the violence of the Shining Path swept the countryside, causing 
terror, thousands of victims, and the frequent destruction of the existing forms of 
political organisation. A combination of three factors generated the conditions for 
this violent eruption. First, the agrarian reform had put an end to relations and 
destroyed the political power of landlords, opening new political spaces that the 
state was unable to fill (Kay, 2001). Second, the distance between the radical 
discourse of the revolution and its real achievements on the ground nurtured 
frustration and increased the popularity of more radical discourses (Mallon, 1998). 
Finally, the retreat of the state from the countryside in the late 1970’s gave the 
Shining Path the opportunity to spread its radical ideology and to build its 
stronghold in rural areas of the Andes.  
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The Shining Path used Maoist strategies and took advantage of this political 
opportunity to challenge the power of the Peruvian state from the countryside. 
Brutal reprisals from the army often followed the escalating atrocities of the 
guerrillas. Consequently, the peasantry was caught in the crossfire in wide areas of 
the sierra, placing an additional and cruel burden on the rural and – frequently – 
indigenous population. Meanwhile, for almost the entire decade, the economic and 
political elite in Lima was apparently unaware of what was happening in the 
countryside. As one of the rural victims reported:  
The state still discriminates against the Andean people, considering us 
second class citizens. Only when the bombazos [car bombs] went off in 
Tarata50, did the people in Lima realise that something was happening in 
the country; what was going on before in the countryside was only to do 
with the cholos as far as they were concerned (CVR/Peru, 2004:101).  
This testimony illustrates the way in which the rural population in remote areas of 
the country perceived ‘Lima’, ‘the government’, and ‘the rich’ to be completely 
indifferent to what was going on in the hinterland. 
In the late 1980s, the state was so impotent that political analysts did not rule out a 
Shining Path takeover of the country, if only in the short-term. The sense of chaos 
was pervasive. Political parties, politicians and institutions were completely 
discredited and the population demanded a heavy hand to restore order.  
3.1.3 Fujimori (1990-2001): authoritarianism and neo-liberalism.  
In the presidential elections of 1990, Alberto Fujimori emerged as the country’s 
saviour. Fujimori, an academic born into a humble family of Japanese immigrants 
to Peru, appeared as the  ‘brand new’ outsider who was able to break the 
hegemony of the white ruling class (Murakami, 2007:207-218). The people wanted 
a new style of leadership and Fujimori offered an alternative to the orthodox 
formula of Vargas Llosa, the neoliberal and ‘white-rich’ candidate.  
Fujimori initially gained popular support by making a mockery of the elite-controlled 
Parliament, judiciary and traditional political parties. He governed the country by 
                                                            
50 This testimony from Edilberto Oré (December 2002) refers to the first car bomb in Lima, in 
Tarata Street, in July 1992. Shining Path’s activities in the capital had started to escalate some 
years previously, in 1988, when the Central Committee of the Shining Path decided to move the 
war from its bases in the countryside to the cities (CVR/Peru, 2004:411-417). The sense of real 
danger reached its peak in 1991–1992, when the government was forced to impose a nightly 
curfew in Lima.   
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exploiting his direct rapport with the population and marginalising representative 
institutions (Crabtree, 2000), instilling in the people a suspicion of politics, 
politicians and institutions.  
In the economic field, reneging on his electoral campaign promises, he 
implemented an orthodox and drastic neoliberal agenda.51 The ensuing harsh 
economic readjustment plan brought soaring prices under control, granting Fujimori 
further credibility among the sectors of society that had suffered the most from the 
devastating effects of hyperinflation (Murakami, 2007:258-267).  
With the backing of the army and popular support, in 1992 Fujimori dissolved 
Parliament, reformed the constitution and initiated an austerity programme that 
promised ‘efficient technical solutions’ in contrast to the chaos of the policies of 
previous governments. Moreover, his victory by force over the Shining Path and 
MRTA52 guerrilla groups in the first years of his mandate legitimised and reinforced 
his authoritarian regime.  
Fujimori succeeded in stabilising the economy and led the country to recover its 
attractiveness as an investment prospect. Accordingly, the privatisation of state-
owned utility monopolies and the mining companies promoted foreign investment 
from 1992, rehabilitating Peru back into the world economy. Since then, Peru has, 
on average, scored higher than neighbouring countries in capacity to attract foreign 
capital – an achievement in sharp contrast to Peru’s performance over the previous 
twenty years, when the country consistently ranked below its neighbours (Figure 
3.1). As a result, by 1994, the country had resumed its export tradition. 
Market liberalisation promoted the greater involvement of foreign capital, which 
assumed control of key economic sectors (Durand, 2007), limiting local capitalists’ 
room to manoeuvre. However, the traditional alliance between foreign and 
domestic investment found a new equilibrium. A leaner and fitter elite reinforced its 
position by brokering relations between foreign interests and local political powers. 
The desperate attempt of the Peruvian government to demonstrate its commitment 
                                                            
51 In the introduction to the most recent edition of his best-seller, The Other Path (1989), the 
confessional Peruvian neoliberal Hernando De Soto explains how he personally took Fujimori to 
the IMF and the World Bank in the first weeks of his tenure to convince him of the benefits of 
adhering to liberal principles.  
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The abrupt end of Fujimori’s third term of office – prompted by the disclosure of 
evidence of widespread corruption at the top levels of his regime – demanded the 
thorough reformation of the Peruvian political system. From a social perspective, 
the persistence of endemic poverty generated growing unrest that threatened 
political stability (Schuldt, 2004). In the political field, different actors challenged 
authoritarianism and the reinforced centralisation of the state. The provisional 
government of Valentín Paniagua (2000–2001) and the subsequently elected 
president, Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006), undertook the task of implementing the 
reforms.  
3.1.4 The new democratic era (2001–2008): political reform straitjacketed by an 
untouchable economic model. 
Innovations in the immediate post-Fujimori period were asymmetric. The main 
political forces simply agreed to the reformation of the political system without any 
revision of economic policy. The international institutions supported this dual 
approach to safeguarding the recovery of economic growth. Their stance was in 
line with the second generation of structural reform of the state that the IFIs 
advocated in the late 1990s in order to sustain the achievements of neoliberal 
economic adjustment in that decade (Inter-American Development Bank, 2003). 
This approach weakened the transformative capacity of the political reforms.    
The process of democratisation encompassed a broad reform agenda, fostering 
decentralisation, direct popular participation and administrative transparency 
(Remy, 2005:23-31; Tanaka, 2005:42-54). These innovations attempted to respond 
to the popular demand for a more inclusive polity. In particular, decentralisation was 
hailed as a sort of political talisman to (i) promote political participation; (ii) generate 
the incentive to respond to the demands of the public; (iii) solve long-term tensions 
between Lima and the regions; (iv) foster accountability; (v) reinforce the presence 
of the state at local level; (vi) distribute public resources more fairly; (vii) improve 
services for the population; (viii) encourage the economic development of the 
regions through the coordination of public and private investment; and (ix) drive the 
modernisation and rationalisation of the state apparatus (Monge, 2006; Polastri & 
Rojas, 2006; Ugarte, 2006: 24-25; UNDP, 2006). 54 
                                                            
54 The demand for political and administrative decentralisation goes back to the nineteenth 
century. During the last years of the first government of Alan Garcia, there was an attempt to 
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With such high expectations, Parliament reached a consensus on some key basic 
reforms and called for new presidential and parliamentary elections by 2001. The 
change from a single national electoral constituency to 25 regional constituencies 
was the first decentralisation policy that triggered later reforms. In the resulting 
parliament, 85 out of 120 members were provincianos, representatives of the 
regions (Pease, 2006:87). Between 20th July 2002 and 9th July 2004, the new 
legislature approved 11 laws directly related to decentralisation, laying the 
normative foundations of this reform process (Zas Friz Burga, 2005:29-30). 
Originally, the national parties thought that decentralisation would help them 
develop power bases in the regions. However, right from the beginning, the 
disparity between national and local politics was patent. In the first regional 
elections, Alejandro Toledo’s party won control of only 1 out of 25 new regional 
governments; the main opposition party, the American Popular Revolutionary 
Alliance (APRA), gained 12. However, by the time of the next regional election in 
November 2006, when the APRA leader, Alan Garcia, was president of the 
Republic, his party gained control of only two regional governments. An array of 
regional movements with no connection to any of the national political groups 
dominated the ballot. The failure of national parties to gain popular support in the 
regions slowed down the decentralisation process and, more importantly, shaped 
the form it would later take. The central government reinforced its control over the 
process, predetermining the function of the new governments through increasing 
the number of  centrally imposed norms and regulations (Revesz, 2009a:39-40).  
In the economic realm, the new democratic governments did not tamper with 
inherited economic policies, tending to reinforce existing patterns. The 
governments of Toledo and Garcia repeatedly appointed technocrats to manage 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and the Central Reserve Bank. Most 
Economic ministers during the period 2001–2008 belonged to an exclusive club of 
highly qualified professionals who had previously worked for the World Bank, the 
IMF or various international companies.55 They constituted a nucleus that 
                                                                                                                                                                              
promote decentralisation as the answer to the persistence of regional pressure groups active in 
the 1960s and 1970s (Crabtree, 1992:67). However, Fujimori aborted the process at its 
embryonic stage.  
55 This was the case with Javier Silva Ruete (2000–2001; 2002–2003); Pedro Pablo Kuczynski 
(2001–2002; 2004–2005); Luis Carranza (2006–2008; 2009–2010); and Luis Valdivieso (2008–
2009). 
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guaranteed the continuity of the neoliberal agenda: price stability, sound fiscal 
policies, reduction of the national debt, liberalisation of trade and, above all, the 
promotion of a favourable environment for investment. 
The alliance between the MEF and the business sector, especially the mining 
companies, dominated the political landscape during the previous two presidential 
terms. Some analysts have declared that, “the big corporations elect the minister of 
the economy, and the MEF controls the government on their behalf.”56 Moreover, 
the public relations director of the most profitable company in Peru, the Southern 
Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC), openly confirmed the corporations’ policy: 
“Private companies are the only actors who can generate wealth and provide 
stability to this troublesome country. Thus, it is clear that the government should 
subordinate the rest of its policies to the smooth running of private businesses.”57 
This alliance rests on the assumption that economic growth automatically reduces 
poverty, which, in turn, generates political stability.  
3.2 The unsatisfactory outcomes of neoliberal policies: territorial 
inequalities and lack of trust in public institutions 
The strategy of the last governments appears to have been successful, as Peru 
has consistently been named among the Latin American countries in the best 
shape to face the global crisis that began in 2008 (The Economist, 2009, 2 May: 
49-50). However, the lustre of the macroeconomic figures hides some less positive 
outcomes. Two problems illustrate the shortcomings of the strategy. First, the 
poverty gap between rural and urban Peru has widened during the last years (see 
Table 3.2). Second, there is widespread suspicion of state capture by private 
interests, especially the mining and oil companies. The sanctioning of the Mining 
Programme of Solidarity with the People (MPSP) and the revelation in October 
2008 of evidence of corruption in the granting of exploration rights to a Norwegian 
oil company reinforced this popular belief (O`Brien, 2009), further eroding the 
already weak legitimacy of the state.  
 
                                                            
56 Interview with Sinesio López (2007-011; Lima, 12-06-2007). 
57 Interview with Guillermo Vidalón (2008-149; Lima, 06-08-2008). 
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3.2.1 The poverty gap between rural and urban population 
Poverty and inequality have marked Peruvian history. Although this is a common 
feature in the Global South, the Peruvian record during the last four decades is 
sadly outstanding. In the 1970s and 1980s, the incidence of poverty increased in 
comparison to previous decades and to the rest of Latin America (Sheahan, 1999: 
105). In 2001–2008, impressive economic growth fostered a significant 
improvement in the overall level of poverty, which dropped from 54 per cent to 36 
per cent (INEI, 2009c). Yet, this reduction was concentrated in coastal and urban 
areas, leaving the rural hinterland of the Andean and Amazonian regions worse off 
in comparative terms.  








* Data for 1990 are based on expenditure at household level, 
whilst data for the remaining years are income-based.  
Source: (World Bank, 2010). 
 
Levels of inequality have increased in Peru in recent years. The Gini index was 
0.520 for 2005 (Table 3.1), meaning that Peru ranked among the most unequal 
countries in the world: 109th out of 126 (World Bank, 2010).  
A deeper analysis shows that this income inequality strongly correlates with 
geographical factors; and, that in the context of runaway economic growth, the gap 
between urban and rural areas has widened. Lima and the coastal regions have 
enjoyed the lowest levels of poverty and consistently improved their indicators over 
recent years, dropping from 39 per cent in 2001 to 21 per cent in 2008. However, in 
sharp contrast, the Andean sierra (especially its rural areas), which was already 
poorer, has made significantly weaker progress, with its level of poverty stagnating 
at a shocking 69 per cent in 2008 (Table 3.2).58 In the same year, the Pearson 
                                                            
58 See Appendix II for additional statistics for the period 2001–2008 on the percentage of the 
population living below the poverty line in different geographical regions.  
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correlation between the level of poverty and the percentage of rural population was 
0.6 and 0.9 at municipal and regional level respectively.59  
Table 3.2 Percentage of population below the poverty line in different 
geographical regions of Peru, 2008 
 Lima Coastal region Andean Sierra Amazon rainforest 
  Urban* Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Poverty % 18 23 35 34 69 31 49 
* Excluding Lima.  
Source: (INEI, 2009a). 
The figures in Table 3.2 tend to understate the real differences between regions. 
This is because official poverty levels are measured against minimum consumption 
expenditure, which varies from region to region according to an (also variable) 
basket of basic goods and services (INEI, 2009a:1-4). Differences become more 
acute on comparing per capita average monthly income by geographical areas 
(Table 3.3).60 As the figures indicate, differences in income are remarkably high 
and, although all geographical areas show improvement in average income, the 
change in rural areas – especially in the Andes– is notably smaller than in the rest 
of the country (see evolution in Appendix II).  
Table 3.3 Average monthly per capita income in different geographical areas of 
Peru, 2008  
 Lima Coastal area Andean Sierra Amazon rainforest 
  Urbana Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Incomeb 703 482 334 505 185 431 224 
a Excluding Lima; b PEN at 2001 rates. 
Source: (INEI, 2009a). 
These differences between regions are more severe in Peru than in other Latin 
American countries. Moreover, despite the existence of a process of political 
decentralisation, economic activity remains highly centralised in Lima. In 2007, 31 
per cent of the population lived in Lima, but the metropolitan area accounted for 47 
                                                            
59 Author’s elaboration with data from INEI (2008a, 2009c). 
60 The income estimate includes domestic production, payments in kind, and donations (INEI, 
2009a).  
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per cent of national GDP, 87 per cent of internal tax revenue, and 50 per cent of 
central government’s total expenditure (INEI, 2009c, 2009d). Furthermore, Peru 
represents the most extreme case in the Latin American context of the poverty gap 
between the capital city and the rural areas of the country (Table 3.4).  
The recent democratic governments have paid little attention to these problems. 
They have prioritised economic growth over poverty alleviation, trusting in the 
conventional trickle-down effect to reduce poverty (García Pérez, 2007b, 2008). 
Moreover, they perceived inequality as a mere transitory by-product of growth and 
modernisation.61 However, the fact that inequality is grounded in geographical 
cleavages challenges the government’s conviction because, in the absence of 
corrective measures, economic growth tends to exacerbate the differences. The 
government’s denial of this factor is likely to increase political instability. 
                                                            
61 This is the Kuznets hypothesis, although there is no conclusive empirical evidence in the 
Latin American context, where economic growth has traditionally gone hand in hand with an 
increase in inequality (Székely & Montes, 2006:599-602). 
Table 3.4 Relative importance of the main metropolitan area in relation to the rest of the country, and the poverty gap with respect 
to different geographical areas in various Latin American Countries  
 Bolivia Brazil Colombia Chile Ecuador Mexico Peru 
Index of metropolitan concentrationa 48 54 55 74 51 66 81 
Percentage of rural populationb 36 17 23 14 37 24 27 
Percentage of population living in 
poverty nationwidec 54 30 45 14 43 32 39 
Percentage of population living in 
poverty in metropolitan areasc 41 27 34 10 na 27 18 
Percentage of population living in 
poverty in rural areasc 76 46 51 12 50 40 65 
Poverty gap incidence between rural 
areas and the national average 22 16 6 (2) 7 8 26 
Poverty gap incidence between rural 
areas and the capital  35 19 17 2 na 13 47 
a             Percentage of the combined population of the four largest cities that lives in the largest city. The data are for different years: Peru 2007; Ecuador 2003; Bolivia 2008; 
Colombia 2007; Chile 2002; Mexico 2005; Brazil 2007.  
b        Estimated data for 2005 (ECLAC, 2010). The criteria for differentiating rural from urban areas vary from country to country (ECLAC, 2005): Bolivia: population living 
in towns of less than 2,000 inhabitants; Brazil: population living outside the limits of rural areas, according to the boundaries of municipalities; Colombia: population 
living in towns of less than 1,500 inhabitants; Chile: population living in towns of less than 1,000 inhabitants, or in towns of between 1,000 and 2,000 inhabitants in 
which at least 50 per cent of the active population works in the secondary sector; Ecuador: population living in rural parishes and on the outskirts of provincial 
capitals; Mexico: population living in towns of less than 2,500 inhabitants; Peru: population living outside district capitals in agglomerations of less than 100 houses.  
c        The data are for different years: Peru 2007; Ecuador 2007; Bolivia 2007; Colombia 2005; Chile 2006; Mexico 2006; Brazil 2007.  
Sources: (ECLAC, 2005, 2010; INEI, 2008b; World Bank, 2010), adapted by the author. 
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3.2.2 Erosion of public’s trust in political institutions 
Unsurprisingly, despite more than eight years of significant economic growth and 
poverty reduction at national level, the Peruvian public’s trust in the principal 
political institutions ranks consistently below the Latin American average (Table 
3.5), which, in turn, is not the most positive region when it comes to judging its 
institutions (World Values Survey, 2009).  
Table 3.5 Level of trust in political institutions: a comparison between Peru and 
Latin America (LA) as a whole 
Trust ina 1996 2001 2004 2007 
Peru LA Peru LA Peru LA Peru LA 
Parliament 35 26 23 25 15 26 17 31 
Judiciary 26 34 16 28 20 33 16 31 
Government 29 35 - - 9 31 22 39 
President 34b 40b 31 31 7 37 25 46 
Political parties 20 22 24 20 11 19 14 20 
Police 31 31 23 30 24 36 33 40 
a   Percentage of people who said they had ‘strong’ or ‘some’ trust in the institutions. 
b   1997 data. 
Source: (Latinobarómetro, 1995-2008). 
Trust in Parliament, the judiciary and political parties tends to decline. 
Circumstantial factors determine the scores for the government and president. 
Ironically, before the revelations of widespread mismanagement, Fujimori and his 
government (1996) achieved the highest Peruvian score. In contrast, Toledo (2004) 
attained the lowest level of popular trust ever enjoyed by any Latin American 
authority in this kind of survey. Finally, trust in  Garcia’s government started to 
decline after the first year of relatively generous public support, as his 22 per cent 
rating of 2007 declined to 15 per cent in 2008 (Latinobarómetro, 1995-2008).  
This general distrust of political institutions goes hand in hand with increasing 
discontent with the current democratic system. Only 16 per cent of the Peruvian 
population appeared to be satisfied with the political situation in 2008, the lowest 
percentage in Latin America and 21 points below the average for all Latin American 
countries. In contrast, 88 per cent believed that a few powerful groups controlled 
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the country in their own interests (Latinobarómetro, 1995-2008). This lack of public 
trust in political institutions is an important factor in the explanation for the local 
dynamics behind the increase in social conflict (Chapter 6) and the waste of 
financial resources at local level (Chapter 8).  
3.3 Economy of extraction in its historical perspective: political dynamics 
and social outcomes 
Post-independence Peru did not escape the mining character of colonial rule.  The 
Spanish crown’s avarice for Peru’s gold and silver shaped not only relations 
between colony and crown for 300 years, but also the internal economic and 
political structures inherited by the newly independent republic. This section 
examines the political dynamics and the social consequences related to this 
economy based on extraction highlighting their relevance for the implementation of 
the NEIS. 
3.3.1 Economic cycles and political dynamics 
Thorp and Bertram (1978) propose a still widely accepted view of post-colonial 
economic history structured around three major export cycles of about fifty years 
each. The guano economy characterised the first cycle, beginning in the 1830s and 
expanding until the War of the Pacific with Chile (1879–83). Peru’s defeat meant 
the destruction of the country’s economic infrastructure and brought about a time of 
political and social turmoil (Klarén, 2000:191-194).  
The second cycle began in the late 1880s, with the reconstruction of the country. 
The exploitation of minerals and the growing participation of foreign companies 
were the main features of this period, which came to an end with the Great 
Depression of 1929 (Dore, 1988).  
The third cycle ran between the economic recovery of the 1930s and the early 
1980’s.62 The Second World War and the subsequent expansion of the world 
economy fostered Peruvian exports of agricultural products, fish and minerals. 
Crops and fisheries comprised the bulk of exports in the early 1940s, but minerals 
                                                            
62 Thorp and Bertram dated in 1974 the end of this cycle. However, according to data now 
available (Figure 3.2), this period can be extended to the early 1980s. When the book was 
published in 1978, they could not predict that the crisis of the early 1970’s was only an early 
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seeking opportunities to gain access to technology, financial resources and 
international links. The political position of this coalition of local and foreign 
capitalists was reinforced by the model of export-oriented growth:   
Periods of successful export growth rapidly consolidated the political 
power of those who reaped the benefits of comparative advantage, and 
thus ensured the supremacy of policies which served their interests, so 
that the familiar orthodox policy mix of laissez-faire liberalism and 
encouragement for foreign investment grew naturally out of export 
growth, rather than vice versa. Once adopted, of course, such policies 
thereafter produced acceleration of the growth of export-linked activities, 
encouraging the concentration of economic activity in parts of the modern 
sector while the rest of the economy was left to drift (Thorp & Bertram, 
1978:323). 
Following Thorp and Beltran’s analysis, the existence of a fourth cycle that started 
in the early 1980s and is currently at the peak of a remarkable export phase (Figure 
3.3) is a reasonable hypothesis. Minerals account for almost 70 per cent of total 
exports in this most recent phase. As with the previous cycles, it started with the 
instability generated by the collapse of the preceding one, which, in turn, led to an 
initial recovery and, finally, a boom phase.63 In relation to the questions driving this 
thesis, it is relevant to analyse how this new economic cycle interacts with the 
political domain and, therefore, how it influences the implementation of the NEIS.  
As has happened in previous cycles, representatives of the leading economic 
sector gained political leverage and fostered policies favouring their interests. In 
this case, mining companies have widely publicised the importance of mining for 
the country’s economic growth and for its fiscal balance (Macroconsult, 2008). They 
tried to reinforce their political position with the government and to attract popular 
support for their activities. It is clear that during the last years, mining companies 
received full government backing by making regulations responsive to their 
commercial interests. However, this close collaboration between the mining 
companies and the government has provoked a political backlash from different 
segments of society. First, some political groups perceive the alliance between the 
government and the companies as an attempt to sell the nation’s riches off cheaply 
to foreign interests for the private gain of an elite. This nationalist discourse is 
popular with poor populations in rural areas of the Andes, the stronghold of Ollanta 
Humala, the 2006 nationalist Presidential candidate. Second, ecology groups fear 
                                                            
63 A more detailed analysis of the specific features of this hypothetical new economic cycle can 
be found in Gonzales de Olarte (2005). 
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that the government prioritises economic growth over the enforcement of 
environmental regulations. Finally, people living in resource rich areas feel that the 
government has become too close to the mining companies to be a fair arbitrator in 
their frequent disputes with them. The result is the further erosion of public trust in 
the government.  
Figure 3.3 Peruvian exports per capita, 1950–2008 (USD at 1950 rates) / minerals 
and fuel as a percentage of total Peruvian exports, 1950–2008 
                 Sources: (Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, 2009; ECLAC, 2010). 
3.3.2 Social outcomes of the extractive economy 
According to Thorp and Bertram (1978:326), acute inequality and widespread 
poverty have usually been the consequences of these economic cycles driven by 
natural resource booms. The picture of the national long-term perspective is grim 
enough, but the experience at regional level was more intricate and multifaceted. 
Mining development in the central highlands during the 20th century is a good 
example of this complexity. Academics have reached different conclusions about 
the impact of mining activities in Peruvian mining regions during the 20th century. 
Some of the pioneering studies affirmed that mining conformed to an enclave 
economy, with no linkages to other local economic sectors (Flores Galindo, 1974; 
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benefit substantially from mining because they were exploited (miners), 
dispossessed of their land (smallholder peasants), or simply neglected.  
Subsequent analyses contested, at least partially, this perspective. De Wind (1985, 
1987) agreed mining had a negative impact, but he challenged the view that  
mining was isolated from other economic activities. From the perspective of 
dependency theory, he analysed the presence of the Cerro de Pasco Copper 
Corporation (CPCC) in the central highlands and argued that by buying large land 
holdings the company tried to reduce job opportunities and salaries in the 
agriculture sector. This move aimed to facilitate the recruitment of enough workers 
for the mines. These dynamics transformed the traditional labour organisation in 
the agriculture sector and the use of land, generating long-lasting socio-economic 
changes in the rural areas. He concluded that the mining industry accumulated 
wealth at the expense of the rural agricultural sector.  
Long and Roberts (1984), not disputing the subordination of agriculture to the 
company’s interests, pointed out three main positive linkages between mining and 
the regional economy. First, mining was labour-intensive employing large number 
of miners who alternated between periods of work in the mines and subsistence 
farming. They spent their wages in the local markets, fostering a multitude of 
informal small-scale enterprises. Moreover, there were a large number of 
independent producers of ore scattered across the region that sold their production 
to the CPCC. They also required workers for their enterprises. Second, the CPCC 
and the independent producers purchased local construction materials, machinery 
and other supplies promoting local commerce and small scale manufacturing (Long 
& Roberts, 1984: 47-49). Finally, the need to ship the ores produced in small mines 
to the CPCC smelter facilities, the commercial dynamism of the region, and the 
growing mobility of people demanded transport that was mainly supplied by local 
firms. These linkages were enough to stimulate economic dynamism in the region.  
The situation started to change in the 1960s, when technological improvements in 
the mining sector reduced the workforce and transformed the relationship between 
the company and the local economy (De Wind, 1987). The process of capital 
intensification weakened the demand for local unskilled labour and locally 
manufactured machinery, eroding links with the local economy. This tendency was 
reinforced in subsequent years. Mining companies now hire qualified people from 
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Lima or other cities in the country. They purchase machinery abroad, and even the 
food supply for the workforce comes from Lima to meet the standards demanded 
by the labour unions. Nowadays inhabitants in mining areas perceive the mines to 
be controlled from Lima and bring little benefit to the locals. Not surprisingly, job 
opportunities in the mines for locals are the most frequent demand in mining 
regions.  
3.4 The emergence of new and more dispersed political actors 
The agrarian reform, the internal war, and the crisis of the political parties and 
labour unions have nurtured a redrawing of the map of Peruvian political actors. In 
the last few decades, the Peruvian elite and its challengers have moved in opposite 
directions. On the one hand, the elite has become increasingly concentrated – both 
in terms of membership and location – in Lima (Cotler, Barrenechea, Glave, 
Grompone, & Remy, 2009:13-23; Manrique, 2006:24). On the other hand, the 
challengers are now more dispersed. Local and regional movements of different 
kinds have multiplied and replaced political parties, labour unions and more 
organised urban social movements. They frequently build their constituency and 
legitimacy by echoing long fomented local struggles actualised through the 
articulation of new grievances and claims. This section presents two actors that 
strongly influence the local dynamics around the implementation of the NEIS: 
peasant communities and regional political movements.  
3.4.1 Peasant communities  
The ‘peasant community’ is a concept that includes diverse types of entity. There 
are three basic features of a community: (i) the control of resources within a 
delimited territory, (ii) some degree of communal management of these resources, 
and (iii) the existence of institutionalised organs for decision-making and external 
representation. Within this loose definition, traditional communities whose history 
goes back to the colonial era coexist with those formed through the collectivisation 
and co-operative project of Velasco Alvarado’s agrarian reform. Moreover, 
communities built around strong Quechua or Aymara indigenous traditions enjoy 
the same legal recognition as the free associations of owners of small plots of land 
(Castillo Castañeda, 2007).  
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By 2006, there were 5,818 peasant communities encompassing 4 million people – 
15 per cent of the country’s total population – occupying 25 million hectares, more 
than 40 per cent of the productive land (Castillo & Urrutia, 2007:12-14). However, 
these communities accounted for the poorest section of the population and the soil 
on their land was of comparatively low fertility.  
After the corporatist period of Velasco Alvarado (1975), the peasant communities 
fell on difficult times. Internal disputes within the communities, the violence that 
swept the Andean countryside during the 1980s, and the subsequent promotion of 
more liberal/individualist policies weakened the organisational capacity and political 
role of the Andean peasant communities. Moreover, the emergence of municipal 
governments as powerful actors eroded the role of the community as the principal 
local grassroots institution. The peasant communities controlled the territories, but 
institutional representation, political power and the economic capacity to get things 
done were put in the hands of the regional authorities. Thus, some commentators 
predicted the communities were doomed to lose their institutional importance.64 
In contrast to the diminution of their political role, simultaneous processes helped to 
keep alight the lingering embers of a more complex peasant identity. Thus, 
although ‘being an Indian’ was still considered a social stigma in the Andes, the 
growing international support for the indigenous cause in the 1980s and 1990s 
opened up spaces for the reconstruction and exploitation of an indigenous identity 
among some social leaders (Yashar, 2005). Additionally, the rondas campesinas 65 
crucial role in the fight against the Shining Path in the countryside (Degregori, 
1998) also boosted the self-image of Andean peasants as genuine Peruvians who 
defended the nation, while the blanquiñosos66 in Lima were doing nothing.67  
In the late 1990s, when the mining companies started to expand their activities in 
the Andes, seizing mineral deposits to exploit, their presence provoked indigenous-
peasant communities to reinvent themselves in answer to both the external threat 
to their control of the land and a rare opportunity to improve their economic 
                                                            
64 Interview with Alejandro Diez (2008-017; Lima 14-04-2008). 
65 Traditional rural organisations that were set up to prevent cattle rustling. Later, they started to 
play an important role in settling disputes among villagers and providing security for the 
population.  
66 White people.  
67 This is very much in contrast to the traditional image of the elite limeña, who dismiss the 
‘Indians’ as not being real patriots (Mallon, 1995:1-2). 
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situation (Castillo Castañeda, 2007; Diez 2006:88-97). Indeed, their subsequent 
interlocution with mining companies that needed their land and water reinforced 
their position, granting them a renewed political role. 
Two factors raised the leverage of the communities in their relations with the 
companies. First, the law demanded that the companies should reach an 
agreement with the owners of the land. Second, beyond this formal requirement, 
there was mounting pressure on the mining companies to obtain a ‘social licence to 
operate’. This meant that the companies had to get explicit permission from the 
local communities to proceed with their activities (World Bank, 2003: 21,50). Failure 
to procure this social license to operate led to serious loss of reputation thanks to 
the action of global networks that connected local disputes to international forums 
(Bebbington et al., 2007). 
3.4.2 Regional movements and other local actors 
Despite the prophecies of the 1980s that gave prominence to the new urban 
populations as catalysts of social change (Matos Mar, 1984), in recent years, the 
most significant forces demanding innovation have emerged from the countryside 
in regional and local scenarios. The discredit of political parties in conjunction with 
the decentralisation of resources to local and regional governments has promoted 
the emergence of fresh political leaders at grassroots level. Local politicians no 
longer need to follow a traditional party career that implies taking a party line, 
loyalty to the party leadership, and internal competition in order to demonstrate 
capability. On the contrary, in this new era, local leaders are encouraged to prove 
that they are not slaves to party discipline, or indeed to any authority beyond their 
own constituency.  
Thus, at sub-national level, politics have become the domain of local leaders with 
very weak connections to national parties. This generates a partisan dynamic 
between the centre and the regions, and between regions and districts, in which 
local leaders tend to champion popular claims in order to build their own political 
agendas in opposition to those of the regional or national governments. This 
dynamic has two consequences: (i) conflicts are sometimes local leaders’ means of 
gaining popular support (Revesz & Diez, 2006); and (ii)  local leaders take little part 
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in national politics, and regional perspectives are thus underrepresented at national 
level.  
The frentes de defensa68 have recently proliferated as local political organisations 
in the countryside. These frentes bring together an array of regional groups to 
defend local interests and, increasingly, to oppose policies that affect them. They 
are usually formed when institutional channels have proved to be inefficient, 
consequently, their approach combines popular mobilisation (demonstrations, 
marches, public assemblies, and, in some case, regional strikes) with the 
advancement of an agenda for negotiation. This kind of organisation is very flexible 
in terms of both its membership and thematic focus. Once a frente has 
demonstrated its ability to challenge authority on one specific issue, the same 
name, organisational structure and strategies are frequently used to address other 
problems. Sometimes leaders use their participation in the frentes as a platform to 
advance their own political careers, or to contest local and regional elections 
(Panfichi, 2010).  
 As with peasant communities, the growing presence of mining companies in the 
countryside has incited the formation of larger number of frentes. Despite their 
success, the frentes remain highly localised and until now have not shown 
themselves to be either capable of, or interested in forming a more articulate 
national social movement (Panfichi, 2009).69 But this could change.  
In summary, the emergence of actors who channel local discontent directly to the 
authorities has made the persistence of poverty and inequality affecting rural areas 
increasingly untenable for the central government. This has increased the instability 
of the Peruvian polity. Each of these actors alone lacks the capacity to successfully 
challenge the central authority. However, their fragmentation and lack of connection 
with national parties, economic power bases or the central government all make it 
more difficult than in the past to co-opt or repress them.  
                                                            
68 Defence fronts. 
69 The indigenous demonstrations of 2008 and 2009 are a possible exception due to the pre-
existence of the National Organization of the Amazon Indigenous People of Peru (AIDESEP) 
and the Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru (CONAP), national umbrella 
organisations that encompass local organisations all over the Peruvian Amazon.  
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Most ‘developing countries’ face significant problems of governance and political 
legitimacy. These have always existed in Peru. They have become really severe in 
recent years. The implementation of the NEIS should be examined against this 
background of the growing alienation of the rural population from the state, the 
accumulation of local grievances aimed at the centralised elite, the discredit of 
institutions, the historical experience of mining activities and the emergence of an 
increasing number of widely dispersed political actors. 
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Chapter 4 
Perspectives on social conflict in mining areas 
 
This and the two succeeding chapters examine the relationship between social 
conflict and the implementation of the New Extractive Industry Strategy (NEIS) in 
the mining regions of Peru. The NEIS policies were deliberately designed to reduce 
friction between local populations and mining companies. Thus, the claim that the 
NEIS has not only failed to reduce social conflict, but, in fact, has multiplied them 
puts seriously into question the soundness of the strategy. These three chapters 
aim to substantiate this claim through a three step analysis. I start by reviewing, in 
this chapter, the conventional wisdom concerning the relationship between mining 
and local disturbances. In Chapter 5, I use a dataset of social conflict in Peru to test 
quantitatively the factors affecting the variations in the incidence of conflicts across 
the Peruvian regions. The results show a clear correlation between the increase in 
social conflict and the amount of canon transfers received by the sub-national 
governments of the region which in turn, are directly associated with the profits of 
the mines in the same region. These results are unexpected because previous 
studies did not suggest this ‘money’ factor as a possible cause of disturbances. In 
Chapter 6, I present the results of my field research into social conflict in 3 regions. 
These support the claim that the level of canon minero transfer is the dominant 
driver of conflict.  
Thus, I start my analysis by asking what is known about the relationship between 
mining and social conflict. First I examine what different Peruvian actors have to 
say about the issue. Second, I review the academic literature on the topic. I 
conclude with some reflections about how to research the issue.  
Neither popular nor academic explanations of mining and social conflict in Peru 
take sufficient account of the situation created in the mining areas by the 
implementation of the NEIS. The public debate mainly concerns stereotypical 
interpretations that overlook the diversity and complexity of social conflicts, while 
academic studies focus on a small group of cases where impact on the 
environment and uncertainty about livelihoods were the most significant issues. 
Although these studies contribute to a better understanding of these disputes, they 
have not captured the emergence of new types of social conflict. Thus, the chapter 
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ends by arguing the case for a broader methodological perspective to the study of 
mining-related conflicts in Peru.  
4.1 What do different Peruvian actors think about social conflict and 
mining?  
I begin this thesis by telling the stories of Santiago, Isabel and Antonio (Chapter 1), 
and their involvement in three different mining-related conflicts. Unfortunately, their 
stories are not exceptional. From 2004–2008, there was an upsurge in social 
conflict in Peru (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2009). This growing social unrest is also 
captured in Peru’s remarkably low score and deteriorating trend in political stability, 
as measured in the World Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2009).   
Untypically, the Peruvian government, the mining companies, and leaders of social 
movements agreed that extractive activities were at the centre of the escalation of 
social conflict. However, as was to be expected, they offered an array of divergent 
and frequently conflicting explanations.  
The national government gave two different types of explanation for the high 
incidence of disputes in mining regions. The first centred on the behaviour of 
opposition movements, while the second blamed the poor performance of local 
government. The government used the first type of explanation for conflicts that 
grew into national political issues. The president himself repeatedly declared that 
they were the result either of the concerted resistance of ignorant rural inhabitants 
to the very modernisation process that would bring prosperity to them, or of an 
international communist conspiracy against the country’s most dynamic economic 
sector (García Pérez, 2007a). Frequently, the two arguments were combined into a 
catch-all explanation of how global forces in collaboration with allegedly left-leaning 
international NGOs and their domestic counterparts, the progressive wing of the 
church and other supposedly radical groups to manipulate an ignorant population to 
create conditions favourable for popular rebellion (El Comercio, 2008b; García 
Pérez, 2009).70  
Thus, taking the clash in Bagua in which my friend Santiago was wounded, the 
official line given by various ministers and President García himself was that 
                                                            
70 This was also the opinion of some company managers in the following personal interviews: 
2007-005 (Lima, 11-06-2007); 2008-051 (Pasco, 13-05-2008); 2008-102 (Huaraz, 23-06-2008); 
2008-149 (Lima, 06-08-2008).  
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international forces in collaboration with local radicals had manipulated the 
uneducated indigenous population with the intention of impeding the modernisation 
of Peru.71 When Santiago heard this presidential statement, he felt that the 
government did not understand what had really happened. He explained to me that 
the protest was a genuine grassroots movement born out of people’s real fear of 
losing control over their territory.   
This type of official explanation is not only inadequate, but also dangerous because 
it led to the heavy-handed repression of popular movements. García’s statement 
after the bloodbath in Bagua illustrates his approach: “the government is 
determined not to allow a group of 400,000 indigenous people, who are not first 
class citizens, to decide what to do in the country.”72 The government replicated 
this repressive stance in other places, as the tragic militarisation of localities around 
the Rio Blanco project (Majaz) demonstrates.73 
The government sometimes uses a second type of explanation. When confronted 
with the fact that protesters frequently did not oppose mining per se, ministers and 
high ranking bureaucrats put the blame on the sub-national governments and their 
inadequate responses to the needs of their people.74  
Mining companies were deeply concerned about the escalation in conflicts, and 
perceived them as a real threat to their businesses. At the international level, the 
Fraser Institute’s Annual Survey of Mining Companies ranked Peru among the 
most attractive countries in terms of the economic potential of its mineral reserves, 
but very low in terms of political variables – security, political stability and disputes 
over land and indigenous people’s rights (Fraser Institute, 2009).75 A survey among 
the top managers of 36 of the most important mining companies operating in Peru 
corroborated this view (Apoyo, 2009a). The respondents identified the incidence of 
social conflict – in 98 per cent of cases – and political instability – in 90 per cent of 
cases – as the two factors most detrimental to mining investment, way above other 
                                                            
71 This discourse is in line with President Garcia’s fixation with ‘the dog in a manger’ fable as a 
means of explaining Peru’s problems (García Pérez, 2007a). 
72 The interview can be seen at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDVgw4pbHEk 
73  http://www.larepublica.pe/archive/all/larepublica/20091213/1/01/todos  
74 Presentation of the Minister of Trade at the 29th Mining Convention (Arequipa, 16-09-2009). 
75 The Fraser Institute sent a questionnaire to approximately 3,000 exploration, development 
and mining consultation companies around the world. Its Annual Survey of Mining Companies 
represents responses from 658 of these companies. 
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typical business concerns such as the tax system – 48 per cent of cases – or credit 
availability – 5 per cent of cases. 
However, the mining companies were by no means unanimous about the reasons 
behind the growing incidence of conflict; and in my interviews with corporation 
representatives I came across at least two quite different perspectives. The 
Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC)76 and a group of middle-sized 
companies with strong connections to the Peruvian political elite tended to endorse 
the official explanation for conflicts as the work of ‘troublemakers’.77 Some even 
went as far as to put the blame squarely on terrorist elements supposedly linked to 
the Shining Path.78  
Alternatively, some mining companies – especially the big international concerns 
with extensive experience worldwide – recognised that no conspiracy theory was 
needed to account for the proliferation of conflict situations, and listed a set of more 
prosaic explanations. First, they were well aware of the impact mining has on host 
communities. In the words of one manager: “mining activities are closer to the 
harmful effects of the tobacco industry than to a bucolic dairy farm in the pristine 
countryside”.79 Second, they tended to blame the state for its inability to deliver 
services to its population and for its failure to guarantee a business-friendly 
environment at local level.80 Finally, in private, some managers conceded that the 
inappropriate behaviour of some companies generated problems. Among bad 
corporate practices they cited attempts to mislead the population over the real 
                                                            
76 In recent years, SPCC has consistently been ranked among the three largest  – in terms of 
income – and most profitable companies in the country (CONASEV, 2010). Since the early 
2000s, it has been part of the Grupo Mexico, which bought it from the previous US owners. The 
linkages between SPCC and the Peruvian political elite are well established. The career 
trajectory of one of its most senior managers, Hans Flury, illustrates these connections. He has 
worked for SPCC for more than 30 years. In 1997 he was elected president of the National 
Society of Mining Oil and Energy (NSMOE). In 2003, he left SPCC to become Minister of Mining 
and Energy. After some months in that position, he went straight back to SPCC. In 2009, he 
once again assumed the presidency of the NSMOE, while maintaining his responsibilities at 
SPCC.   
77 This was the opinion of company managers in the following personal interviews: 2007-005 
(Lima, 11-06-2007); 2008-051 (Pasco, 13-05-2008); 2008-102 (Huaraz, 23-06-2008); 2008-149 
(Lima, 06-08-2008).  
78 Interview 2008-051 (Pasco, 13-05-2008). 
79 Interview 2008-084 (10-06-2008). 
80 Interview 2008-083 (Lima, 9-06-2008) and a study commissioned by the NSMOE (Apoyo, 
2009a). 
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impact of mining operations, mafia-like strategies to intimidate local opposition, and 
disrespect for local authorities.  
These private confessions portray a lack of unity in the industry, whereby 
international newcomer companies feel uneasy about the way their peers have 
managed relations with national and local political actors. In a particularly shocking 
statement, a senior manager of one international company said they hoped (SPCC) 
would not go ahead with its new Tia María operation, which had met strong 
opposition from the peasant population of Islay (Arequipa). According to this 
informant, SPCC had “handled things so badly that a green light for this operation 
will mean that anything is permitted and, consequently, some companies can 
maintain their unscrupulous style of doing things.” He added that, “it would be the 
wrong signal for the industry as it would jeopardise the future of mining in the 
country”.81 
The social movement around mining has also its internal differences. Most groups 
tend to think of social conflict simply as concerted popular resistance to global 
capitalist forces and environmental destruction, the mining sector being regarded 
as the epitome of such exploitation (Bajo la Lupa, 2009; Echave de, Hoetmer, & 
Palacios, 2009; Palacín, 2008). However, other civil society groups such as Oxfam, 
CooperAccion and Labor82 do not rule out the possibility that under the right 
conditions mining could contribute to local development. They suggest conflicts are 
mainly caused by lack of institutional arrangements to properly regulate mining 
operations, and to the myopic perspective of the companies in forcing local 
administrative processes to dance to the tune of maximum short-term company 
profits.83  
Unfortunately, the two extreme interpretations of conflict – the official conspiracy 
theory and the narrative of popular resistance to environmental destruction – are 
the most widespread in the media and dominate the political debate. They tend to 
oversimplify the situation, ignoring the existence of different types of conflict and 
the complex web of interests at stake. The prevalence of these discourses also 
results in limited political diagnosis and confrontational attitudes that frequently 
                                                            
81 Interview 2010-201 (Lima, 5-04-2010). 
82 CooperAccion and Labor are well respected Peruvian NGOs with a long tradition of work on 
behalf of populations affected by extractive industries.  
83 Interview 2010-006 (08-04-2008). 
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worsen the situation. Although conflict is sometimes unavoidable – and may even 
be productive – the stories of Santiago and the others seriously injured or killed in 
Bagua and similar incidents elsewhere, demand a deeper understanding of the 
situation so that better and more appropriate institutions and mechanisms are put in 
place to deal with  conflicts of interest in a less violent and painful fashion.  
4.2 What does the academic literature say about the relationship between 
mining and social conflict? 
Over the last decade, research into the links between social conflict and the 
intensive exploitation of minerals and oil has generated two different – largely 
unrelated – bodies of literature. Economists and political scientists have studied the 
influence of natural resources on the outbreak and duration of civil wars.84 
Frequently these authors have framed their research within the debate surrounding 
the ‘resource curse’ hypothesis (see Section 1.4). Most of these studies rely 
primarily on large-N cross-country comparative analyses, although some authors 
have also carried out small-N comparisons and national case studies (Holden & 
Jacobson, 2007; Ross, 2004a; Weinstein, 2007).  
Another body of literature deals with conflicts related to the exploitation of natural 
resources that do not conform to the definition of civil war. These studies have 
focused on how mines and oil wells – typically owned or managed by large, 
powerful, international companies – affect (poor) communities in their localities.85 
Such conflicts usually have a local dimension and are the domain of 
anthropologists and political geographers who conduct single case studies or small-
N comparative studies.  
It is clear that from 2004-2008, there was nothing resembling civil war in Peru. The 
most common type of social conflict in Peru comprised middle ground  disturbances 
in which a group of protesters did at least one of the following: (i) threatened the 
                                                            
84 Civil war is usually defined as a conflict over government or territory that involves a minimum 
of 1,000 battle-related deaths per year in the case of a full-scale civil war, and 25 for lower-
intensity internal armed conflict. 
85 Comparatively, mining has received more attention than oil regarding this kind of dispute with 
local communities. The growing difficulty faced by mining companies in appeasing local 
populations near their operations might explain this special interest. However, the oil-related 
Niger Delta case that recently hit world headlines has attracted wide academic interest (Frynas, 
2000; Watts, 2004), partly because oil in the Delta has an unusually highly adverse 
environmental impact. 
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integrity of life or health; (ii) damaged private or public property; (iii) obstructed 
freedom of movement; (iv) impeded the exercise of public authority; and/or (v) 
obstructed public service delivery (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2009). This kind of social 
conflict is due to the impact of mines and oil wells on local communities rather than 
civil war. Having reviewed  − in the first chapter − the literature on the relationship 
between war and natural resource exploitation, in this section I examine the 
literature on these more localised conflicts, first in places other than Peru, and then 
recent studies of Peruvian cases.  
4.2.1 The comparative literature 
Recent studies of social conflict generated around mining have paid special 
attention to the Melanesian and Andean regions because of the importance of 
mining and the high incidence of disturbances. From this literature, three main 
types of explanation for mining-related conflicts emerge: (i) ecological crisis; (ii) 
threat to local livelihood; and (iii) dissatisfaction with the distribution of rent. Of 
course, these hypothetical causes rarely define clear-cut processes. In most cases, 
they are amalgamated into a single local discourse; and, indeed, they are usually 
variously and simultaneously said to be at work in each actual  situation (Banks, 
2005). However, for the sake of analytical clarity, I present them separately and 
highlight their differences.  
The environmental damage caused by large mines has been the most popular 
explanation for the social conflict surrounding the mining industry. Pioneering work 
on Melanesian communities pointed to the negative impact of these mining-created 
‘ecological crises’ on the lives of indigenous populations as the main factor behind 
conflicts in Papua New Guinea (Hyndman, 1995, 2001; Kirsch, 2004). Martínez-
Alier (2002:54-77) also refers to  ‘ecological conflicts’ in his historical analysis of 
mining impact. However, he introduces a political perspective when he frames 
environmental degradation in the context of a broader struggle over the control of 
resources. 
This environmental focus has been challenged from two different perspectives. 
First, Banks (2002) claims that mining conflicts in Melanesia are at least as much 
about community development and livelihoods as they are about the environment. 
However, he argues that problems are framed as environmental or ecological 
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issues because this allows the affected populations and their allies to “tap into the 
strong international vein of environmental rhetoric to attract support in the 
developed world” (p.42).  
In the Andean context, a group of scholars also focused on the disruption to local 
livelihoods as the main explanation for this kind of conflict (Bebbington & Bury, 
2009; Bebbington, Hinojosa et al., 2008; Bury, 2002). According to them, mining 
activities generate uncertainty within the local population about their livelihoods and 
control over key assets such as water and land. A community that relies mainly on 
agriculture cannot afford the risk of depreciation in either the quantity or the quality 
of these assets. Thus, although environmental damage might be one outcome of a 
mining operation, the main engine of conflict is uncertainty over sustainable 
livelihoods.  
Second, some authors push the challenge to the traditional environmental 
explanation even further, claiming that at least some conflicts must be understood 
in terms of competition over resource rents (Filer & Macintyre, 2006). Banks 
(2005:190) argues that traditional indigenous institutions in Melanesia were not 
designed to handle the distribution of mining revenue, resulting in disputes within 
the communities. MacIntyre and Foale (2002) focus on the relationship between the 
companies and local population, claiming that beyond real environmental fears, 
“the desire for development and wealth dominates discussions and the emphasis is 
on the extraction of benefits for local people, financial compensation for loss of land 
and resources, and improvements of infrastructure and services” (p.3). These 
findings about the relationship between resource rents and conflict at the local level 
in Melanesian mining regions suggest that something similar might be happening in 
Peru. Thus, I will consider these three explanations in my enquiry into the 
relationship between conflict and mining in Peru after the implementation of the 
NEIS.  
4.2.2 Literature on Peruvian cases 
Social conflict has also attracted the attention of scholars in Peru. Most analyses of 
conflicts around mining in Peru focus on a handful of emblematic cases, notably 
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those in Piura – Tambogrande and Rio Blanco – and Cajamarca.86 Local opposition 
to new mining operations is the main cause of conflicts in Piura (Paredes, 2008; 
Revesz, 2009a, 2009b). The situation in Cajamarca is more complex: the 
prominent popular struggle against the expansion of the Yanacocha mine to Quilish 
Hill is a rare, although symbolically and politically important, case of collective 
opposition to mining. However, as some authors have pointed out, most opposition 
to mining in Cajamarca does not involve radical opposition to mining per se, but is 
an attempt to obtain satisfactory solutions to concrete, negotiable grievances and 
expectations (Bebbington, Hinojosa et al., 2008; Bury, 2002; Lingan, 2008; Tanaka 
& Meléndez, 2009).  
Salas (2008) and Gil (2009) focus their studies on the initial stages of the Antamina 
operation. Through a detailed ethnographic analysis they reveal how 
disagreements about compensation packages and resettlement were shaped by a 
complex combination of factors. They explain that the clumsy behaviour of the 
company interacted with the interests of some leaders to provoke social conflict. 
Both authors also point out that demands for financial compensation were already 
mixed up with other types of discourse in the conflicts between the company and 
the communities.  
The core of the research into mining and conflict in Peru presents a coherent 
narrative about the effects of mining on livelihoods. Extraction industries’ 
exploitation of mineral deposits generates local uncertainty about livelihoods and 
the control of key assets such as water and land (Bebbington, Humphreys 
Bebbington et al., 2008; Bebbington & Bury, 2009: 2-4; Bury, 2002).  
Moreover, a series of institutional distortions characterise the interactions between 
extraction companies and local populations who remain unconvinced of the 
benefits of extraction. The state is generally eager to promote investment and is 
                                                            
86 There have been also studies on Tintaya (Cuzco), Antamina (Ancash), and Las Bambas 
(Apurimac). Tintaya is frequently portrayed as an example of successful negotiations between 
the company and the population through the mediation of national and international NGOs 
(Aroca, 2008; Echave de, Keenan, Romero, & Tapia, 2005). Antamina has attracted attention 
on account of its enormous scale and the company’s attempts to constructively engage with the 
local population (ICMM, 2007; Sanborn, Portocarrero, & Camacho, 2007). Finally, Las Bambas 
– still to commence construction – is expected to be the largest single mining investment in the 
history of Peru (Cooperacción, 2006; El Comercio, 2009; Gouley & Kuramoto, 2007). 
 
− 83 − 
 
therefore reluctant to enforce regulations that can upset the companies. This 
arouses local suspicions of government collusion with company interests 
(Bebbington, et al., 2007: 5; de Echave et al., 2009: 389-390). In this context, local 
people conclude that open conflict is the only way to challenge the power of a de 
facto state–business alliance (Bebbington & Bury, 2009). 
Although these studies on different conflicts in Peru provide a solid foundation for 
further enquiry into the topic, they collectively suffer three limitations. First, most 
deal with the situation before 2006 – the year that mineral prices boomed and 
social conflicts increased. Second, they focus on a handful of emblematic cases 
without considering the existence of a greater variety of conflicts. Finally, they tend 
to define mining conflicts as those involving active local opposition to the actions or 
presence of a mining company, thereby missing the extent to which mining also 
generates or exacerbates pre-existing conflicts within local society. 
4.3 A new analytical framework for the study of the relationship between 
mining and conflict. 
I argue that the implementation of the NEIS has changed the politics surrounding 
mining issues and social conflict. In assessing this new situation, I propose an 
analytical framework that takes into consideration two key aspects of the 
relationship between mining and social conflict: (i) the identification of new mining-
related conflicts; and (ii) the relationship between intentions and legitimising 
discourses. Before presenting this analytical framework, I review the main features 
of the NEIS that have influenced the transformation of mining-related conflicts.   
As stated in Chapter 1, the NEIS is a collection of policies aimed at counteracting 
hostility towards extractive industries through the devolution of a portion of the rents 
generated to populations living close to mines, and oil and gas wells. However, it is 
important to note that the NEIS is not a precise set of policies that are strictly 
implemented according to a well-defined ‘Washington Consensus’ type of plan. 
Rather, it constitutes a flexible framework that has been applied differently in 
different contexts. Generic political principles have been adapted in each country 
according to the interests and relative power of the mining companies, national 
government, political parties, and sub-national political movements (ICMM, 2006c).   
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Peru has adopted a radical version of the NEIS. An analysis of the case reveals the 
logic behind this set of policies. Since 2002, sub-national governments of regions 
and municipalities in which mines are located have received 50 per cent of the 
corporation tax paid by mining companies to the national government. Additionally, 
since 2006, the mining companies have become increasingly involved in the 
promotion of local development through the Mining Programme of Solidarity with 
the People (MPSP). Such a radical implementation of the NEIS results from the 
confluence of three political factors.  
First, the companies needed to respond to popular resistance to the construction of 
new mines and the expansion of existing operations, which had threatened the 
good prospects of the mining industry in Peru since the early 2000s. Second, the 
increase in the percentage of tax distributed to sub-national governments was 
considered to be an obvious step on the road to democratisation and 
decentralisation impelled by the fall of the Fujimori regime. The weakness of central 
government and the national parties vis-à-vis the mining industry and regional 
political movements made this massive devolution of revenues politically viable. 
Finally, in the middle of a boom in mineral prices, the growing dependence of the 
Peruvian economy on its capacity to attract fresh investment in the mining sector 
provided the companies with sufficient political leverage to consolidate a favourable 
tax regime. In 2006, despite mounting popular pressure for a windfall tax and a 
favourable international environment for the introduction of such a measure, Alan 
Garcia’s government bowed to the demands of the mining companies and agreed 
to set up the MPSP, an alternative voluntary contribution system directly managed 
by the mining companies as an alternative to a new tax.   
The Peruvian government and the mining companies operating in the country used 
the changes in legislation for the distribution of the canon minero and the 
introduction of the MPSP as a quick fix to avoid the revision of key aspects of the 
mining industry. Popular mobilisations opposing mining expansion in 
Tambogrande, Cajamarca and Moquegua in the early 2000s (De Echave et al., 
2009) signified the emergence of a new ethos that proclaimed the people’s right to 
have a say in projects directly affecting their lives, and greater transparency in the 
relationship between the state and private investors. However, the government and 
the mining companies were concerned that allowing the public the power to decide 
over future investments could jeopardise the viability of the industry. Then, they 
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modified the law that regulate the distribution of canon minero thinking that people 
would be willing to exchange power for money. In a similar vein, the authorities 
promoted the MPSP to block any revision of the mining tax regime.  
Lastly, it should be emphasised that the NEIS encompasses two different types of 
policy, which affect different actors and influence the polity though diverse 
channels. On the one hand, fiscal transfers to sub-national governments are 
implemented within the realm of state institutions. They require the active 
collaboration of different departments and levels of government, which eventually 
exposes problems with both the internal cohesion of the state and the relationship 
between the people and the state. On the other hand, corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) spending mainly concerns the companies and the populations 
living around operations, while public institutions are rarely involved in such 
transactions. This distinction between public and private channels and processes is 
analytically useful in distinguishing different types of conflict (Chapter 6).  
However, it is also apparent that public and private realms frequently merge in the 
implementation of the NEIS. Mining companies tend to actively lobby for the 
decentralisation of revenue to sub-national governments in order to gain the 
support of local populations. In some cases, the companies even get involved in 
institutional politics through their support for sub-national government capacity 
building programmes. In parallel, CSR spending frequently results from political 
negotiation between companies and the government over the granting of mining 
rights; tax benefits; the more flexible enforcement of environmental legislation; or 
other advantages to the companies. The resultant contracts between the 
government and the companies have important political consequences. They tend 
to erode the legitimacy of the state and transform CSR projects into compensatory 
schemes for which the government become the ultimate guarantor.  
4.3.1 The identification of new mining-related conflicts 
The NEIS has reduced the incidence of genuine anti-mining social conflict; but it 
has increased the total number of clashes in fuelling disputes over the distribution 
of rent generated by the mines. Some of these conflicts can be included among the 
already documented struggles between local communities, and mining and oil 
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companies in which the former try to capture a greater share of corporate profits 
(Banks, 2005; Filer & Macintyre, 2006).  
However, the NEIS has also generated a new type of middle ground conflict, 
neither national nor local, that is yet to be studied. The decentralisation of mining 
revenue has promoted such conflicts, in which the mining companies are generally 
absent. Local communities, urban populations of small towns, regional social 
movements, and public authorities at different levels of government are the main 
actors. Mismanagement by local authorities; opposition to national government 
policy; disputes among mayors, regional presidents and national ministries over 
unfulfilled promises; and disputed claims over the delimitation of territories trigger 
this type of conflict.  
In order to detect the existence of these different types of conflict it is necessary to 
challenge the appropriateness of the individual mining operation as the unit of 
analysis. The emergence of new political dynamics at regional level; the distribution 
of the canon minero to regional and local governments; the concentration of mines 
in certain regions; and the proliferation of actors all make it advisable to take the 
region itself as the entry point for our investigation. This is not to deny the 
importance of local dynamics around particular mining operations but it helps to 
place them in a broader perspective. Thus, I use this new unit of analysis to 
undertake a comparative examination of the incidence of conflict across Peru’s 
regions (Chapter 5) in which I test the capacity of mining rent to explain the 
incidence of conflicts vis-à-vis the other competing explanations usually included in 
the academic literature. 
4.3.2 The relationship between intentions and legitimising discourses 
The NEIS has increased the number of conflicts related to the distribution of mining 
rent that is either in the hands of the companies or in the coffers of canon-rich sub-
national governments. However, these conflicts frequently appear in the guise of 
the more radical anti-mining disputes that the policy is intended to reduce. The use 
of a mixture of grounds and discourses on the part of local communities in their 
claims against mining and oil companies is not new. Banks (2002, 2005), and 
MacIntyre and Foale (2002) analyse the fusion of environmental, livelihood and 
rent-seeking arguments in mining-related conflicts in Melanesia. The novelty in the 
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Peruvian case is that the use of the NEIS to avoid a substantial revision of key 
aspects of the mining industry has promoted the blending of discourses in a way 
that makes it more difficult for either the government or the companies to determine 
the real intentions of the protesters. My analysis of two different types of conflict 
illustrates the perverse influence of the NEIS.  
Substantial corporate profits tend to foster popular demand for a wider 
redistribution of mining rent; there is nothing new about that. However, the 
government’s refusal to introduce a windfall tax has reinforced popular suspicion of 
state subordination to corporate interest, modifying the way in which the population 
conceives of and expresses its demands. In most conflicts between local 
communities and companies, the protesters frame their demands not in terms of a 
greater share in corporate profits, but as a compensation claim for both the money 
that the companies do not pay to the state and the potential environmental damage 
that the government is not willing to moderate. Moreover, the people frequently 
ratchet up the pressure on the company by arguing that they oppose mining 
activities. They resort to this more radical argument because they have not had the 
chance to express their opinions on the issue, since the government has repeatedly 
refused to guarantee their right to prior and informed consent to activities affecting 
their lives. The result is an escalation of conflicts in which the ultimate goals appear 
unclear to external observers.  
Something similar occurs in a number of conflicts over the control and distribution 
of the canon minero by sub-national governments. The populations around the 
mines, and the local and regional authorities think of canon minero transfers as 
compensation for the exploitation of their natural resources. Accordingly, they 
perceive any attempt to modify legislation for the distribution of the canon that 
seeks to equalise the transfers that are distributed to each region as an 
unacceptable violation of their rights. Thus, they block such attempts by playing the 
card of underlying popular opposition to mining that may only be appeased through 
such compensation.  
This strategy is effective because neither the government nor the industry can 
afford to risk the emergence of widespread opposition to the expansion of mining in 
the regions that host the main operations. The existence of such prevalent 
opposition is not real. Their political significance notwithstanding, there are few 
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cases of genuine opposition to mining. However, the government paves the way for 
the notion of widespread opposition to attain credibility by preventing people from 
expressing their opinions through institutional channels.   
In Chapter 6, I propose a typology of conflicts that helps to untangle the intricate 
web of intentions, perceptions and legitimising discourses behind mining-related 
social conflicts in Peru. Our analysis is consequently able to reach beyond the 
stereotypical choice between ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ (P. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004a) 
to discover how each type of motive reinforces the other  
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Chapter 5 
More money, more conflict 
 
Between 2005 and 2008, social conflicts became more frequent in Peru.  
Observers of Peru already know that and many also suspect or believe that an 
increase in conflicts around mining areas was the main cause of the overall 
increase. I confirm that suspicion by analysing a data set on social conflict built with 
information from the Ombudsman’s office (Section 5.2). In Section 5.3, I build an 
index of the incidence of social conflict derived from the same source to determine 
the statistical correlates of (i) cross-sectional variations among regions in the 
incidence of social conflict and (ii) how those statistical patterns evolved in the 
period 2005−2008. It is here that my conclusions begin to diverge substantially from 
existing views, both popular and academic. There appears to be a strong statistical 
connection between mining and conflict. It is however indirect. It is not that changes 
in the levels of mining activity ‘explain’ – in a statistical sense – changes in the 
frequency of social conflict. It is rather that changes in the levels of canon minero 
transfers to sub-national governments explain changes in levels of conflict. These 
transfers are allocated through formulae that concentrate them in municipalities and 
regions where mining takes place (see Section 1.3). They are proportional to the 
profits of the mining companies that, in turn, are tightly associated with the 
international market prices for copper, gold, silver, zinc, lead, tin, etc. When those 
prices go up sharply, as they did in 2004−2008, sub-national government revenues 
also increase rapidly.  
Through the analysis of regional variation in the incidence of conflict over the period 
2005-2008, my study reveals that the strong statistical link between mining and 
social conflict does not seem to be a direct connection from mining to conflict.  
Mining generates rents; central government appropriates a small proportion of 
these, leaving the rest to the companies, and returns a high proportion of its ‘take’ 
to sub-national governments in mining areas. It is the per capita level of these rent 
transfers that best explains both cross-section and time series changes in the 
incidence of social conflict. 
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In Section 5.1, I present my data base on social conflict. In Section 5.2, I use it to 
demonstrate that it was mainly an increase in mining conflict that accounted for the 
overall increase in social conflicts over the period 2005-2008.  In Section 5.3, I 
show that canon transfers at sub-national level is the variable that explains the 
relationship between mining and conflict. 
5.1 The dataset  
The pioneers in the social science analysis of conflict in Peru compiled datasets on 
contentious events from information published in national newspapers (Garay & 
Tanaka, 2009; Muñoz, 2006).87 These datasets have made possible some 
insightful research; however, they have several limitations. The coverage of 
incidents is almost certainly incomplete because reporting reflects the partisan 
political biases of the newspapers.  And, because different scholars define conflict 
differently, or are interested in different phenomena, there are very different 
estimates of conflict incidence.  For example, for the period 1995–2005, Gray and 
Tanaka identify more than 5,000 cases, while Munoz identifies less than 250.   
Since 2004, the office of the Peruvian Ombudsman has been publishing monthly 
reports on social conflicts (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2009). There are four reasons 
that make these reports a very good basic source of data. First, the Ombudsman’s 
office has clear criteria for deciding whether an incident is classified as social 
conflict. Second, the Ombudsman has offices in every region of the country and a 
clear internal procedure for the selection of reported cases to reduce the risk of 
bias.88 Third, the offices of the Ombudsman report facts rather than opinions. 
                                                            
87 Garay and Tanaka compiled articles directly from three national newspapers (La República, 
El Comercio and Expreso) covering the period 1995–2006. Alternatively, Muñoz used a pre-
existing collection of articles that had been compiled weekly by the Centre for the Promotion 
and Study of Development (DESCO, 2009) through a digest of the same three national 
newspapers over the period 1980–2005. Finally, CLACSO (Latin American Council of Social 
Sciences, 2009) publishes an alternative anthology of social conflicts in Peru, which has been 
compiled monthly since 2000, although this collection seems to rely heavily on the weekly 
DESCO digest.  
88 The procedure for the selection of cases involves intervention at regional level; media digests; 
occasional direct information from actors involved in conflicts; and the final decision of a 
committee in Lima that guarantees consistency. The authenticity of these procedures was 
personally cross-checked in interviews with Jairo Rivas (person responsible for the design and 
direction of the first reports; 2008-003, Lima 05-04-2008); Rolando Luque (director of the Social 
Conflict Unit of the Ombudsman; 2008-014, Lima 11-04-2008); Raquel Alvarez (representative 
of the Ombudsman in Pasco; 2008-031, Pasco 24-04-2008); Porfirio Barrenechea 
(representative of the Ombudsman in Ancash; 2008-09, Huaraz 17-06-2008); and Hernán Cuba 
Chavez (representative of the Ombudsman in Moquegua; 2008-170, Moquegua 25-08-2008). 
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Fourth, the office keeps records containing detailed information of individual 
clashes. Other researchers have used this data set recently (Caballero, 2009; 
Panfichi, 2009). I decided to do the same, but did extensive work on the raw data to 
produce more sophisticated and relevant measures of social conflict. 
Caballero (2009) and Panfichi (Panfichi, 2009) work with monthly snapshots of the 
incidence of conflict in the country, but provide no information about the evolution of 
individual conflicts over time nor any overall measures of the duration or intensity of 
particular conflicts. Neither do they consistently compare geographical variations in 
conflict incidence.  Using the data from the Ombusman’s reports, I reviewed all 374 
social conflicts reported monthly by the Ombudsman from 2004 to 2008, identifying 
where they occurred, when they started, how long they lasted, and how severe they 
were according to an objective scale (Table 5.1). I then codified each conflict 
according to three different classifications: types of main actor involved (indigenous 
groups, rural population, etc.) (see Figure 5.2); the causes and motivations of the 
conflict (environment, policies of the national government, etc) (see Figure 5.3); 
and whether and how it related to mining or to the extractive industries more 
generally (see Appendix V for the definition of categories and criteria). In the next 
section I use this information to characterise the conflicts during the research 
period and determine to what extent they are directly related to mining activities.  
Second, I constructed an ‘annual conflict incidence index’ (ACII) for each of the 25 
regions of Peru. First, I counted the number of active and dormant conflicts 
reported monthly by the Ombudsperson for each region.89 Subsequently, I used 
these data to calculate the index so that the incidence of conflict was comparable 
between regions: (i) I assigned a weight of three points to each active conflict and 
one point to each dormant one; (II) I calculated the index monthly and aggregated it 
to an annual figure; finally; (iii) I normalised the index according to the population of 
the region to reflect the incidence of conflict per million people. I calculated the ACII 
for each region of Peru for the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008.90  ACII is thus not 
                                                            
89 The report classifies conflicts as either active or dormant depending on their level of activity 
during the month of the report. A conflict has to be without continuously dormant for a year 
before it is removed − even if not formally resolved − from the data.  
90 2004 data were excluded, as inconsistencies in the methodology of the initial reports were 
detected. I also excluded Callao region from my analysis, as it has now been absorbed into the 
metropolis of Lima, thus, there were no individual conflicts reported in Callao itself between 
2005-2008.  Moreover, the ACII scores are only meaningful in the context of comparison over 
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a simple calculation of the number of conflicts relative to population, but also 
incorporates a measure of the duration of conflicts.   
I incorporated the ACII into a comprehensive nationwide dataset including also 
welfare, economic, budgetary, and political indicators for the 25 regions of the 
country for the period 2001−2008. I use this dataset in Section 5.3 to analyse the 
factors influencing the variation in the ACII across the different regions.  
5.2 Main features of social conflict in Peru (2004-2008): the growing 
importance of mining 
Despite the core position of social conflict in current Peruvian politics (The 
Economist, 2008), there is little systematic understanding of (i) who the actors are; 
(ii) their motives; (iii) how long conflicts last; (iv) how intense they are; and, finally, 
(v) whether there is any significant link/correlation between all these factors. My 
aim in this section is to analyse these features of conflicts in Peru and to determine 
how they changed from 2005-2008.  
I discovered that, from 2005–2007, the number of new conflicts remained stable 
each year but the number of unresolved conflicts increased (Figure 5.1). However, 
new conflicts directly related to mining increased threefold and constituted 56 per 
cent of all new conflicts in 2007 (Table 5.1). The unusually large number of new 
conflicts in 2008 seems to represent the eruption of a more generalised wave of 










space and time within Peru; they are not expressed in units that could be used to make rational 
comparisons with other countries. 
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Figure 5.1 Comparison of the number of new conflicts breaking out year by year 
with those reported to be in progress in the last month of each year (2004–2008) 
      Source: (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2009). 
Table 5.1 also shows that there was no difference between the intensity of mining 
and non-mining conflicts, but that the former tended to last significantly longer. 
Thus, two factors lay behind the generalised perception of the growing incidence of 
mining-related conflicts: they were more frequent among new conflicts and they last 
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Number of new conflicts breaking out
Number of conflicts in progress in the last month of each year
Table 5.1 Number, intensity and duration of social conflicts in Peru, by year of outbreak and connections with mining 
 
  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  Total 2004–2008 
  Mining Other  Mining Other  Mining Other  Mining Other  Mining Other  Mining Other 







































































* Standard deviation in brackets. 
 a  Each conflict is gauged according to its most severe manifestation on a scale ranging from 1 to 5: (1) popular mobilisation that threatens to disrupt public services; (2) disruption of 
public services, and/or blockade of roads and other basic infrastructure, and/or interruption to local governance, and/or confrontation with the police, without injuries being sustained; (3) 
destruction of public infrastructure or other material assets, and/or cases of minor injury, and/or occupation of private premises; (4) serious endangerment to life or physical well-being, 
including hostage-taking; (5) Serious injuries or deaths.  
b The duration of conflicts breaking out in 2007 and 2008 have not been taken into consideration because a high percentage of them were reported as either still being active or as 
dormant at the end of 2008.  
Source: (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2009). 
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Most of the active conflicts during 2004–2008 were located in rural areas. The main 
actors were indigenous communities and local populations, although local and 
regional governments played an increasing role (Figure 5.2). However, the 
ruralisation of conflict did not mean localisation. Changes in the motives for conflict 
are summarised in Figure 5.3. Strictly local issues relating to the actions of sub-
national governments became less significant. By contrast, issues concerning 
central government policy, the environment and the behaviour of mining companies 
became more prominent. The accumulation of (longer-lasting) mining conflicts was 
one aspect of the overall conflict situation in Peru. Another was the apparent 
ruralisation of conflict because of the increasing focus on mining. The third was a 
relative shift in focus, from issues about the behaviour of sub-national authorities to 
issues concerning national policies, the environment, behaviour of companies, and 
territorial boundaries. The main local actors in these rural conflicts became 
increasingly disconnected from national political parties (Chapter 3).  
Figure 5.2 Conflicts by principal actor 2004−2008 (number of conflicts and 
percentage of total) 
             Notes: total number of conflicts indicated in columns. 
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Local and regional political authorities Trade unions and workers' organisations
Business associations Students
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Figure 5.3 Conflict by motive 2004−2008 (number of conflicts in each category 
and percentage of total) 
             Notes: total number of conflicts indicated in columns. 
             Source: Defensoría del Pueblo; adaptation by the author. 
 
5.3 What factors explain regional and temporal variations in conflict?  
Table 5.1 makes a clear distinction between conflicts directly related to mining and 
those that were not, by looking at the overt causes of each case. This procedure is 
to some degree problematic because it does not take into consideration the 
possibility that mining might cause or exacerbate existing conflicts in indirect or 
relatively invisible ways. For example, in addition to the conventional claims about 
environment damage and changes in livelihoods, mining could increase social 
conflict by fostering migration and changes in social relationships, or by promoting 
political competition, especially over access to and control of the rents that have 
increasingly been re-directed to local governments in mining regions. Conversely, it 
is also possible that conflicts that appear to be about mining might also be caused 
or exacerbated by non-mining factors. 
Another way of examining causation is to see how far variations over time and 
space in the incidence of conflict – as measured by my ACII – correlate in a 
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consequences. I do that in this section using panel data for each of Peru’s 24 
regions for each of the years 2005−2008.91  
The results confirm the relationship between conflict and mining, but they also 
show that the volume of canon minero transfers to sub-national governments of the 
regions is highly associated with an increase in conflict in the period 2005-2008. 
These findings complement the conventional interpretation of the relationship 
between mining and conflict, and, significantly for the aim of this thesis, they reveal 
that the NEIS not only fails to reduce conflict, but seems to have caused an 
increase. 
I use multiple linear regression to explain variation of ACII across Peruvian 
regions.92 The ACII varied widely among the Peruvian regions: taking the figures for 
the years 2005-200 collectively, the average ACII for the whole country was 277, 
but this varied from zero in Tumbes region to 1,956 in the mining region of 
Moquegua. I then tested hypotheses for the factors that were most likely to be 
associated with differences among the regions in terms of the incidence of conflict. 
Due to the relatively small number of observations in the dataset I kept the models 
as simple as possible by incorporating a reduced set of variables for each model. In 
the first set of models I tested the influence of poverty in combination with four 
mining-related variables that capture different ways mining may directly or indirectly 
cause conflict: 93 
(i) Percentage of the regional population below the poverty line in terms of 
income measured against a region-specific variable demarcation of poverty.  
(ii) Annual canon minero transfers per capita at current values, as a proxy for 
mining rent.94 This variable directly accounts for the total amount of canon 
                                                            
91 I excluded Callao from the analysis.  
92 I use a Random Effects (RE) panel regression model to analyse the panel data set. This 
method is the best possible way of dealing with the problems of the serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity of the panel. I ruled out the use of the more conventional Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors (PCSE) models to correct for serial correlation because the number of regions 
in the panel is very much larger than the number of years (Beck, 2001; Beck & Katz, 1995). In 
the case of panel with this type of structure (N>T), Wooldridge (2002:490) proposes the use of 
RE models to solve the problems of serial correlation. Additionally I compute the regression with 
robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on regions to correct heteroskedasticity.  
I use the XTREG command in STATA with the option ‘r’ to correct these problems. 
93 See appendix VI for a complete description of variables. 
94  Year-by-year regional populations have been calculated taking 1993 as the base year and 
using the population growth rate between 1993 and 2007 for the interpolation.  
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minero transfers accrued by the local government and municipalities of each 
region. However, owing to the formula for distributing the canon, the figures 
also strictly correlate with the profits of the mining companies operating in the 
region.  
(iii) Percentage of mining production in relation to total regional GDP at constant 
1994 prices, as a proxy for the level of mining activity. This indicator relates to 
factors directly linked to physical activity such as the actual environmental 
impact of an operation. 
(iv) Percentage of the total area of the region for which companies hold mining 
rights, as a proxy for future prospects for mining activity. The process of 
granting mining rights to the companies involves a sequence of administrative 
events that rarely have an immediate impact on the ground. However, they 
generate both expectations and uncertainties when the population in the 
affected regions knows that these rights have been granted.  
(v) Regional level investment by mining companies in the exploration and 
construction of new mines and the expansion of existing operations is the 
best available proxy for the physical expansion of mining activities. This 
indicator captures the actual expansion of mining activities on the ground and 
the related impact on the control of land and water. 
To test change over time, I used two different and complementary methods. First, I 
introduce year dummies into the models to detect significant variations due to time-
specific factors. Second, I undertook a year-by-year OLS cross-sectional 
regression analysis to study the evolution of significant variables and coefficients 
over time. To prevent extreme values driving the results, I calculated the log of 
annual transfers, mining GDP and the ACII variables. 
The figures in Table 5.2 summarise the results of five different models. The first 
model explains for 35 per cent of the variance in the ACII. Two variables, the 
incidence of poverty and the level of per capita canon minero transfer positively 
correlate with the ACII in a statistically significant fashion. Models 2 and 3 continue 
controlling for the level of poverty but substitute the per capita canon transfers for 
two other mining-related variables that capture ‘mining expansion’: the level of 
investment by mining companies in the region, and the percentage of the total area 
in the region for which companies hold mining rights. Both variables are also 
− 99 − 
 
statistically significant when tested independently, although the level of mining 
investment only at the 10 per cent level. Moreover, the explanatory power of these 
two models is slightly lower than the first model. These three mining-related 
explanatory variables lose statistical significance when they are jointly introduced 
into the model. A high degree of collinearity among them is responsible for this 
effect.95  
Clarification of the relationship between these proxies for ‘mining expansion’ and 
the amount of canon transfers is crucial to a better understanding of the underlying 
process. In theory, the three variables capture quite different processes. However, 
the mechanism for the distribution of the canon minero transfers establishes a link 
between the three. Canon minero transfers to local and regional governments are 
based on the previous year’s profits for the mining companies operating in the 
region.96 Such profits have a twofold influence. On the one hand, they tend to boost 
company investment at the site of the mine and in adjacent locations in subsequent 
years.97 On the other hand, the existence of large, highly profitable operations in a 
particular region is an indicator of mineral richness, which attracts the attention of 
other companies and increases the number of mining rights allocated in that region. 
Thus, I argue that in the context of the increase of mineral prices, these two 
variables – the level of investment by mining companies and the area for which 
companies hold mining rights – are themselves a consequence of the increase in 
mining profits generated in the region. As the canon transfer variable is a direct 
proxy for profits, I decided to keep it within the basic specification to test other 
explanatory variables.  
                                                            
95 Pearson correlation coefficients for these variables:  
Canon minero transfers – mining investment in the region = .83 
Canon minero transfers – area under mining rights = .62 
Area under mining rights – mining investment in the region = .68 
96 Canon minero transfers account for 50 per cent of corporate income tax, which in turn is 30 
per cent of a company’s annual profits.  
97 Two methodological notes:  
First, in the mining industry, a flow in the other direction – from more investment to greater profit 
in subsequent years – does not apply because profit is heavily dependent on mineral prices, 
which are quite difficult to forecast in the short term.  
Second, the temporal relationship between profit and investment necessitates a lapse of a year 
in the investment variable. However, as the canon minero transfer in any given year is based on 
company profits for the previous year, both variables – transfer and investment – are already 
contemporaneous.  
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In contrast to the variables discussed so far, the level of mining activity captured by 
that of ‘mining as a percentage of total regional activity’ does not have statistical 
significance in any of the three models. This reduces the importance of the mere 
increase in mining activity – and its associated negative environmental impacts – 
as a determining factor for the escalation of conflicts. This finding is consistent with 
more direct evidence: in mining regions such as Cajamarca, Tacna, Moquegua and 
Cusco where conflict has increased although the level of mining activity has not 
changed significantly in recent years. 
To summarise, the first three models (Table 5.2) reveal that in addition to the 
incidence of poverty, there are four other factors – all associated with the amount of 
mining rent – that may account for variance in conflicts among regions: (i) the 
redistribution of rent at regional and municipal level through canon minero 
transfers; (ii) company profits in the previous year; (iii) the expansion of mining 
operations through the investment of a portion of the profits; and (iv) the 
expectation that new mining companies will come into the region. In the next 
chapter I discuss the possible mechanisms through which these factors increase 
the incidence of social conflict in mining regions.  
Model 4 controls for temporal variation through the introduction of time dummies. 
This model explains a larger proportion of the variation in the ACII across regions − 
49 per cent−, while the two variables previously relevant remain statistically 
significant. However, in the case of the 2008 data, the time dummy itself is 
statistically significant. This implies that there were other factors associated with 
this year that are not incorporated into the model, but which are also important in 
explaining the variation in the ACII.  
Estimates of model 5 help clarify the underlying dynamics. They reveal the 
changing relative importance of the two main explanatory variables over time. In 
2005, the level of poverty was the only statistically significant independent variable. 
However, in 2006, the levels of poverty and per capita canon minero transfer were 
both associated with the incidence of conflict in a statistically significant manner. 
The same was true in 2007, but by now – according to the regression coefficients – 
the level of canon minero transfers appears to be the more significant driver of 
conflict.  
  
Table 5.2  Regression of poverty levels and mining-related variables on the incidence of conflict by region (2005–2008) 
Dependent variable: Log of per capita annual conflict incidence index (ACII) 
Time frame 
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(.126)* 
      





     
t2006 
   .156 
(.143) 
    
t2007 
   .253 
(.171) 
    
t2008 
   .721 
(.195)*** 
    
R2 .35 .26 .29 .49 .57 .58 .56 .36 
N 96 96 96 96 24 24 24 24 
a  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering in regions;  
Notes:  standard errors in parenthesis;  *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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The degree of statistical link between level of canon minero transfer and incidence 
of conflict increased markedly over the period 2005–2007, with the level of poverty 
playing a steadily diminishing role (Figures 5.4 and 5.5). However, in 2008, as 
model 4 reveals, there was a shift in this trend. Although the levels of poverty and 
per capita canon minero transfer (i.e. mining rent) remain statistically significant 
and explain a notable degree of variation in the ACII, the regression coefficients 
and the level of significance show that the two variables lose explanatory power in 
comparison with previous years. In the same fashion, the differences in the 
intercept coefficients indicate a general rise in the incidence of conflict consistent 
with the descriptive statistics in Table 5.1 revealing a general increase in the level 
of conflict in the country. 
Figure 5.4 Correlation between canon minero transfers per capita and ACII at 
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Figure 5.5 Correlation between poverty and ACII at regional level in the period 
2005–2008 
 
To complement the analysis and to test the robustness of the results I introduced 
other variables into the basic model. They are proxies for alternative factors that 
might influence the incidence of conflict. I have clustered these variables in three 
thematic groups that I tested independently to maintain the simplicity of the models: 
(i) Type of region: dummy variables for four different types of region. I modified 
the conventional trio of natural Peruvian regions – coast, Andean highlands 
and Amazonian lowlands – to include a fourth mixed terrain type comprising 
both coastal and mountainous areas.  
(ii) Features of the population: (a) dummy for indigenous populations of above 20 
percent; (b) percentage of the total population who migrated to the region 
between 2003 and 2007; (c) percentage of the economically active population 
for whom agriculture is the main occupation; and (d) percentage of the 
economically active population with mining-related jobs. These act as proxies 
for the degree of social change, economic dynamism, and the social 
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(iii) Political variables: percentage of votes for the winning party in regional 
elections, as a proxy for the legitimacy of the regional government. In 
addition, I introduced dummies for (a) electoral participation in regional 
elections, as a proxy for institutionalised political mobilisation; and (b) support 
for a radical candidate in the first round of the presidential elections of 2006, 
as a proxy for ideological position.   
The figures in Table 5.3 summarise the results of these three complementary 
models. As  in the previous models, the level of mining activity captured by that of 
‘mining as a percentage of total regional activity’ at constant prices does not have a 
consistent effect on the variation in the incidence of conflict across regions. 
Meanwhile, poverty and canon minero transfers remain strongly significant in all 
three models, and their coefficients and standard errors remain reasonably stable, 
supporting the robustness of the previous results. However, the rest of the 
variables included in these models do not have any statistically significant effect.  
Model 6 shows that the estimates for the main variables remain stable when 
controlled for regional dummies. This means that independent of the type of region, 
the incidence of conflict correlates to poverty levels and the amount of canon 
transfers per capita accruing to the sub-national governments of the region. This 
reduces the possibility that other underlying structural features of the regions drive 
the correlation between the two variables and the incidence of conflicts.  
Model 7 does not indicate any positive significance of variables linked to specific 
features of the population. The percentages of Indigenous population and the 
workforce in agriculture control for some important general features of the regions. 
Neither have any effect on the incidence of conflict. The other two variables 
included in this model − the level of migration into the region and the percentage of 
people working in the mining sector − help to test alternative ways mining might 
influence the incidence of conflict. They are proxies for the effect of mining-induced 
social change and potential miners’ strikes respectively. These two variables are 
not statistically significant either.    
Finally, the political variables of model 8 are also unimportant. It is worth noting that 
even support for the radical candidate in the 2006 presidential elections has no 
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statistical significance, throwing a lot of doubt on the government’s claim that 
radical ideologies are frequently the driving force behind civil unrest.  
Table 5.3 Complementary regression models of canon minero transfers, 
poverty levels and other variables on the incidence of conflict by region 
(2005–2008) 































































Migration to region in 2003–2007 













Electoral turnout higher than 85%   
.133 
(.167) 
Radical vote above 50%   
-.170 
(.240) 
Percentage of vote captured by 
winner in regional elections   
.003 
(.008) 
R2 .37 .36 .37 
N 96 96 96 
aAll standard errors are adjusted for clustering in regions  
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis;  *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 
10% level 
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The description of conflicts in Section 5.2 and the multivariate analyses in this 
section provide a consistent interpretation of the growing incidence of conflict 
undermining the stability of Peruvian polity. At the beginning of the period under 
study, conflict correlated with poverty, but the increase in mineral prices and the 
associated dramatic increases in rent and canon minero have tended to multiply 
the incidences of conflict in mining regions receiving large amounts of transfers. 
The quantitative analysis downplays the importance of other possible causes that 
appear in the literature. Thus, neither the level of mining activity in the region nor 
mining-induced social changes have any statistically significant effect on the 
incidence of conflicts. Moreover, although the variables relating to the expansion of 
mining activities are statistically significant, I argue that the effect of mining 
expansion at regional level is a consequence of the generation of rents in the 
region. These results show that the implementation of the NEIS did not reduce the 
incidence of conflicts. On the contrary, it seems to have increased them.   
These powerful results present a different picture from what the government, 
mining companies and social movements currently believe. However, I did not just 
rely on the analysis presented in this chapter of data derived from the 
Ombudsperson’s reports. I undertook extensive field research in three mining 
regions to look in more detail at social conflict.  The next chapter presents the 
results. The field research confirms the importance of mining rents and canon 
minero transfers in stimulating conflict, and reveals the channels and mechanisms 
through which this happens. 
   




How the NEIS multiplied conflicts: a local perspective 
 
On 8th of January 2010, I received a rather unusual e-mail. The public relations 
manager of Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC) had included in his 
distribution list a personal reflection on Avatar, the recently released James 
Cameron movie. He appeared to be incensed that the film would further damage 
the already poor reputation of the mining companies. Therefore, he tried to 
counteract this perniciousness by pulling to pieces the idea that an idyllic planet like 
Pandora, the world of the Na’vi people where all the living creatures are symbiotic, 
nurturing a benign and holistic web of life, whose survival is threatened by an evil 
mining company trying to exploit a valuable mineral was at all plausible. Thus, he 
added Hollywood with its ‘wild imagination’ to the usual enemies of the mining 
industry. His arguments sounded both desperate and as naive as Pandora itself. 
But his sense of outrage prompted me to immediately see the film.  
Although my uncritical side enjoyed the exuberance of the special effects, and I 
could not avoid remembering the struggle of my Awajun friends mentioned in 
Chapter 1, I had to admit that Avatar was a fantasy and the plot disappointingly 
clichéd. However, my dissatisfaction with the film stemmed from a different point of 
view from that of the corporate e-mail. When I started working with the Awajun 
people in 1991, my friend Santiago told me that portraying the indigenous people 
as collectively virtuous and their culture as completely harmonious was one of the 
worst forms of racism. Avatar exhibits a similar kind of prejudice, in that the Na’vi 
have been depicted as collectively virtuous, but helpless and in need of the 
intervention of an external saviour – coming of course, from our own dominant 
Western Civilisation – to defend their world.  
There are close parallels between some interpretations of conflicts around mining 
in Peru and the plot of Avatar: the tendency to view resistance to mining as 
spontaneous defence, untarnished by material motivation, politics or strategic 
calculation of an indigenous life-style and the natural environment.  
During my field research I witnessed tragic cases of environmental disaster and 
also genuine popular struggles against the construction of new mines due to the 
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fear of losing livelihoods and being left worse off (Section 6.2). These conflicts are 
highly important because they shape the features of all conflicts that have been 
labelled ‘mining-related’. The existing literature gives the impression that most 
conflicts around mining in Peru are of this kind. In contrast, I wish to argue that 
these Avatar-type conflicts are neither the only type of contentious actions nor are 
they now the most numerous. Instead, the implementation of the New Extractive 
Industry Strategy (NEIS) has generated more complex disputes over the 
distribution of the rent generated by the mines.  
As I explained in the introductory chapter, the issue of mining rents is highly 
political. Rents are economic surpluses that tend to attract the attention of 
(competing) rent-seekers who employ political means to get a share. After the 
implementation of the NEIS, peasant communities, municipal and regional 
authorities, regional movements, and ‘defence fronts’  in mining areas engaged in 
social conflict to gain political leverage in the negotiations over the distribution of 
the mining rents. In addition to the ‘Avatar-type’, my field research led me to identify 
two other types of conflict directly related to disputes over rents. I have labelled the 
first ‘enhancing bargaining power’, whereby peasant communities seek to obtain a 
share of mining rents directly by claiming some form of economic compensation for 
the adverse impact of mining. The perception that government policies allowed the 
companies to retain an unfair share of the profits, the increasingly influential role 
the state has granted to the companies in the mining regions, and the companies’ 
use of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) schemes provide the communities 
with incentives for making claims against the mining companies (see Section 6.3). 
‘Seeking decentralised revenue’, is the second type of ‘distributional’ conflict. It pits 
citizens, authorities, and administrative jurisdictions against one another around 
access to and use of natural resource revenues transferred from central 
government (Section 6.4). These two new types of conflict accounted for the 
majority of new mining conflicts during the period 2005−2008.  
In the following sections, I first outline the typology of conflict that I developed 
(Section 6.1). Second, I review the defining features of ‘anti-mining’ conflicts – 
those in which local populations challenge the establishment of new mining 
operations or the expansion of old ones. I present the main features of these 
conflicts as the benchmark for comparison with the new types of conflict (Section 
6.2). Third, I use examples from Ancash, Pasco and Moquegua to illustrate how the 
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peasant communities closest to the mines use the narratives and protest repertoire 
of the anti-mining movement to improve their bargaining power with the mining 
companies and increase their access to mining benefits (Section 6.3). Fourth, I 
explain how canon minero transfers have increased the incidence of conflict in 
mining regions through three different mechanisms: (i) by creating unrealistic 
expectations that municipal and regional authorities cannot fulfil; (ii) by pitting 
different levels of government against each other in an attempt to divert popular 
anger; and (iii) by promoting the confrontations in municipalities and regions that 
claim jurisdiction over mineral deposits and sources of water (Section 6.4). Finally, I 
draw some conclusions about the relationship between social conflict and mining.  
6.1 A typology of mining-related social conflicts  
From my field research, I found that three different types of mining conflict 
coexisted in the period 2004–2008. First, there were well known conflicts in which 
the local population opposed mining on the grounds of its negative impact on the 
environment and their livelihoods. Second, there were cases in which local 
communities adopted conflict as a tactic to gain bargaining power and negotiate 
more generous economic compensation from the mining companies. And third, 
conflicts caused by the canon minero transfers. My argument is that the 
implementation of the NEIs increased conflicts of the second and third types.  
As Table 6.1 illustrates, I have constructed my typology on the basis of claimants’ 
intentions. Obviously, this kind of representation is a simplification, and some 
specific cases cannot easily be allocated to one category or another – a standard 
problem in conflict analysis. However, I believe the analytical value of distinguishing 
between types of conflict outweighs the limitations of the procedure because it 
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Table 6.1 Typology of social conflicts in Peruvian mining regions 
Conflict Type Intention Actors 
Type 1 
Anti-mining movements 
Attempts to stop the 
exploitation of new mines, or 
the expansion of currently 
operating ones. 
Principal: Mining companies 
and peasant communities.  
Others: National government, 
ombudsman, national and 
international NGOs. 
Type 2  
Enhancing bargaining  
power  
Strategy for the preparation 
of a negotiation process with 
the company regarding 
compensation.  
Principal: Mining companies, 
peasant communities, and 
population of the municipalities 
close to the mines. 
Others: Regional representative 




Control and use of canon 
minero transfers. 
Principal: Defence fronts, social 
organisations, and different 
levels of government. 
Others: Rarely present. 
 
In Peru, there is a general perception that in mining conflicts, peasant − and 
sometimes indigenous − communities confront mining companies. The 
Ombudsman’s report on social conflicts places all of them in a single category 
labelled ‘socio-environmental’ conflicts (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2009). I consider 
that this classification is not analytically helpful because it includes at least two 
different types of conflict: ‘anti-mining’ (Type 1) and those seeking greater 
‘bargaining power’ (Type 2). These two types of conflict differ in the intention of the 
claimants and the degree of involvement of different actors. Conflicts of the first 
type are concerned with companies’ actual or attempted appropriation of local 
resources, especially land, water and unpolluted local environments and the 
attempts of peasant communities to resist the expansion of mining. Although 
communities and companies are the principal actors, a wide array of other actors 
participate in the conflict in support of one or other, or in trying to broker 
agreements.  
Conflicts seeking greater bargaining power (Type 2) are more tactical. Peasant 
communities used social conflict as a means to open up negotiations with the 
companies regarding increased financial compensation for the use of land and 
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water, corporate investment in social projects, and employment opportunities in the 
mines. They know that beyond the legitimacy and fairness of their claims, their real 
bargaining power lies in their capacity to disrupt the work of the mines and to 
tarnish the reputation of the companies. The failure to differentiate between these 
two types of conflicts leads to erroneous diagnoses of the problems.  
The third category of conflicts has generally been overlooked. I argue that in 
regions receiving a high volume of canon minero transfers, political disputes over 
the control and use of these financial resources have generated a specific type of 
conflict that I label ‘seeking decentralised revenue’ (Type 3). This type differs from 
the anti-mining conflicts both in terms of the actors involved and the motives for the 
protest. First, there is a wider set of actors who initiate and get involved in these 
conflicts - local communities, the urban population in small towns, and local and 
regional political authorities. Second, their most explicit claims are not directly 
related either to the mining activity itself or to the behaviour of the companies. 
Frequently, discontent over mismanagement by local authorities, opposition to 
national government policies, disputes among mayors and regional presidents over 
unfulfilled promises, and claims about the delimitation of territories trigger protests. 
As Section 6.4 shows, these conflicts were directly related to the control and 
distribution of canon minero.  
In the next sections I unpack the features of the three types of conflict. This will 
provide a better understanding of why and through which processes the 
implementation of the NEIS in combination with a mining boom has created the 
conditions ripe for the escalation of conflict in mining regions.  
6.2 Anti-mining conflicts: showing the way 
The success of the opposition to mining in Tambogrande (Piura) and Quilish Hill 
(Cajamarca) captured the interest not only of scholars (see Section 4.2), but also of 
people in other parts of the country affected by the extraction industries. In 
Tambogrande – a municipality close to the coastal city of Piura – the Canadian 
company Manhattan Minerals spent five years (1998–2003) and more than USD 60 
million on a project to exploit a rich polymetallic deposit through open cast mining. 
The operation demanded the relocation of the whole population of Tambogrande. 
Opposition from the inhabitants of the town, in alliance with peasant organisations 
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and wide sectors the population of Piura, forced the company and the government 
to drop the plan (Paredes, 2008).  
In Cajamarca region, the Yanacocha Company operates the largest gold mine in 
Latin America. Yanacocha began mining in 1993 and claims to be at the forefront of 
the ‘new mining’ industry on account of its consideration for indigenous people, its 
environmental responsibility and a genuine concern for local development.98 
However, the enterprise has been plagued by recurring conflicts, mostly opposition 
to the exploitation of Quilish Hill. Peasant communities and the population of 
Cajamarca city claimed that the operation would jeopardise the water supply for the 
regional capital and impede the development of agriculture, the main economic 
activity of the region. After five years of recurring conflict and protracted 
negotiations, in November 2004 Yanacocha gave up exploiting the Quilish Hill gold 
deposit (Lingan, 2008).99 
These two cases are ‘all-or-nothing’ conflicts in which peasants and sectors of the 
urban population united to oppose mining activities. Similar examples include the 
Rio Blanco project where local opposition has been suppressed  and the area 
militarised (Bebbington, 2007);100 and to a lesser extent, opposition to the 
Condorhuain project near Huaraz.101  
These heavily publicised conflicts mark the recent history of mining in Peru. They 
have shaped the official reaction that led to the implementation of the Peruvian 
version of the NEIS. Moreover, although conflicts of this type are infrequent, they 
are important testing grounds for the narratives, strategies and repertoires of 
                                                            
98 Yanacocha is a joint venture between Newmont (USA), which holds 51.35% of shares; 
Buenaventura (Peru), owning 43.65%; and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), an arm 
of the World Bank, which holds the remaining 5%. The ownership structure of this joint venture 
has remained stable since its foundation.  
99 However, this renunciation did not resolve the dispute between Yanacocha and the peasant 
communities living around the operations; on the contrary, the conflicts merely diversified 
(Lingan, 2008). 
100 The Rio Blanco deposit is the main asset of the London-based Monterrico Metals Company. 
The Chinese Zijing Mining consortium paid USD 185.4 million for the acquisition of Monterrico in 
April 2007. The new owners are fully committed to developing one of the top 20 largest copper 
mines in the world (Monterrico Metals, 2009). 
101 Barrick, the Canadian gold company, tried to extend its Pierina operation (Ancash) to 
Condorhuain, a hill close to the city of Huaraz. However, following opposition from the peasant 
communities downstream to the planed mine, Barrick abandoned the project. Protesters claim 
that they stopped the expansion, while Barrick says that exploratory tests did not reveal 
profitable reserves. 
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contestation that people have subsequently employed elsewhere. Thus, 
investigation of this type of conflict provides a way to explore both the continuity 
and the innovative aspects that emerged along with the other two types of conflict 
during the period 2005–2008. I shall examine the main features of type I anti-
mining conflicts under the following headings: (i) actors and their motives, (ii) 
mobilisation structures and alliances, (iii) narratives of conflict, (iv) adaptation of the 
repertoire of protest, and (v) influence of the NEIS.  
6.2.1 Actors and motives 
Company announcements about the discovery of an important mineral deposit or 
the publication of its plans to exploit one already identified have usually caused a 
shock at the grassroots level. However, actors differ in their perception of its 
significance. In the case of Tambogrande, Cajamarca and Majaz, the peasants – 
who make up the majority of the population around potential new operations – 
deem mining to be a serious threat to their livelihoods. In sharp contrast, the state 
and local elite see it as an exceptional opportunity to profit from an increase in tax 
revenue and to reinvigorate the regional economy.  
The peasants perceived agriculture to be incompatible with mining in these three 
locations. In the valleys of Cajamarca and the districts around the Rio Blanco 
deposit, the benign climate and fertility of the land fostered a profitable agrarian 
economy that constituted the principal means of livelihood for the majority of the 
population. In both cases, the mineral deposits were located in valleys where 
headwaters were located and the projected massive open pit mines posed a 
substantial threat to the water supply necessary for farming. In Tambogrande, the 
proposed gold mine would have occupied the centre of a fertile valley hitherto 
devoted to export-oriented agriculture (Paredes, 2008:272-275).  
Thus, the peasants had good reason to resist the mining ventures and, in addition, 
had accumulated sufficient knowledge about the probable impact of the exploitation 
around Yanacocha to distrust official promises about the benefits that mining could 
bring to agriculture. But the concerns of the peasantry are usually insufficient in 
themselves to incite significant mobilisation. Indeed, peasants’ grievances 
frequently remain unresolved. Thus, the question arises as to what were the 
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contributory factors that tipped these grievances into broad-based mobilisations 
that were able to challenge the important mining investments.  
The history of these examples of anti-mining conflict reveals three crucial factors in 
the initiation and sustaining of mobilisation against mining: (i) the existence of a 
consistent organisational nucleus and the forging of alliances; (ii) the composition 
of an appealing and flexible narrative; and, (iii) the adaptation of the repertoire of 
contestation. 
6.2.2 Mobilisation structures and alliances 
The formation of widely accepted and locally embedded organisational structures 
has been critical to the success of mobilisation. In Tambogrande, the Front for the 
Defence of Tambogrande made collective action possible in the early stages of the 
confrontation by coordinating three peasants communities, and peasant water 
management committees and associations (Paredes, 2008). In Cajamarca the 
peasant communities and the powerful rondas campesinas (peasant defence 
committees) proved invaluable as vehicles for mobilisation (Lingan, 2008).102 These 
nuclei provided legitimacy, organisational resources, and clear leadership to 
galvanise wider alliances.  
This initial power base was still not sufficient to generate mass social mobilisation. 
After initial confrontations between the protesters and the companies – and the 
state apparatus – claimants realised that they needed to gain wider popular support 
for their cause if they were to pursue it in earnest. At local level, coordination with, 
and the support of the Catholic Church – or at least sympathetic elements of it – 
was an important mechanism to gain social legitimacy and the sympathy of a wider 
section of the population in the region.  (McAdam et al., 2001:145). At the same 
time, coordination with an array of national and international organisations 
reinforced the challengers’ position through an increase in technical ability and 
negotiation leverage (Bebbington, Humphreys Bebbington et al., 2008; Paredes, 
2008). These alliances reinforced local mobilisation capacity and generated 
external pressure on both the companies and the national government.  
                                                            
102 Traditional rural organisations originally set up to prevent cattle rustling. Later, they started to 
play an important role in settling disputes among villagers, providing security to the population 
and frequently deputising for the ineffectual leadership of peasant communities (Diez 2007). In 
some areas, they were crucial in the fight against the Shining Path guerrillas. 
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Moreover, in Tambogrande and Cajamarca, recruitment to the cause of important 
sections of regional society – especially citizens of Piura and Cajamarca, the two 
regional capitals – cemented the success of the protest. Large numbers of people 
from these two sites started to perceive mining operations as either a serious risk to 
their own water supply (Cajamarca), or to the safety of the environment (Piura).  
6.2.3 The development of an attractive and flexible narrative  
Original concern expressed locally about dispossession and loss of livelihood was 
rapidly fused with a broader environmental discourse. Initially, this was the result of 
a spontaneous synthesis of the various tendencies and concerns that allies brought 
to their assessment of the causes they were fighting for. Moreover, three factors 
heightened the use of the environmental framework.  
First, the work of NGOs raised popular awareness of environmental issues and 
their connection to the sustainability of livelihoods. Second, environmental 
concerns became an acceptable framework within which to introduce popular 
demands in a context where other forms of political expression were repressed or 
illegitimate. Third, international institutions and NGOs sympathised with and 
supported popular environmental struggles, providing resources and advocacy 
networks.   
Moreover, the flexibility of the environmental framework made it possible for 
different groups to come together under the same banner. However, the process 
did not only involve the addition (or substitution) of a new set of issues. This fusion 
of discourses transformed the original meaning of the concepts. Thus, the 
conventional perception of the environment being linked to the conservation of 
nature was broadened to include long-standing social demands such as dignity and 
justice, popular control over territory, respect for human rights, and sustainable 
development (Arellano-Yanguas, 2008:26).  
Not surprisingly, political activists portrayed the Tambogrande and Cajamarca 
conflicts almost entirely in environmental terms. However, the reality is more 
complex. As Bebbington et al. (2008:10) argue with regard to Cajamarca, “The 
mobilizations brought together groups motivated by quite different concerns [...] 
These actors, while united by a general sense that Yanacocha has dispossessed 
them from something, differ in the specific nature of their concerns.” In 
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Tambogrande, initial apprehensions also evolved to incorporate the right to decide 
the allocation of local resources (Revesz, 2009b). 
This fusion of different discourses within a flexible environmental framework is not 
new; Banks (2002), and Macintyre and Foale (2002) discuss similar earlier 
processes in Melanesia. The capacity of this discourse to attract the attention of a 
wider audience  and, therefore, to represent a real threat to corporate reputations, 
allows people to employ it effectively in different settings, even if their demands 
differ significantly from the narrower, technical understandings of what 
environmental impact is. I discuss this more extensively in the analysis of the 
second type of conflict under enhancing bargaining power.  
6.2.4 The adaptation of the repertoire 
Protest marches, general strikes and roadblocks are the protesters’ most common 
weapons in the early stages of social conflict. The Peruvian government’s response 
is suppression. The companies, on the one hand, look to the state for protection 
and on the other, try to derail the protest by offering employment, social projects or, 
in some cases, bribes to movement leaders. These tactics frequently lead to the 
radicalisation of the conflict and an escalation in violence. Violent confrontation with 
the police at roadblocks and the destruction of company assets during marches on 
its premises signal the peak of the clash. However, this kind of escalation tends to 
alienate the more moderate members of alliances − urban people who sympathise 
with the protest, some NGOs, religious groups, etc., hindering the protesters’ 
capacity to achieve their objectives.  
Thus, In Tambogrande and Quilish Hill (Cajamarca), the most promising option was 
to transform the tactics by radicalising the political rhetoric but reducing the use of 
violence. Media campaigns, the publication of alternative assessments of the real 
impact of mining and calls for popular consultation are the elements of this modified 
strategy. However, this softer approach still retains the radical message: the 
population of the mining area is not only determined to safeguard livelihoods, but 
also to defend its right to make decisions that affect sovereignty over its territorial 
resources (Revesz, 2009b).  
In sum, these examples of local resistance to the initiation or expansion of mining – 
all-or-nothing conflicts – occur mainly when people perceive that they can do 
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without the mining operation, that they have alternative, adequate livelihoods. This 
was the case with the threat to export-oriented agriculture in Tambogrande and 
water scarcity in Cajamarca. In addition, overwhelmingly successful resistance to a 
mining operation tends to prevail only where proximity to a city provides alternative 
jobs, markets for rural produce and the critical mass of people necessary for a 
major confrontation. These conditions are especially unlikely to be found in 
sparsely populated regions above about 3,500 MSL in the central and southern 
Andean highlands, since non-mining livelihood opportunities in such locations are 
scarce. 
6.2.5 The influence of the NEIS on emblematic anti-mining conflicts 
New anti-mining conflicts were rare in 2004-2008. The Rio Blanco–Majaz case has 
been the most prominent (Bebbington, 2007:16-19) and in 2009–2010 two other 
disputes erupted that have the features of  an anti-mining conflict. The resistance of 
my friend Santiago and his Amazonian compatriots to the legislation facilitating the 
incursion of extraction industries into their territories is the first. It represents a 
determined opposition to mining and oil exploitation on the grounds of 
environmental damage and loss of territorial control. Both these motives are 
especially important to the indigenous Amazonian people, who rely on the 
rainforest for all aspects of daily survival.  
The conflict that erupted in Islay – Arequipa – in early 2010, around ‘Tia María’, the 
new mining operation of SPCC, is the second case. The population of Islay, a 
coastal valley endowed with abundant farmland, opposed the new operation 
because its use of underground water would jeopardise commercial agriculture in 
the valley. A certain amount of internal division notwithstanding, massive popular 
mobilisation stopped – or at least temporarily halted – development of the project 
(Rojas & Salas, 2010).103 These two high profile cases are very important because 
they generated political debate on the role of extraction and the need to reform the 
institutions governing the extraction industries.  
I argue that the implementation of the NEIS together with the mining boom has 
diminished the frequency of anti-mining conflicts, despite the rise in mining 
                                                            
103 Nevertheless, it is possible that an agreement on the construction of a dam to be used for 
both mining and agriculture might ease this dispute.  
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investment. A combination of two factors has led to a lower incidence. First, large 
canon minero transfers have changed popular expectations about potential 
livelihoods. People in mining regions perceive public sector employment funded by 
mining revenue can benefit them – as long as mineral prices remain high – even if 
the expansion of operations damages agriculture and other pre-existing sources of 
livelihood. Second, the anticipation of a historically high price for minerals is 
modifying the behaviour of mining companies. They increase their social spending 
in the communities around the new operations to cultivate popular acceptance. 
Moreover, when the mineral deposit is large and rich, they also are ready to 
increase investment in less harmful technologies.  
Quellaveco, the giant Anglo American’s new operation in Moquegua is an example 
of this tendency. Anglo American bought the rights to exploit this copper deposit 
from the Peruvian government in 1992. The site is located within 15 kilometres of 
Cuajone, the third largest mine in the country. However, in 2000, peasant 
communities around the site refused to grant Anglo American a social licence to 
operate on the basis of an inadequate water management plan.104 In refusing the 
licence, the population of the highlands and more prosperous peasants in the 
Moquegua Valley recalled their bad experiences with Cuajone. 
In contrast to the behaviour of Monterrico Metals in the Rio Blanco project, Anglo 
American bided its time, accepted the initial verdict without appealing to the 
Peruvian government for the enforcement of its legal rights. In 2008, the company 
tabled a fresh plan for public consideration. The new design of the mine 
significantly reduced the negative impact of the operation through a substantial 
increase in the initial investment, especially with regard to water management.105  
Beyond this important technical development, during the most recent escalation in 
mineral prices, there has been a change in people’s perception of the benefits 
mining could bring. From 2006 to 2008, the coffers of municipal governments in 
Moquegua overflowed with canon minero funds (see statistics in Chapter 2 and 
Appendix VI).This allowed municipal governments in Moquegua to generate 
thousands of relatively well-paid jobs in public works. In 2008, more than 50 per 
                                                            
104 The plan had already been approved by the Ministry of Mining and Energy. 
105 Personal participation in Anglo American’s environmental impact assessment workshop 
(Moquegua, 28-08-2008).  
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cent of the active population in the Andean districts of Torata, Carumas and San 
Cristobal were working in the public sector.106 Impoverished peasants in these 
localities gained an important supplementary income and, in some cases, a 
completely new means of earning a living. In turn, this substantial increase in 
income boosted the retail trade and demand for services, benefiting the urban 
population in the regional capital.107  
The result was that in September 2008, when Anglo American organised 
workshops to present its modified plans, both at regional and municipal level, 
opposition to mining had largely dwindled away and the majority of the population 
viewed new mining investment with a sense of hope. However, this does not mean 
that there was no opposition. A group of peasants from the Moquegua valley and 
radical political activists took part in the workshops to make sure that some people 
spoke out vociferously against the company’s vaguely worded and rosy proposal, 
generating the impression that there was strong opposition to the project. The 
company also prepared carefully, renting coaches to bring loyal supporters from 
communities in which it had previously financed social projects. Anglo American’s 
representatives claimed that the new operation would create more than 4,000 new 
jobs – 1,500 direct and 2,500 indirect jobs – and would double the canon minero 
transfer to the region.108 Even the most ferocious opponents conceded that they 
would be happy if they could finally come to a more beneficial deal with the 
company.109  
Anglo American has firm plans to invest between USD 2,500 and 3,000 million in 
Quellaveco, intending to start copper production in 2014. However, the way in 
which Anglo American engaged with the peasant communities to gain the social 
license, generated internal divisions, promoted unrealistic expectations, and laid 
the foundations for the future proliferation of the second type of conflict.   
 
                                                            
106 Interviews with mayors and municipal managers in the three municipalities (2008-171, 
Calacoa 16-08-2008; 2008-177, Carumas, 28-08-2008; 2008-189, Torata, 05-09-2008). 
107 Retail prices increased by 23.4 per cent in Moquegua in 2006–2008, in comparison to the 
12.7 per cent increase in Lima (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas - Perú, 2009).  
108 Participants in the Anglo American workshop and interview with the manager of community 
relations at Quellaveco (2008-191, Moquegua 09/09/2008). 
109 Interviews with representatives of the National Confederation of Communities Affected by 
Mining (CONACAMI) (2008-161, Ilo 16-08-2008; 2008-189, Moquegua 08-09-2008). 
− 120 − 
 
 
6.3 Communities enhancing their bargaining power to negotiate the 
redistribution of mining benefits 
In the second type of conflict, confrontation is widely understood to be a prelude to 
direct bargaining with the company in order to gain greater compensation. 
However, a common strategy is to make these conflicts appear similar to the first 
type.  Both types of conflict may share the same tactics and – frequently – 
narratives, but they differ in their aims.  
During my field research, I found this more tactical type of conflict far more 
common than the first anti-mining type. It appears that the implementation of the 
NEIS in the context of a dramatic increase in the profits of the mining companies 
has generated incentives for communities to engage in contentious activities in 
order to access what they consider to be a fairer share of the benefits.  
Some of my Peruvian colleagues, being active members of social movements, 
were not very comfortable with my description of this second type of conflict when I 
presented a preliminary version of these findings in 2008.110 They argued that my 
proposal shifted responsibility for the eruption of conflicts from unfair company 
practices to the supposedly avaricious behaviour of the peasants. My study does 
not have that intention, but their criticism encouraged me to proceed with extreme 
care when assessing the evidence emerging from my field work. My argument is 
that beyond the reprehensible behaviour of some mining companies, the 
introduction of short-sighted policies has tended to promote this type of conflict. 
The mining companies appear to have shot themselves in the foot when they 
agreed with government policies benefiting them in the short-term but eroding the 
legitimacy of the state and making companies responsible for service delivery in the 
territories around their operations.  
I undertook a four-step analysis. First, I introduce the main actors involved in these 
conflicts and the context in which they interacted. Second, I identify different 
motivating factors. Third, I review some conflicts of this type, and conclude by 
summarising the main features of these conflicts.  
                                                            
110 Presentation at the international seminary, The New Paradox of Plenty in the Andes: budget 
coalitions, sub national governments and social monitoring. Organised in Lima by the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS), Revenue Watch Institute and the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos 
(11-12 November 2008). 
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6.3.1 Peasant communities and companies interacting in a changing environment 
Peasant communities located close to the mines were the main actors in this type 
of social conflict in 2005–2008. This is not surprising since, while municipal 
governments were occupied spending canon minero transfers, peasant 
communities on the ground strived to grasp benefits for themselves from the mining 
boom.  
The adoption of a local approach to sovereignty over resources has legitimised the 
claims of peasant communities. The constitutional sanction of the state’s ownership 
of the subterranean riches of the country has little sway over people’s views. 
Claims for priority of ownership over natural resources are made according to level 
of territorial organisation: the region takes precedence over the state; the 
municipality takes precedence over the region; and, at the end of the chain, 
peasant communities take precedence over municipal governments that have 
frequently alienated them. For example, although regional and municipal 
governments in mining regions have received an extraordinary amount of revenue 
in recent years, the communities around the operations strongly believe that these 
funds do not reach them.111 Therefore, they look directly to the mining companies 
as a source of immediate benefit.  
In this context, I found that two factors increased the bargaining power of 
communities in their relationship with the mining companies. First, legislation 
required  the companies to reach an agreement with the owner of the land. Second, 
beyond this formal requirement, there was mounting pressure on the companies to 
obtain a ‘social licence to operate’. This means that they had to get explicit 
approval from the communities in the area around the operation to proceed with 
their investments (World Bank, 2003:21,50). Failure to procure this social licence 
before an operation started, or failure to maintain support at a later stage led to 
serious loss of reputation. Gil (2009) argues that the combination of these two 
factors increased the leverage of communities around Antamina, which were better 
able to negotiate alternative compensation packages in the early stages of the 
operation. 
                                                            
111 This opinion was often expressed in my interviews with peasant community organisations.  
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Mining companies operating in remote areas of the country believed they needed to 
convince the local communities of the advantages that mining could bring them. 
Under this pressure, companies responded by boosting their presence through a 
twofold strategy: (i) scaling up their CSR budgets, and (ii) reaching an agreement 
with the government over the controversial Mining Program of Solidarity with the 
People (MPSP), which exonerated mining companies from the payment of windfall 
taxes in exchange for a commitment to invest a predetermined amount of money in 
social development projects (see Chapter 1).  
But pursuing this strategy generated new problems. Although mining companies 
claim they do not intend to act as a proxy for the state, in fact, they do because 
both the state and the communities demand it.112 The people living around the 
mines perceive that the government renunciation of a windfall tax means the 
companies retain an unfairly large share of the profits. The implementation of the 
MPSP is thus an explicit admission that the companies are neglecting their duties, 
not a sign of their benevolence. This perception legitimises the claims lodged by 
peasant communities against the companies. Moreover, when the companies 
demand a greater presence of the state in mining regions (Apoyo, 2009a), the 
government reminds them that they have a commitment to improve the lives of 
people living around the mines (El Comercio, 2008a). As a result, the strategy has 
trapped companies in a web of ever more complex contention and positioned them 
at the forefront of popular demands and anger.113 
6.3.2 Triggers of ‘distributive’ conflicts 
Contextual factors are not enough to explain the actual outbreak of conflict. There 
needs to be an immediate cause for people to engage in contention. In my field 
research, I identified four different types of trigger in 2005-2008. First, peasant 
communities demanded the fulfilment of previous promises and agreements that 
they felt had not been honoured. These were mostly related to the implementation 
of social programmes and more local jobs, or salary rises for members of the 
community already working for subsidiary firms. Second, they felt that land transfer 
                                                            
112 Cheshire (2010) reports a similar process of state substitution in rural mining areas of 
Australia.  
113 Senior managers of some of the largest international companies operating in Peru expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the current situation. They recognised that payment of the windfall tax 
would have put them in a better position to hold the government accountable for its performance 
in mining localities (personal interview at PERUMIN, Arequipa 16-09-2009). 
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agreements were unfair. Although the price had been agreed 10 or 15 years ago, 
the current ratio between payments and the astonishing company profits was 
interpreted as a big swindle. Third, some communities demanded a share of the 
unprecedented profits on the basis that they had never previously benefited from 
the natural wealth they considered rightly belonged to them. Finally, in the context 
of historically high mineral prices, companies decided to reinvest the profits in the 
expansion of their operations. Thus, they needed to renegotiate with local 
populations in order to obtain additional land and water supplies. The communities 
in turn recognised this process as an opportunity to realign themselves in relation to 
the company. 
In the case of the first three triggers, the huge increase in corporate profits 
prompted peasant communities to critically reassess their relations with the 
companies. People revisited historical grievances that re-emerged with greater 
urgency. In contrast, the fourth trigger presupposed the emergence of fresh 
opportunities for the empowerment of the communities. Nevertheless, in none of 
the four cases did people radically oppose mining activities – they just wanted fairer 
compensation for loss of assets, and the assurance of future livelihoods.  
There was frequently more than one of the four triggers at work in any given conflict 
because different actors within the communities attempted to safeguard different 
interests as the conflicts passed through various stages, in which the relationship 
between companies and communities also evolved. In the next section I illustrate 
the underlying dynamics of this type of conflict through an analysis of conflicts 
around Pierina and Antamina (Ancash), and in Pasco. 
6.3.3 The case of Pierina 
Conflicts around the Pierina area broke out in 2005, when the productive life of the 
mine was coming to an end.114 In 2003, official investigations revealed that 
Barrick115 had exploited a loophole in the law, allowing it to avoid payment of 
corporation tax from 1999 to 2001 to the tune of USD 141 million (Congreso de la 
República, 2003). In September 2004, a judicial resolution upheld Barrick’s claim of 
non-liability for the tax. The refusal of the Ministry of Economy to appeal against the 
                                                            
114 Initially, the mine was scheduled to close down at the end of 2009.  
115 The Canadian parent company that owned Pierina. 
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court’s decision outraged the regional authorities and communities of Ancash, 
triggering opposition and social conflict. In March 2006, the mayors of the region 
and some social organisations called for a regional strike, putting forward a 
comprehensive platform of demands that the mining companies and central 
government should meet. In the case of Barrick itself, they demanded that it 
financially support some key regional projects. 
The mobilisation of protesters brought Barrick to the negotiation table, but the 
protesters were frustrated by the company’s response. According to Lombardo 
Mautino, the mayor of Huaraz and leader of the public protest, “the company did 
not cooperate and its public image with the local population deteriorated. This 
negative reaction paved the way for subsequent conflicts.”116 On 4th May 2006, 
without previous warning, peasant communities around Pierina blockaded the two 
roads giving access to the mine. They demanded a salary rise for their members 
employed by subsidiary companies. After the violent death of one of the peasant 
activists, injuries to 19 people – both civilians and police officers –  and a series of 
tense meetings, the company increased salaries from PEN 20 (USD 6.6) to PEN 30 
(USD 10) a day.  
An interview with the president of one of the peasant communities involved in the 
clash revealed the intricate web of causes behind this conflict. He argued that 
essentially, they had no complaints about the presence of the company, but that 
they were frustrated by the non-fulfilment of promises to provide jobs. Additionally, 
he explained that they had agreed to sell their land at PEN 1,000 per hectare (USD 
330) in the hope that they would be employed on permanent contracts. Of course, 
no such thing ever happened and the people later regretted selling their land at 
such a low price.117 Therefore, in negotiating the resolution of the conflict, the 
population tabled a mixture of clear economic demands backed by a list of 
environmental grievances aimed at justifying their claims for compensation. 
In January 2007, a new conflict arose. Barrick had recently acquired the rights to 
prospect Condorhuain Hill, close to the city of Huaraz and to Pierina. The 
communities closest to the potential operations supported Barrick in the hope that 
the new mine would offer them fresh economic opportunities. However, the 
                                                            
116 Personal interview 2008-104 (Huaraz, 25-06-2008). 
117 Personal interview 2008-106 (Jangas, 26-06-2008). 
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population of Huaraz – which had been let down by Barrick’s refusal to make 
reparation for its tax avoidance – opposed the project. Again, the protesters 
employed an environmental argument alongside their grievance over Barrick’s 
failure to support regional development.118 Finally, the company pulled out of its 
attempt to exploit Condorhuain Hill on the grounds that the preliminary survey had 
revealed that the deposit was not commercially viable.119 
6.3.4 Cases around Antamina 
The interests of Antamina, the other large mining operation in Ancash, were also 
plagued by this kind of tactical conflict during the period 2005–2008. While the 
municipalities around the mine grew rich on canon minero transfers, the peasant 
communities of Carhuayoc, Huaripampa, Ayash and Juprog120 engaged in various 
disputes with the company in order to get some economic compensation. These 
conflicts have complex roots that stretch back to the early days of Antamina’s 
presence in the region (Gil, 2009; Salas Carreño, 2008). Although unable to 
chronicle that history, I draw attention to some issues that repeatedly came up in 
discussions when actors explained the local dynamics.  
First, in order to obtain the social licence to operate and to convince the 
communities and some private landowners of the advantages of selling their assets 
to the company, Antamina promised employment to local people, generating 
unrealistically high expectations about the positive impact of the mine (Gil, 
2009:119-125). In this favourable context, the communities of Huaripampa and 
Carhuayoc sold significant portions of their land to Antamina at USD 450 per 
hectare.121  
Second, the forced resettlement of those displaced by the mine generated popular 
discontent and the first signs of frustration. This dissatisfaction escalated when 
people realised that employment opportunities at the mine were scarce owing to 
their lack of the technical skills this highly mechanised industry demanded. The 
company tried to halt this growing unrest through the blatant cooption of the more 
                                                            
118 Personal interview with local leader of CONACAMI, 2008-103 (Huaraz, 25-06-2008) and with 
Lombardo Mautino, mayor of Huaraz, 2008-104 (Huaraz, 25-06-2008). 
119 Personal interview with Guillermo Fajardo, Barrick’s senior community affairs manager, 
2008-102 (Pierina, 23-06-2008). 
120 The mine is in their territories 
121 Huaripampa sold 2,337 hectares and Carhuayoc 1,129 hectares. (Gil, 2009:115). 
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confrontational leaders. As one of the critics of Antamina declared, “Setting up a 
defence front against Antamina was the best business in town.”122  
For example, in 2001 Glicerio Mauricio, a member of one of the most influential 
families in San Marcos, was instrumental in the formation of the Front for the 
Defence of the Interests of San Marcos. He openly opposed Antamina, claiming 
that the company had deceived the population with empty promises.123 He 
subsequently gained victory under this confrontational banner in the municipal 
elections of 2002. However, once in power, he swiftly reached an agreement with 
Antamina over the construction of local infrastructure in exchange for cordial 
relations. At the same time, Mauricio did well out of the deal personally: he founded 
a transport company that Antamina began to contract regularly, and two of his sons 
were employed by the company.124  
Antamina resorted to similar tactics in order to quash disputes in the communities. 
The setting up of both communal and private firms to which the company promised 
contracts was the most frequently used tool for the appeasement of conflict. This 
strategy commonly implied the cooption of leaders and the division of communities 
into opposing factions. Initially, this ‘divide and conquer’ approach worked well for 
Antamina. However, as some company officials confessed, it also created an 
incentive for the appropriation of resources and promoted confrontational leaders 
that exploited the conflict for personal gain.125  
Third, local narratives often emphasised the arrogant behaviour of mine managers 
and staff, including the air of detachment and self-importance that people perceived 
in the few local people who fulfilled the dream of getting a job at the mine.  
Fourth, the immense amount of money Antamina spent on CRS did not help to 
improve its relationship with the communities. The Company usually subcontracted 
the implementation of its CRS programmes to national and local NGOs, which 
                                                            
122 Personal Interview 2008-123 (San Marcos, 07-07-2008). 
123 Apparently, Mauricio was personally aggrieved because he was one of the private 
landowners who had sold an old underground mine situated on the large copper deposit being 
exploited by the current operation to Antamina for USD 900,000. A few months later, some 
relatives who had initially resisted a similar offer sold a comparable mine for USD 11 million. 
Personal interview 2008-121 (San Marcos, 06-07-2008). 
124 Interviews 2008-121 (San Marcos, 06-07-2008); 2008-123 (San Marcos, 07-07-2008); 2008-
129 (San Marcos, 09-07-2008). 
125 Interview 2008-140 (Antamina, 16-07-2008). 
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helped to project the image of an open and receptive company. However, the 
communities that should have benefited from these initiatives were unanimously 
disillusioned with the efforts of Antamina and the performance of the NGOs. 
According to a member of one of the communities: 
These NGOs got a lot of money from Antamina. They came and started 
to ask a lot of questions about how we do things and how we think things 
should be done. Then, after a few weeks, they came back and used the 
information that we gave them to train us. Later, they disappeared. They 
do not live here and do not understand us. They are interested in the 
money, but not in our development. Antamina would do better to give the 
money directly to us (Interview 2008-131; Carhuayoc, 10-07-2008). 
Against this backdrop, the communities around Antamina started various conflicts 
in the period 2005–2008. In September 2006, residents of Juprog (4,200 MSL) tried 
to bar access to the mine, demanding that Antamina keep its promise of more jobs 
for the community. The clash between the claimants and the police resulted in eight 
people being injured. The representative of the regional Ombudsman office was 
invited to mediate in the negotiations. The original demand for employment was 
combined with concerns about the population’s health. In September 2007, after 
several failed attempts to reach an agreement, 500 inhabitants of Juprog and 
Ayash blocked the road to the mine. At the same time, Antamina published a 
proposal for the expansion of its operation towards the territory of Juprog and, 
consequently, the acquisition of 1,353 hectares of farmland and relocation of the 82 
families living there.126  
The company offered USD 600 per hectare and the relocation of the inhabitants to 
a coastal region. However, the people of Juprog were deeply offended. Some of 
them had previously been relocated from the land that Antamina had acquired in 
the 1990s for its original operation and were aware that the offer would not permit 
them to start a more comfortable life in another location. Thus, although they did 
not reject the relocation proposal out of hand, they were keen to secure better 
terms for a potential agreement. Negotiations opened with an asking price of USD 
100,000 per hectare, and an additional USD 200,000 for each family on the site 
holding a title deed. This last point increased the number of affected families from 
the 82 permanent residents to more than 500 families with historical rights to the 
                                                            
126 Information about these conflicts was gathered through attendance at a communal assembly 
(2008-135; Juprog 12-07-2008). I later cross-checked the details with the Ombudsman’s 
representative for Ancash and also with Antamina. 
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land. The communal assembly realised that Antamina would not accept such a 
proposal, but the community wanted to demonstrate its determination to the 
company and get a fair price this time.  
When I visited the community in July 2008, I was shocked by the number of new 
houses that seemed to be unoccupied. The neighbours explained that the houses 
belonged to descendents of the community living in San Marcos, Huaraz, or Lima. 
They had built dwellings in Juprog in an attempt to force Antamina to include them 
in the resettlement deal. After some months of fruitless negotiation, the people 
living there permanently formed the opinion that including these 500 families on an 
equal footing would reduce their compensation package. The situation thus created 
tension between the two groups.  
Antamina continued to hold meetings with the community at the end of 2008. The 
inhabitants had decided it would be preferable to negotiate directly with the 
company without bringing in any third party to arbitrate. During the process, the 
community used both environmental demands and threats of fresh roadblocks as 
bargaining tools. They assumed that Antamina would finally make them a better 
offer since it needed to expand its operation. 
At the same time, Antamina was involved in similarly intricate disputes with the 
communities of Huaripampa, Carhuayoc and Ayash. In Huaripampa and 
Carhuayoc, employment at the mine and additional contracts benefiting transport 
and construction companies – both communal and private – were the main issues. 
However, community representatives used the low price paid by the company for 
the initial acquisition of land and demands for environmental damage compensation 
to try to force a better deal.  
The situation in Ayash was slightly different, but the pursuit of a fairer 
compensation package was at its heart. Ayash is a large community situated in the 
valley below Antamina’s huge tailings dam and comprises three different 
municipalities. When I visited the area in 2008, the company and community were 
locked into a protracted dispute over environmental damage, loss of livelihood and 
the health of the local population.  
It was generally agreed that there were high heavy metal levels in people’s blood. 
However, the failure to conduct a baseline survey to determine the health of the 
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population before the construction of the mine gave Antamina the argument that 
the problem was due to the naturally high mineralisation of the valley, which had 
contaminated the soil, water and, consequently, the food. In response, the whole 
community of Ayash demanded to be relocated to a safer area. However, Antamina 
rejected this option on the grounds that it would be tantamount to admitting some 
kind of responsibility for the situation. Therefore, demands and negotiations 
focused once again on employment and the implementation of social projects.  
6.3.5 Cases in Pasco 
In Pasco, I studied the dynamics of contention around the mine in Cerro de Pasco, 
and another four middle-size operations in the surrounding municipalities. Despite 
the severe environmental damage that mining has produced in the region, all the 
conflicts reported in recent years have ended in agreement over economic 
compensation and employment in subsidiary companies, without demands for the 
implementation of effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.127   
This is especially relevant in the city of Cerro de Pasco. The situation of the 
community of Champamarca − placed less than three hundred metres from the 
Cerro de Pasco open pit mine − illustrates the trade-off between health and 
employment opportunities. The community lives among piles of rubble and tailings, 
and 83 per cent of the children have high levels of lead in their blood (Astete, 
2005). Nevertheless, the population has refused to leave the place and move to a 
new site because temporary jobs at the mine are the only opportunity for making a 
living in the city. Moreover, the president of the community declared that they 
hoped that remaining there would help them get jobs with a Canadian company 
that was soon arriving to re-exploit the old tailings left behind in the 1980s by the 
state-owned company Centromin.128  
In a similar vein, though on a larger scale, a significant share of the population of 
the city of Cerro de Pasco, including its mayor, resisted Law Nº 1244-2008, which 
decreed the relocation of the whole city to a new site 50 kilometres away. Despite 
the good intentions of Gloria Ramos, the congresswoman from Pasco who 
                                                            
127 An excellent media report on the environmental problems of the city can be found at 
http://elcomercio.pe/EdicionOnline/especiales/cerrodepasco/index.html 
128 Interview with the president of Champamarca (2008-062; Champamarca, 24-05-2008). 
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introduced the law in Parliament, people in popular assemblies were unconvinced 
of the viability of trying to make a living in a new town that had few employment 
prospects.129  
The activities of this mine also affected the well-chronicled community of 
Rancas.130 Despite being in a comparatively fortunate situation in comparison to 
other communities in the area, the population of Rancas came into conflict with 
Volcan, the current owner of the mine, in 2008. In 1990, the community had signed 
an agreement with Centromin granting the mining company a lease on part of their 
territory for a period of 20 years. In exchange, the community received USD 2.5 
million, which it invested in setting up a peasant cooperative and a community 
company – Communal Multiple Services Company (ECOSERM) – that started 
providing services to the mine.  
In 2008, the community numbered approximately 300 families, with a balance in 
employment between mining and agriculture. About 400 people were regularly 
engaged in farming activities, using the land  furthest away from the mine. 
Meanwhile, another 320 mainly young people worked for ECOSERM, which had 
grown into a thriving business through the diversification of its activities and 
customers. The vice-president of the community attested that the close relationship 
with the mine was one of the main factors behind this success.131 
However, this apparently fruitful relationship did not prevent the eruption of new 
conflicts. In July 2008, Volcan informed the local authorities of a new plan to 
expand its operations. The development necessitated that Rancas be granted a 
fresh lease on an additional 1,000 hectares. The demand came at the time when 
the community was in the process of renewing the old lease agreement due to 
expire in 2010. The discussions about the renovation of the old agreement and the 
lease of new land generated tensions among community members. Widely known 
for its lack of tact in getting things done, Volcan did not wait for the formal 
                                                            
129 Personal attendance at local assemblies in Cerro de Pasco on 20th and 21st May 2008. 
130 A brief reference to the novel Redoble por Rancas (Scorza, 1970)can be found in Section 
2.2.1. 
131 Interviews 2008-052 (Simón Bolivar, 19-05-2008) and 2008-054 (Simón Bolivar, 20-05-
2008). 
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authorization of the community and occupied the new land taking for granted that 
the community would agree.132  
The move aroused the anger of a section of the community and put the supporters 
of the new deal with the company in a difficult position. During the ensuing 
demonstrations, the protesters complained about the invasion of the territory and 
the pollution of water and land. They drew a parallel between their protest and the 
struggle of their parents and grandparents against the Cerro de Pasco Copper 
Corporation in the 1950s. However, they knew that they needed to reach an 
agreement with the company, as permanent conflict would jeopardise the viability 
of ECOSERM. When I interviewed the community authorities shortly before this 
confrontation, they were already of the opinion that a certain level of conflict, 
including the existence of different opinions among the locals, might be a good way 
of applying pressure on Volcan in order to get a better deal in the imminent 
negotiations.133  
Similarly, conflicts between the peasant community of Huayllay and the  American 
Silver company, Yarusyakan, Ticlacayan and San Juan Milpo  with the Atacocha 
company were settled with economic agreements that did not take the original 
environmental claims into account. In all these cases, greater employment 
opportunities were the principal demands put forward by the communities during 
the negotiations.  
The situation at El Brocal, the other important mine in Pasco, is in stark contrast, 
illustrating the importance of employment in mining-related conflicts in the region. 
El Brocal occupies land belonging to the peasant communities of Smelter and 
Huaraucaca. There is no evidence that El Brocal has a better environmental 
management policy record than other mining companies in the region. In fact, there 
are important environmental liabilities in both communities that El Brocal has not 
addressed.134 Moreover, the local population could have easily targeted the 
company given that in 2005, a massive landslide from one of its waste piles buried 
the community graveyard. However, during the period 2005–2008, there was no 
                                                            
132 Interview with senior managers of mining companies at PERUMIN (Arequipa, 16-09-2009). 
133 Interview 2008-054 (Simón Bolivar, 20-05-2008). 
134 A smelter facility closed down by previous companies operating in the area had produced the 
environmental damage.  
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significant conflict between the company and these two communities. Employment 
opportunities appear to be the explanation for this state of affairs.  
Huaraucaca consists of 260 families. In 1999, the community sold part of its 
territory to the mining company and, following the example of Rancas, decided to 
use the proceeds to set up a company that could work for El Brocal. The enterprise 
was successful and by 2008, the community owned two separate businesses – 
ESGH and ECOSEMH135 – that employed more than 300 people. At the same time, 
the community sold additional land to the company and gave up agriculture 
completely. As a result, the livelihood of the entire community came to depend on 
the mine.136 
The community of Smelter run a smaller enterprise, but this still demonstrated 
sound business sense to El Brocal. In 2007, the company suggested to the 
president of the community that it establish a company through which the mine 
could hire some of the inhabitants. By the following year, the new company was 
already providing jobs for 50 out of the 300 members of the community.137  
Despite its early success, El Brocal’s strategy for ensuring social stability has two 
potential weaknesses in the long term. First, as the general manager of the 
company recognised, many of locally employed workers are not essential to the 
operation. Thus, such a level of employment can only be sustained in the context of 
very high international prices and corporate profits.138 Second, the communities 
have become highly dependent on the mine, and attempts to enlarge their client 
base have not yielded significant results.  
In these examples, communities perceived social conflict as the only way to 
attempt to negotiate on an equal footing with the company. The asymmetry of 
power between the actors, and the widespread suspicion of collusion between 
central government and the mining companies excludes the state from acting as an 
arbitrator underlines this perception.   
                                                            
135 They operated as an intermediate employment agency providing a qualified labour force and 
hiring out heavy machinery respectively. In 2007 el Brocal paid USD 3,080,000 for these 
services (EL Brocal, 2010). 
136 Interview with the president of the community (2008-060; Huaraucaca, 22-05-2008). 
137 Interview with the president of the community (2008-061; Tinyahuarco, 23-05-2008). 
138 Interview with Ysaac Cruz, general manager of El Brocal (2008-199; Lima 19-09-2008). 
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6.3.6 How do communities and companies engage in social conflict?  
Once a community decides conflict is the best strategy to benefit from the rent 
generated in its territory, the connections between the root causes, the ways in 
which local demands are expressed and the actual outcomes of negotiation 
become complex and ambiguous. The communities frame their demands in a 
variety of ways, employing discourses from ecology, social justice, and, most 
recently, ethnicity.   
The use of an ecological discourse in this kind of conflict is not new. In similar 
situations in Papua New Guinea, Macintyre and Foale (2002) observe that local 
people find ecological discourses especially effective in legitimising claims for 
compensation. This does not mean that claims about the adverse environmental 
impact of mining are false, or that local people do not genuinely value their local 
environment. Rather, they find that it makes sense to align themselves with the 
global trend to make the environment an increasingly inclusive concept, which 
incorporates considerations of ethnic justice and the obligation to redistribute 
mining surpluses locally (Banks, 2002; Bridge, 2004).   
In terms of ethnicity, the National Confederation of Communities Affected by Mining 
(CONACAMI) has made effective use of an ethnic discourse focused around 
indigenity and a common historical Inca legacy (Palacín, 2008). However, most 
people directly affected by mining are reluctant to endorse the narrowly defined 
indigenous identity that CONACAMI ascribes to them (Paredes, 2006). 
Representatives of communities play their cards shrewdly in the tactical 
deployment of ethnicity to back their claims: “We are the descendents of the Incas, 
we have always been here, this is our home and the company came to dispossess 
us of our resources.”139 They know that portraying the conflict as an indigenous 
claim provides extra leverage in negotiations (IIED, 2003). 
How do peasant communities make the leap from environmental and symbolic 
claims and discourse to pragmatic negotiation over material issues? It seems that 
claimants have both in mind, but in most of the communities in my study, daily 
survival is the paramount issue. Moreover, once a mine is already operating and 
                                                            
139 President of Ticlacayan in a public negotiation with the company Atacocha (Mayo 2008). 
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changes to the environment are inevitable, the logic of the negotiation requires 
them to put forward clear and achievable demands for economic compensation.  
The logic behind these conflicts makes agreements for compensation highly 
unstable, leading to the recurrence of conflict. The companies are partially 
responsible for this because they frequently buy time in order to keep the mine 
running instead of looking for real, long-lasting solutions. Although mining 
companies have highly qualified anthropologists in their community relations 
departments and use the discourse of ‘accompanying the communities at their own 
pace’,140 maintaining the activity of the operation is invariably their main goal in the 
event of conflict. The opportunity costs of postponing the construction of a new 
mine or paralysing its operation once it is running can reach the order of millions of 
dollars a day in the present climate of high mineral prices. Co-opting leaders and 
creating divisions and rival factions are frequently part of the ‘damage limitations’ 
strategy of the companies. Not surprisingly, agreements last only until the 
emergence of a new leadership that demands to re-negotiate the terms.  
In contrast to the anti-mining conflict, national and international actors are 
completely absent. In the case of the troubled relations between Juprog and 
Antamina over the purchase of community land for the expansion of the mine, 
CONACAMI was involved in the initial stages of the conflict but once members of 
the community had made up their minds to ask for fair compensation for their land, 
they asked CONACAMI to leave them alone141. Although the involvement of this 
and other national and international NGOs in the disputes would strengthen the 
communities’ position, they prefer to negotiate directly with the companies without 
any third-party involvement. They seek flexibility and are afraid to rely on external 
actors, often perceived as having their own agendas, like pushing confrontations.  
The more tactical nature of these conflicts does not mean they are less violent. 
Marches, roadblocks, taking company staff hostage, or threatening to damage 
company premises are the usual means of putting forward the community’s 
demands. An increase in the number of strategies marks the escalation of social 
conflict that has frequently led to serious casualties. When confrontations reach this 
                                                            
140 Personal interview with a senior community relations manager (2008-102, Huaraz 23-06-
2008). 
141 Personal interviews with members of the community and CONACAMI (2008-135, Juprog 12-
07-2008; 2008-153, Lima, 08-08-2008). 
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point, the regional Ombudsman or the local catholic priest could be called into the 
proceedings to broker a deal.  
To sum up, in line with the findings of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 5, 
increases in mining company profits have stimulated further conflict through which 
local populations see as a way to negotiate over the distribution of the revenue. In 
this type of conflict, mining expansion – whether in terms of investment or the total 
area for which companies hold exploitation rights – has not usually triggered 
disputes on account of its negative impact on livelihoods or the environment, but 
through the emergence of a new opportunity to negotiate with the company for a 
more favourable distribution of mining-generated rent − a bigger slice of the cake. 
The next section analyses the last type of conflict triggered by increased canon 
minero transfers to sub-national governments.   
6.4 Canon minero transfers at local level: pouring oil on the flames 
In June 2008, Moquegua hit the headlines when its population paralysed the region 
and for ten days, took control of and closed the bridge that linked the rest of the 
country with Tacna and Chile. Disruption to trade caused significant loss of 
business, damaging the country as a whole. When the government tried to restore 
public order, the protesters took the head of police and 60 of his officers hostage, 
some of who were injured.142   
The distribution of canon minero transfers between Moquegua and Tacna triggered 
the protest. SPCC paid taxes on the total profits of its operations which were 
located in Tacna (Toquepala) and Moquegua (Cuajone), and the central 
government was required by law to distribute the transfers in proportion to the 
material processed in each region. However, due to its lower grade ore, in 2007, 
Tacna processed 78 per cent of raw material but produced only 22 per cent of the 
total refined copper. This meant that in 2008, Tacna received 78 per cent of the 
canon transfers that SPCC taxes had generated. This was too much for the people 
                                                            
142 At the height of the demonstration, between 10,000 and 15,000 people occupied the 
Montalvo Bridge (2008-196, Moquegua 11-08-2008). 
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of Moquegua, who felt cheated of the proceeds of ‘their’ copper.143 Consequently, 
they demanded that the central government amend the regulations immediately.  
The incident, popularly known as the Moqueguazo, perplexed a national public that 
could not comprehend why the population of one of the wealthiest regions of the 
country had mobilised so ferociously. While carrying out field research, I learnt that 
this incident was not exceptional but the expression of a new type of mining-related 
conflict. I conducted my fieldwork in 2008 at a time when regional and municipal 
governments had been receiving abundant canon minero transfers for the previous 
four years and conflicts had increased markedly in the mining regions. When I 
thoroughly examined my data on political dynamics, I realised that the devolution of 
the canon minero rather than reducing the number and intensity of conflicts had, in 
fact, generated new disputes over access to and use of these financial transfers. I 
subsequently identified three different subtypes within this new form of conflict.  
The first subtype comprises conflicts between the population and the regional and 
municipal authorities reflecting the inability of the authorities to allocate canon 
minero transfers efficiently. They are obliged to follow strict centrally imposed 
regulations to the letter, but the lack of administrative capacity within municipal and 
regional governments drives such conflicts, which were common in Ancash and 
Pasco in 2005-2008. People complained about both the lack of investment projects 
and the poor quality of those that were implemented. However, in some places, 
such as the Conchucos Valley (Ancash) and the municipalities close to the Cuajone 
mine (Moquegua), the sheer size of the transfer allowed the municipal authorities to 
mitigate popular pressure – at least temporarily – by expanding their payrolls: 
quiescence was exchanged for well-paid jobs in public works.  
The second subtype includes conflicts that arise between different levels of 
government over the regulations and mechanisms governing the distribution of 
canon minero and similar fiscal transfers. In Ancash, Moquegua and Pasco, 
municipalities challenged the regional government over the criteria it used to 
allocate funds. Moreover, these same regional authorities also resisted attempts by 
the central government to modify the legislation for the distribution of canon minero 
transfers and related schemes that would directly benefit the mining regions.  
                                                            
143 The national newspapers of the day were full of testimonies employing these arguments.  
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Politicians had two incentives for initiating and leading these conflicts. First, 
because the Peruvian political system is highly fragmented (see Chapter 3), there 
was a very small political cost to them in building local support through 
confrontation with the higher levels of government. Second, conflict with the higher 
levels of government was a pre-emptive strike against public pressure (on 
municipal mayors) or from mayors (on regional presidents). Although the law 
prohibited them from organising or participating in contentious political events, 
including marches and strikes, local politicians did not hesitate to take covert action 
if it meant diverting popular anger to other levels of government.  
The third subtype relates to the rules governing the geographical distribution of 
canon minero transfers. Sub-national governments at the same level of the 
administrative hierarchy disputed their territorial boundaries. Boundary variations of 
a few hundred metres can make huge differences in terms of the level of canon 
transfer received. The control of water resources might therefore provide extra 
leverage in future negotiations with mining companies. 
An analysis of the events leading to the Moqueguazo, and of parallel political 
dynamics in Ancash, reveal how these three subtypes of conflict interacted in 
escalating contention.  
6.4.1 The Moqueguazo: the curious path from the hills to the bridge  
After the conflict in Moquegua, the national government held Zenón Cuevas – the 
president of the Front for the Defence of the Interests of the People of Moquegua 
(FEDIPM) – and Cristala Constantinidis – the former president of the regional 
government – responsible for the demonstration and ensuing violence, linking them 
to leftist political movements. Both ironically commented that they would have been 
delighted to have such strong political appeal.144 Yet, in truth, they did not have the 
capacity to instigate such a massive mobilisation. On previous occasions they had 
called for public demonstrations around other issues but with very little success. 
Rather, the conflict reflected the presence of a more complex web of underlying 
local dynamics linked to the issue of canon minero transfers. 
                                                            
144 Personal interviews in Moquegua (22-08-2008) and Lima (15-09-2008). 
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For a long time, wealth generated by the mining industry had been concentrated in 
the two main cities of the region, Ilo and Moquegua, mainly through economic 
activities financed by the spending power of SPCC workers. It was not until 2005 
that the rapid increase in canon minero transfers resulted in the municipalities of 
the Andean region being incorporated into the mining dynamics. Subsequently, in 
2006 and 2007, the region and its municipalities received the highest per capita 
transfers in the country (Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2  Per capita canon minero transfers (US dollars) in the three 
Andean municipalities of Mariscal Nieto-Moquegua (2004–2008) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Carumas 70 786 1,428 2,154 1,395 
Torata 121 1,799 3,070 4,398 2,721 
San Cristobal 73 774 1,404 1,868 1,070 
  
This sudden increase in income was perceived as a unique opportunity to improve 
the lives of the people. However, it also generated disputes in these ‘newly rich’ 
municipalities: disagreements over territory and riparian rights, and conflicts 
between the population and the authorities. 
First, the public and the authorities realised that the existence of mineral deposits in 
their territory was a tangible source of income. Water sources also gained new 
strategic importance because they raised the stakes in negotiation with the 
companies. Indeed, between 2005 and 2008, the regional government of 
Moquegua reported 23 territorial conflicts within its jurisdiction, most relating to 
mining issues. Several municipalities in Moquegua region fought amongst 
themselves (Gobierno Regional de Moquegua, 2008a). For example, Carumas and 
San Cristobal disputed the inclusion of the communities of Aruntaya, Titire and 
Jancopujo in their jurisdiction because a new mining operation, Aruntani, had 
commenced and they hoped to benefit from future canon minero transfers 
generated there.145  
However, quarrels with the neighbouring regions of Puno and Tacna over the 
control of strategic territories had a greater influence on the outbreak of the 2008 
                                                            
145 Interviews with the mayors of Carumas and San Cristobal (2008-177, Carumas 28-08-2008; 
2008-171, San Cristobal, 26-08-2008). 
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conflict over canon minero. For some years Puno had challenged the jurisdiction of 
Moquegua over Pasto Grande village, including Pasto Grande Lake, its associated 
water supply system, and the different mineral deposits that had already been 
discovered there. Simultaneously, Moquegua claimed jurisdiction over the 
community of Huaytire and Suche Lake, from which SPCC supplied the Cuajone 
mine then under the jurisdiction of Tacna. In 2007, this conflict in Moquegua 
became more serious when the population expressed its anger through street 
demonstrations. This mobilisation helped to build up the sense of grievance 
necessary to rally the people again in June 2008.  
The second factor critical to explaining the scale of the public mobilisation in June 
2008 is the increasing intensity of popular pressure on the mayors of the rural 
areas. New municipal and regional governments had come into office in January 
2007. The new mayors had won the elections on the promise of delivering the full 
developmental potential of the canon minero. However, this was easier said than 
done and the mayors soon met popular dissatisfaction with their performance. The 
mayor of Torata was removed from office in May 2008, and his counterparts in 
Carumas and San Cristobal soon faced strong opposition and a popular call for 
their dismissal. Faced with mounting hostility, the mayors resorted to generating 
public sector jobs to appease the populace. Consequently, by late 2007 to early 
2008, the majority of the population in these municipalities was employed in public 
works projects financed by canon minero transfers.  
As Table 6.2 shows, when canon minero transfers diminished in 2008, this system 
of political patronage was jeopardised and, as a result, both the population and the 
local authorities had the incentive to mobilise opposition. The mayors pursued a 
double strategy: on the one hand, they attempted to acquire more money for their 
municipalities, and on the other, sought to divert popular criticism away from their 
management shortcomings and direct it towards an external target. Thus, the 
mayors were the main driving force behind the protest. Finally, they convinced 
those employed in municipal public works that if they did not support the 
mobilisation, the municipality would be unable to continue employing them.146  
In September 2008, I got stuck at major road -works on my journey to the highlands 
of Moquegua (not, this time, a roadblock). During a delay of several hours, I had a 
                                                            
146 Personal interview with participants in the demonstrations. 
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pleasant and illuminating conversation with the two young women directing the 
traffic. One of them was Isabel, whose story I related in the introduction of this 
thesis. Accounts of their children’s upbringing, and their long and gruelling day’s 
work ended in their proud declaration that they had won the right to work by 
participating in the June demonstrations because the mayor had promised them 
jobs if they agreed to take part.147 They also confirmed that the mayors had asked 
the companies working for the municipality to pay for trucks to take people from 
their homes to the city of Moquegua and discreetly provided the provisions 
necessary to feed the people during the demonstration.148 Additionally, it seemed 
that the mayors had taken a special interest in the participation of former army 
conscripts from their municipalities, as these veterans played a crucial role in 
confronting the police. 
In these cases, the repertoire of tactics is similar to that used in the direct conflicts 
between communities and mining companies. Nevertheless, one difference is that 
in this case, the companies are able to move out of the political spotlight. The focus 
of protest is on a more directly accessible objective: a share of the abundant 
revenue channelled to sub-national governments. The companies are thus able to 
stand back, thankful that they are no longer the main targets of conflict.  
6.4.2 The domino effect in Ancash: from pressuring the mayors to enlisting the 
whole region in the battle against national policies   
Management of the rapid increase in value of the canon minero transfers put the 
mayors who took office in 2007 in municipalities around Antamina (Ancash) under 
great pressure. As is usual after elections, the new incumbents seek to staff 
municipal administrations with their own people, dismissing most if not all the public 
servants who had worked in the previous one. Not surprisingly, they were unable to 





147 Personal interview with participants in the demonstrations (2008-173, Carumas 26-08-2008). 
148 Peruvian law makes it illegal for public institutions to support this type of public mobilisation.   
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Table 6.3  Percentage of the 2007 capital expenditure budget actually spent and 
percentage of the vote secured by the winning candidate in the 2006 municipal 
elections, in the main municipalities around Antamina  
 Cajay Chavin Huantar Huachis Huari Ponto 
San 
Marcos 
% capital investment 
budget execution 51.3 40.8 74.7 41.5 34.9 3.7 
% of vote to the 
mayor 23.5 38.0 38.4 26.9 41.8 38.5 
Source: Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas; Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales. 
  
By the beginning of 2008, after just a year in office, the mayors met growing 
popular dissatisfaction and hostility. In San Marcos, the district hosting the mine 
and therefore receiving the highest canon minero transfer, the population started to 
mobilise against the mayor. His opponents formed a new Front for the Defence of 
the Interests of San Marcos and spread rumours of corruption and poor municipal 
government performance. By May 2008, tensions reached fever pitch when a 
majority of town councillors asked the National General Comptroller149 to launch a 
formal inquiry into the municipal accounts for the period 2003–2007. Almost 
simultaneously, the town clerk publicly denounced the mayor for 
mismanagement.150  
Facing similarly troubled situations, the mayors of Huari and Chavin de Huantar 
crafted a twofold strategy. First, like their colleagues in Moquegua, they increased 
their offers of work (a more detailed analysis of this dynamic can be found in 
Chapter 8). Second, they targeted the even lower rate of budget spending of the 
regional government to deviate popular pressure from their own management.151 
The regional president was in no better position. Investment in several key regional 
projects was paralysed because the plans lacked the technical rigour demanded by 
                                                            
149 The original Spanish name for the institution is Contraloría General de la República. It is a 
body appointed by the Parliament to ensure that public institutions operate according to the law. 
150 Initially, the national general comptroller did not take the demand very seriously. In fact, his 
immediate response to the town councillors was that an audit of San Marcos’ accounts was not 
scheduled for that year. However, the following year, as an ‘urgent’ solution, the comptroller 
visited San Marcos, Huari and the regional government of Ancash, and found serious 
irregularities in the management of the three institutions for the year 2008, which, in all three 
cases, involved breaking the law (Contraloría General de la República, 2010).  
151 In 2008, the regional government of Ancash spent only 18 per cent of its total capital 
investment budget.  
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the Ministry of Finance and allegations of his involvement in corruption 
mushroomed.152 In June 2008, the mayors called for a strike, demanding the 
resignation of the regional president and appealing to the different groups of actors 
to join them. As was made clear at a regional assembly of regional social 
organisations held in Huaraz, the most active groups supported the idea of 
throwing out the president but were not happy about endorsing the mayors. 153 
Nevertheless, they finally agreed to back the regional strike on 7th July.  
The regional president, Cesar Álvarez, demonstrated that his reputation as a skilful 
political operator was well deserved. He picked up the proposal to change the 
legislation governing the distribution of mining profits to the mineworkers in order to 
mobilise the population against the national government and the parliament. 
According to Peruvian legal tradition, every year, businesses have to share 8 per 
cent of their net profits with their employees. In 1996, Parliament issued a decree 
(Nº 892) establishing an upper limit of 1.5 times the basic salary for this annual 
premium.  Any surplus had partly – up to USD 2.5 million in 2008 – to be allocated 
to the Fondoempleo fund, and invested in job creation in the geographical area in 
which the profit was made. In January 2005, in line with the aim of the NEIS, a new 
law (Nº 28,468) decreed that after payment of bonuses and contributions to the 
Fondoempleo, the remainder of the 8 per cent of the profits should be transferred to 
the regional government for investment in improvements to local road 
infrastructure. According to this law, the regional government of Ancash received 
USD 151 million in 2007 (Fondoempleo, 2010).  
As could be expected, the National Federation of Miners and Metal Workers of 
Peru lobbied for the removal of the cap on the annual bonus payment, finding 
support in a group of parliamentarians that introduced a proposal for the 
amendment of the existing legislation. Cesar Alvarez swiftly grasped the 
importance of this issue for the region and its population. He first put it on the 
political agenda, then mobilised his own support so that he might divide the 
regional opposition to him. The presence of an external enemy served to neutralise 
the internal opposition. The result was that on 8th and 9th July 2008, while there 
were significant popular demonstrations, including road blocks, few of the strikers 
                                                            
152 The national comptroller also confirmed the accuracy of these allegations in 2010 
(Contraloría General de la República, 2010). 
153 Assembly held in the Municipality of Huaraz, 17-06-2008.  
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persisted in demanding the resignation of the regional president; instead, a 
significant number directed their anger against the policies of the central 
government.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The implementation of the NEIS in Peru aimed to reduce the anti-mining 
demonstrations that had impeded the development of mining operations in the early 
2000s. However, the NEIS has created two new types of conflict. The first is 
already known in the wider literature: the rent attached to mining activities tends to 
generate conflict, notably between companies and the population of the areas in 
which they operate. This is especially likely in polities such as Peru where central 
leadership is poorly integrated with sub-national authorities, and is, moreover, 
perceived to be captive to mining interests. The national government is thus unable 
to play an effective role in resolving such routine political disputes over mining 
rents. This type of conflict has escalated as commodity prices and mining profits 
have increased in recent years.  
The second type of conflict I have documented reflects causal processes that I did 
not anticipate finding before I began my field research, and which seem to be much 
less widely appreciated. Large fiscal transfers to the sub-national governments of 
the mining regions themselves cause or exacerbate social conflict through several 
kinds of mechanisms. 
From my data, It is not clear how far these two types of conflict tend to reinforce or 
substitute for each another, or whether they simply coexist. However, I have found 
some evidence to suggest substitution processes are taking place. In certain 
localities, in 2007 and 2008 when very high commodity prices and canon minero 
transfers provoked disputes among local populations and municipal governments 
over public spending issues, the mining companies were temporarily removed from 
the line of fire.  
At present, the Peruvian government, social movements centred on mining, and 
international donors in Peru remain unaware of the diversity of types of conflict 
generated by and affecting the extraction industries. Central government tends to 
see only conspiracy: anyone promoting or supporting social conflict in a mining 
area is denounced as an anti-establishment activist, an enemy of development, or 
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even a supporter of terrorism.154 This authoritarian attitude has left problems 
unresolved and exacerbated antagonism. The inadequate and inconsistent 
management of conflict by the state and its use of political repression could trigger 
the emergence of more articulate national social movements. On the other hand, 
social movements have a propensity to think of mining conflicts simply in terms of 
coherent resistance to exploitative capitalist forces and environmental destruction. 
Both interpretations are misleading and not very helpful when it comes to 
policymaking. The results of my research highlight three aspects that give a better 
understanding of the dynamics of the social conflict surrounding mining in 
contemporary Peru. 
First, the continued emphasis given to anti-mining disputes between local 
communities and mining companies is misplaced. These were emblematic, but are 
no longer the most numerous. There are other significant causes of conflict located 
around mining. Second, the frequency of conflicts in mining areas in large part 
reflects the structure of national politics in Peru; notably, the incentive for local 
politicians to pursue purely locally focused, short-term strategies, and the inability 
of the national government to establish sufficient autonomy from mining capital for it 
to act as a legitimate arbiter of the national interests. And finally, mining companies’ 
adoption of policies of corporate social responsibility cannot eliminate local disputes 
in mining areas. In some cases, the misuse of resources helps to reconcile 
opposing forces in the short term, but it paves the way for new and more complex 
disputes in the long term. Moreover, in the context of a commodity boom, many 
conflicts arise independently of company behaviour towards the local population. 
The size of the operation and the rent that is generated matters as much as the 
company’s behaviour. For best practices to be effective, they have to go beyond 
corporate social responsibility tenets to embrace a real transformation of the 
relationship between the companies, the communities around the mines, sub-
national governments, and the national polity.   
To conclude this chapter, it is important to reflect briefly on the outcomes of these 
conflicts. Most analyses of conflicts in Peru assume that they constitute a negative 
factor, hindering economic development. Needless to say, government, business 
associations and the IFI prioritise stability over all else. In a more dialectic vein, 
                                                            
154 This is the recurrent government message in the media, and was confirmed in an interview 
with a representative of the Office of the Prime Minister (April 2008).   
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Bebbington and Bury (2009) argue that conflict around mining in Peru 
demonstrates the capacity to offset asymmetries of power and to bring about 
institutional change. In this sense, conflict should be taken as a necessary step to a 
more inclusive polity.  
My research both supports and challenges these views. I find that conflict helps 
local communities gain leverage in negotiations with the state and the mining 
companies, and that the introduction of the NEIS was the official response to 
previous popular demands. Additionally, in this chapter I have shown that the 
implementation of the NEIS has given communities more muscle in their 
negotiations with the mining companies.  
However, the Peruvian case also shows that the institutional change induced by 
conflict is neither beneficial nor conducive to further improving policy. To 
underscore this point, I have been able to distinguish between three different types 
of conflict. Some disputes, such as those of the Awajun and in Piura, still constitute 
a genuine opposition to new operations. This kind of conflict retains its potential to 
challenge the status quo around mining, demanding substantive institutional 
modifications, such as the legal recognition of popular consultation and the 
exceptional status of indigenous territories. Yet, while these conflicts are potentially 
the most constructive, official responses to them have intensified political 
repression, a reflection of the political interest of the companies and central 
government and sectors of the national elite who want a quick fix to guarantee a 
hugely profitable extraction industry. In light  of this only an alliance of local groups 
with links to national and international organisations stands any chance of making 
protest and opposition successful and, hopefully, less painful.  
Conversely, disputes over the control of rent – which were the most widespread 
type of conflict between 2005 and 2008 – have more limited potential for generating 
positive changes in the management of the extraction industries. In fact, the 
implementation of the NEIS has reduced the potential constructiveness of social 
conflict. It has increased the number of conflicts whilst, at the same time, creating 
an incentive structure that means protestors seek concrete and immediate benefits 
rather than any change to regulations or governance. Indeed, the introduction of 
important financial benefits for mining jurisdictions has blocked a wider revision of 
the extraction agenda in Peru. Furthermore, as the following chapters will illustrate, 
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these new types of conflict are at least partially responsible for the failure of 
municipal and regional authorities to transform the surging flow of canon minero 
transfers into tangible developmental outcomes.  
  




Fiscal transfers and local welfare 
 
I have shown in Chapters 5 and 6 that in Peru the implementation of the New 
Extractive Industry Strategy (NEIS) has led to social conflict. Before making any 
judgment about the overall impact and desirability of the NEIS generally or of the 
canon transfers more specifically, it is necessary to look at other possible impacts 
of these policies. If levels of material and social welfare have increased in mining 
regions and municipalities (relative to non-mining jurisdictions) as a result of the 
implementation of the NEIS, there is at least a question of trade-offs between 
different objectives to consider. Conversely, if there is no evidence of local 
improvements in material and social welfare in mining areas, then the whole NEIS 
is clearly very questionable.  
Has the NEIS led to any detectable change in the levels of social and material 
welfare in mining areas? That is the question I set out to answer in this chapter. 
The answer is a relatively clear no.  At the levels where I had adequate data to 
undertake a statistical analysis, I could find no clear or consistent evidence that 
levels of either (i) mining activity or (ii) canon minero transfers affected material and 
social welfare in the mining areas – either negatively or positively.  In some ways 
this is a slightly encouraging finding.  I begin, in Section 7.1, with a review of the 
existing evidence from Peru and elsewhere about the effect of mining on social and 
material welfare. There are reasons to believe that mining sometimes leads to 
deterioration in levels of social and material welfare. The fact that I found little 
evidence of adverse impacts is therefore positive.  However, my main concern is 
with the impact of the implementation of NEIS. I found no evidence of any positive 
impacts on levels of material and social welfare to offset the conflict-inducing effect 
of NEIS that I have explained in earlier chapters.   
It is relatively easy to summarise the overall findings of this chapter. The 
explanation of the analytic and statistical procedures I followed to reach these 
conclusions is, unfortunately, rather complex. I do not have access to all the data 
that I would wish to have. The explanation of how I made the best use of what is 
available becomes a little tortuous. The details are in Sections 7.2 and 7.3. I 
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provide some summary guidance here on how I dealt with the three main 
methodological challenges.  
First, at which ‘local level’ did I look for impacts? I have only two choices because 
of the ways in which the official data are made available: at the municipal and the 
regional levels. Both regional and municipal governments receive canon minero 
transfers. There are both advantages and disadvantages of using information 
relating to one level rather than the other. More data are available at the regional 
level, especially on annual variations in welfare indicators and GDP by economic 
sectors. But some mining regions such as Ancash, Cajamarca and Cusco are 
large. The local impacts of mining might not be evident from data that relate to 
whole regions. By contrast, data is scarcer at municipal level, but more likely 
accurately to capture the local effects of mining. This is especially true of the per 
capita levels of canon minero transfers: these vary more widely between 
municipalities than between regions. Further, municipal governments receive a 
larger share of total canon transfers than do regional governments (Table 7.1). I 
would expect the impacts of canon minero transfers to be more intense and visible 
at municipal level. I undertook analyses at both levels, using whatever data sets 
were available and appropriate to testing my hypotheses.   
Table 7.1 Distribution of actual public capital expenditure according to different 
levels of government (2001-2008) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Centrala 79% 75% 81% 53% 52% 47% 39% 33% 
Regional     14% 17% 16% 22% 20% 
Municipalb 21% 25% 19% 33% 32% 37% 39% 47% 
Total (PEN millions) 5,297 4,760 7,056 6,185 7,097 10,252 12,189 15,059 
a Until 2003, the central government included regionally decentralised structures that in 2004 were incorporated 
into the regional governments.   
b The municipal level only included the municipalities with information available for each year that is, numbers 
1636, 1611, 1678, 1704, 1735, 1732, 1759 and 1832 of the total 1834 Peruvian municipalities. 
Source: (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2010); adapted by the author. 
 
Second, methodological problems arise because regardless of the choice of level 
of sub-national government, mining can affect social and material welfare in the 
localities where it takes place through several different channels. Even at a high 
level of abstraction,  three main ones can be distinguished: (i) the direct effects on 
the local economy of mining employment and local commercial purchases of other 
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services and goods; (ii) the slightly less direct effects of the local Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) spending of mining companies; and (iii) the indirect effects of 
the Peruvian fiscal transfer system, which returns large revenues to the sub-
national governments in the mining areas, especially the municipalities, in the form 
of canon minero transfers. Ideally, I should have data on each of those channels 
and be able to examine separately their effects on social and material welfare. 
According to the way I have defined the concept (Chapter 1), NEIS encompasses 
financial transfers through both the last two channels listed: companies’ CSR 
spending and canon minero transfers. But I have good data neither on companies’ 
total CSR expenditure nor for what the funds are actually used for. I can only test 
statistically for the effect of canon transfers. The statistical analysis presented 
below embodies an assumption that the level of canon transfers to sub-national 
governments is a reasonable proxy for the varying amounts of CSR expenditure 
made within those same jurisdictions, over space and time. It probably does not 
matter if this assumption is incorrect because the total volume of canon transfers is 
so large relative to total CSR spending that the former is likely to have the biggest 
impact.155 I can only test for the impacts of two channels through which mining 
might affect local social and material welfare: (i) the direct impacts of mining 
employment and other commercial spending by mining companies and their 
suppliers; and (ii) canon minero transfers.   
My third challenge was to find a way of assessing the effects on local social and 
material welfare of increased canon minero transfers while holding constant the 
local commercial effects of mining. I dealt with this as best I could in the regional 
level analysis (Section 7.2). In a series of regressions that explore the determinants 
of (i) the rate of annual economic growth, (ii) poverty reduction, (iii) changes in the 
availability of drinking water and sanitation facilities, and (iv) variation in rates of 
school attendance at two different ages, I simultaneously used as independent 
variables (i) per capita levels of canon minero transfers to regional and municipal 
governments and (ii) two other variables that stand as proxies for the importance of 
mining and its annual changes within the regional economy. These results imply 
that neither mining activities nor the levels of canon transfers have had a significant 
                                                            
155 In 2007 while total canon transfers amounted to USD 1,617 million, mining companies’ actual 
spending on social projects did not exceed USD 80 million (Antamina, 2008, 2009; Grupo 
Propuesta Ciudadana, 2008; Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2010; Ministerio de Energía y 
Minas, 2010b, 2010c).  
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impact on these economic and welfare indicators. Unfortunately, no data is 
available to allow a similar analysis at municipal level. I find in Section 7.3 that 
larger per capita volumes of canon minero transfers over the period 2001-2007 do 
not correlate with higher levels of improvement in indicators of social and material 
welfare at municipal level. This finding is consistent with the regional results: either 
canon transfers did not have positive effects or their beneficial effects could not 
compensate for the adverse effects of mining. 
The bulk of this chapter comprises detailed presentations of the statistical analyses 
I conducted, and the results, first, at regional level (Section 7.2) and then municipal 
level (Section 7.3). First, I survey the relevant literature on the impact of mining on 
local material and social welfare. 
7.1 What does the literature say about development in mining and oil 
regions?   
In the early 2000s, the International Council on Minerals and Metals (ICMM) in 
collaboration with the World Bank commissioned the Mining, Minerals and 
Sustainable Development (MMSD) research project. The project aimed to offer an 
independent assessment of the social impact of mines on their surrounding 
communities. Specific papers on the topic (Mate, 2002)  and the final report (IIED, 
2002: 198-230) highlighted the poor historical record of the mining industry in 
promoting local development. Understandably, after these initial findings, 
corporate-sponsored research shifted rapidly towards a more policy oriented 
perspective. The ICMM launched the Resource Endowment Initiative (REI) (ICMM, 
2010b) to have a better understanding of the policies that the mining industry, 
governments and development agencies should pursue to increase the positive 
impacts of mines. In 2008, a paper summarising the findings of the first four years 
of the REI proposed “greater decentralisation accompanied by improvement in 
municipal governments’ capacity” and “partnerships between all concerned 
stakeholders” as the way forward “to enhance the positive impacts from mining” 
(McPhail, 2008:6). The ICMM had already advanced similar recommendations in its 
analysis of the Peruvian case (ICMM, 2007). The country case study reaffirmed 
that decentralisation, capacity building at regional and municipal level, and a more 
proactive role for the mining companies were the key to improving the development 
performance of mining. It fully endorsed the NEIS. 
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In addition to this politically influential corporate-led research, there has been some 
relevant academic work on the topic investigating the extent to which mineral-rich 
sub-national jurisdictions benefit from extractive activities in terms of economic 
growth and improvement in welfare indicators through one or more of the three 
channels discussed in the introduction to this chapter: backward and forward 
linkages of mining to the wider local economy; the investment of revenue accruing 
to sub-national governments; and the implementation of CSR projects. Scholars 
have followed different research strategies. Some have undertaken a comparative 
analysis across sub-national units in a given country, while others have used 
particular case studies to understand some of the mechanisms through which 
mining affects economic and social outcomes.  
Some scholars have focused on the potential of big mining companies to be the 
catalysts of local development through the promotion of local businesses and the 
linkages between mining activities and the broader local economy. Wise & Shtylla 
(2007) claim that mining could have important positive effects on the local economy 
through the promotion of local businesses and propose a set of policies to enhance 
companies’ performance in that area. Also, in this more speculative vein, Auty 
(2006) proposes that the enclave nature of mining operations can be used to 
promote a dual track reform strategy similar to the early economic reform zones 
operating in some countries:  
Rapid growth of directly productive investment within the mineral region 
can help build a dynamic market sector that eventually absorbs 
unproductive labour and capital [...] In addition, it builds a political 
constituency for reform to take on the rent seeking interests (p. 143). 
Most of the scholars that have done empirical research on the actual impact of 
mining are less optimistic. They find that the potentially positive spill over effects 
from mining to other sectors of the local economy have not materialised because 
linkages between modern mining operations and the economy of the host regions 
are very weak or/and because mining has negative effects on other economic 
sectors (Bridge, 2008; Bury, 2007; Caselli & Michaels, 2009; Nylandsted, Yankson, 
& Fold, 2009).  
The work of Aragón and Rud (2009) represents an exception to these negative 
findings. They claim that the activity of the Yanacocha gold mine in the Peruvian 
region of Cajamarca improved welfare indicators in the households surrounding the 
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mine during the period 1997-2006. This positive impact correlated to household 
proximity to the operation and was generated by the mine’s backward linkages to 
the local economy, through the activation of the local market for agricultural 
products.156  
Transfer of mining revenue to sub-national governments is the second channel 
through which mining jurisdictions can benefit from extraction activities. Assessing 
the impact of these transfers is not straightforward because it is necessary to 
analyse two questions. The first is whether mining regions develop more than the 
others, and second,  whether and how this is affected by the use of public revenues 
derived from mining. To my knowledge, only two papers have so far addressed 
these related questions through a comparative investigation of the economic and 
social performance of mineral-rich and mineral-poor sub-national jurisdictions within 
a given country. Goldber and colleagues (2008) using a data set for the U.S. from 
1929 to 2002, conclude that resource dependence leads to slower economic 
growth and poorer developmental performance. They qualify these conclusions 
through case studies of Louisiana and Texas. They find that oil revenue was 
responsible for these negatives results. Incumbent politicians in those states used 
oil rents to maintain direct taxes low and to purchase clientelistic support. In this 
way they raised the likelihood of remaining in power while reducing political 
competition and the quality of policies.  
In a similar vein, Caselli and Michaels (2009) do not find that oil exploitation had 
any positive significant impact on economic growth and social indicators in Brazilian 
municipalities. Analysing the different influence of both on-shore and off-shore 
oilfields they claim that oil revenue transfers to oil producer municipalities did not 
generate positive outcomes. Although the authors do not reach conclusive results 
about the causal mechanisms behind this poor performance, they point to 
corruption as the likeliest cause. This lack of developmental success in resource-
rich North American states and Brazilian municipalities are consistent with recent 
research highlighting how rentier regions within fiscally decentralised countries tend 
                                                            
156 Despite the econometric sophistication of the paper, there are at least two important caveats 
to their arguments. First, some of the indicators, for example the subjective valuation of house 
rental prices, do not capture any real improvement in the population’s welfare. Second, the 
sample households used in the research is not statistically representative of all the households 
in the concentric circles which the study divided the region around the mine.   
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to suffer political distortions leading to clientelism and poor quality policies (Desai, 
Freinkman, & Goldberg, 2005; Freinkman & Plekhanov, 2009; Gervasoni, 2010). 
CSR spending is the third potential mechanism through which the presence of 
mining companies might promote local development. Oil and mining companies 
have recently repackaged their CSR schemes as ‘local partnerships’. They aim to 
transform their conventional charitable practices into more collaborative processes 
in which local communities and sub-national governments have a say in deciding 
the projects to be implemented (Hamann, 2004). Despite these good intentions, 
research into the real impact of CSR does not support an optimistic view of its 
developmental record in the oil and mining sector. Frynas (2005) argues that 
corporate interests frequently drive the design and implementation of CSR 
interventions in the oil sector in Nigeria. He claims that “profit maximising motives 
are often incompatible with good development practice” (p. 598). Idemudia (2007) 
also analyses the Nigerian case and concludes that corporate partnerships to foster 
local development in oil communities are greatly limited because their activities do 
not counteract the negative impacts of the operations on the surrounding areas. 
Similarly Hamann and Paul (2004) find that CSR schemes do not generate 
significant positive changes in the mining sector in Southern Africa and make the 
case for greater corporate accountability. 
Other authors focus their criticism on the fact that scaling up CSR does not help to 
overcome the absence of the state apparatus in the territories where extraction 
occurs. Case studies in Papua New Guinea (Filer, Burton, & Banks, 2008) and 
Australia (Cheshire, 2010) show that mining companies act frequently as “shadow 
states” in the countryside. Discourse about partnerships frequently hinders the 
assumption of a state-like role by the mining companies in the vicinity of mining and 
oil operations. These authors claim that these arrangements are neither conducive 
to local development nor sustainable in the long term.  
In the case of Peru, there are two studies comparing welfare indicators in mining 
and non-mining areas. However, both are in terms of the aggregate impact of 
mining and make no attempt to differentiate between the different channels through 
which mining might affect local levels of welfare. De Echave and Torres (2005) find 
that mining regions have higher levels of poverty than non-mining regions, but their 
methodology does not allow them to test whether mining is the real cause of this 
correlation. Zegarra, Orihuela and Paredes, (2007) use Propensity Score Matching 
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(PSM) to compare welfare and income indicators in households of mining and non-
mining municipalities. Due to limitations in data availability they reduced the scope 
of their study and compare only Andean households using data from the National 
Household Survey for 2003-2004 – just before the mineral prices boom and its 
related increase in canon transfers –. They found different results in rural and urban 
settings. Urban households in mining municipalities had higher incomes than those 
in non-mining municipalities. This positive ‘income’ effect of mining did not exist in 
rural households. However, the proportions of urban households served by piped 
drinking water supplies and sanitation facilities were lower in mining municipalities.  
My research relates to this literature in three different ways. First my quantitative 
analysis of regional and municipal socioeconomic indicators (this chapter) confirms 
previous findings about the lack of positive results of mining revenue transfers to 
sub-national governments. Second, I complement previous studies by providing 
evidence on the dynamics explaining the inefficient use of mining revenues at 
municipal level (Chapter 8). In particular, I show that the implementation of the 
NEIS has reinforced incentives to use the money for short-term particular 
objectives, including corruption, in some cases. Finally, my research highlights the 
importance of political factors in determining how resource revenues are used by 
sub-national governments. This helps correct the statements of government and 
company spokesmen, who talk constantly of an alleged lack of technical capacity 
within sub-national governments to handle increased revenues effectively.  
7.2 Regional level analysis 
The NEIS was shaped during 2002-2008, at the beginning of a six year boom in 
global commodity prices. The profits of the mining companies, the taxes they paid 
to the central government and the levels of canon minero transfers to sub-national 
governments all increased considerably over this period. If either (i) mining activity 
in general or (ii) the NEIS were to have beneficial effects on social and material 
welfare in mining areas, clear increases in the welfare indicators over this period 
should be observable. In this section I examine the extent to which this was true at 
the regional level.  
The things I am setting out to explain – my dependent variables – are variations in 
six indicators of material and social welfare across Peru’s 24 regions during the 
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period 2002-2008.157 Using multiple regression analysis, I explore whether these 
are explained in a statistical sense by variations in one or more of three variables 
that indicate either the levels or the profits of mining activity. The dependent 
variables are:  
(i) The annual rate of GDP growth at regional level excluding mining activities. This 
is a proxy for the dynamism of economic sectors other than mining. I calculated 
it using  the sectorally disaggregated data of regional GDP at constant prices of 
1994 provided by the National Institute of Computing and Statistics (NICS) 
(INEI, 2009d).158 From 2002 to 2008 this indicator grew annually by an average 
of 6 per cent. 
(ii) The annual variation in poverty measured as a percentage of the regional 
population below the poverty line.159 During the period 2002−2008 the average 
poverty level for all the regions dropped from 59.4 per cent to 42.3 per cent. The 
figure fell by an average of 2.9 percentage points per year.  
(iii) The annual variation in percentage of population with access to drinking water 
according to the National Household Survey (INEI, 2009c).160 The average 
percentage of people with access to drinking water at regional level dropped 
from 61.5 per cent in 2003 to 59.7 per cent in 2008. This represents an average 
annual decrease of 0.4 percentage points in  coverage.   
(iv) The annual variation in percentage of population with sanitation facilities at 
home according to the National Household Survey (INEI, 2009c). From 2003 to 
2008 the average sanitation coverage rate for the 24 regions of the panel 
increased from 36.9 to 42.8 per cent, with an average yearly improvement of 
1.2 percentage points.  
(v) The annual variation in school attendance rate (percentage) of children between 
3 and 5 years according to the National Household Survey (INEI, 2009c). The 
average annual attendance rate at regional level increased from 48.5 per cent 
                                                            
157 I excluded Callao from the panel because it can be considered part of the Lima metropolitan 
area. 
158 The NICS used a value-added approach to calculate regional GDP by sectors.  
159 The poverty line is defined in terms of income according to a region-specific variable 
benchmark. In Peru, since 1995, the NICS conducts household surveys that provide very 
detailed data on a wide range of issues. In 2003 a change in the methodology allowed statistical 
inferences to be made from the annual compilation of this data with validity at regional level. 
160 This indicator comprises people with drinking water at home and those who access to some 
form of communal service. 
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in 2003 to 63.1 per cent in 2008, representing an annual improvement of 2.1 
percentage points.  
(vi) The annual variation in school attendance rate (percentage) of children between 
12 and 16 years according to the National Household Survey (INEI, 2009c). The 
average annual attendance rates improved from 66 to 72.7 per cent during the 
period 2003-2008, with an average annual improvement of 1 percentage point.  
All these dependent variables are indicators of annual change. Dealing with this 
type of variable, econometricians tend to use average measures for a group of 
years to mitigate the ‘noise’ associated with short-term variations. In this case, due 
to the short period of study I decided to use year-by-year changes as variables. I 
assume that the advantage of keeping a larger number of observations exceeds 
the benefits of the aggregation because the information can be used more 
effectively.  
The first two of my three independent variables are relatively direct measures of 
variations in levels of mining activity while the third, the level of canon minero 
transfers, reflects the indirect impact of mining through the implementation of the 
NEIS. Each indicator captures a distinctively different aspect of the general concept 
of the importance of mining in the regional economy: 
(i) The variable Mining as a percentage of total regional GDP at constant prices of 
1994 is a proxy for the general importance of mining activity within the regional 
economy. The actual cost of production per unit of output can vary 
considerably between mines.  In general, the cost is much lower for large 
modern capital-intensive mines than for smaller and artisan mines.  Because 
this indicator takes no account of cost variations, it is unlikely to be a good 
indicator of the relative importance in different regions of mining profits and 
rents.  Accordingly, it does not significantly correlate with the level of canon 
minero transfers to regions.   
(ii) The variable Index of annual variation of mining GDP measures something 
different again: the change from year to year in the proportion of regional GDP 
contributed by mining weighted according to the general importance of mining 
to the regional economy (in percentage of GDP).  It is a dynamic measure that 
captures the economic importance of annual variations in mining activities  
(iii)  The third independent variable is the logarithm of annual per capita canon 
minero transfers at current value going to the regional government and 
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municipalities in each region.161 More than the previous two variables, it reflects 
changes in the levels of rents made available from mining activities, although it 
accounts for only a modest proportion of total rents in the period in question: 
most went to the mining companies.  I also use this variable as a proxy for the 
implementation of the NEIS.  
I computed the models using Random Effects (RE) panel regression 
specifications.162 I tested the robustness of the results by running a simple Ordinary 
Least Squared (OLS) regression introducing year dummies to control for year 
effects and computing robust standard errors.163 This second specification did not 
change either the sign or the statistical significance of the estimates. Appendix VII 
contains detailed information of the various model specifications, the control 
variables I employed and the statistical results, while Appendix VIII summarises the 
data set.   
In Appendix VII, I take the dependent variables as the main thread to present the 
results of the regressions. In each section of the Appendix I analyse the effect of 
the three mining-related independent variables and the other control variables on 
each of the six dependent variables in turn. Here I take a different approach in 
summarising the results. I take the three independent mining-related variables and 
summarise separately their statistical effects on the dependent variables. This 
procedure helps to differentiate between the impact of mining per se from the more 
specific impact of the canon minero transfers. Table 7.2 summarises the regression 
results of the data presented in Appendix VII.   
The first two variables are most likely to capture any positive effect of mining on the 
local economy through commercial channels: labour, and the local purchase of 
other services and supplies. The fact that they have no identifiable effects on the 
level of local economic and welfare indicators runs contrary to official and corporate 
propaganda. It is, however, no surprise. The literature encourages us to be 
sceptical (Section 7.1 above).  
 
                                                            
161 I have applied logarithms to this variable to avoid extreme values of canon transfers driving 
the regression.  
162 The use of RE with the option ‘r’ in STATA is the best way of dealing with the problems of 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity present in the panel.  
163 This specification is appropriate because serial autocorrelation causes less severe 
distortions in the estimates in panels with short temporal series (Wooldridge, 2002:276).  
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Table 7.2  Summary of panel regressions of mining-related variables on the 
annual change in economic and welfare indicators in Peruvian regionsa 
Mining-related independent variables → Mining as 
percentage of 
regional GDPb 
Index of annual 
variation in 
mining GDPb 
Log of canon 
minero per 
capitac Dependent variables: 
↓ 
Period 
1. Annual rate of regional GDP 







2. Annual variation in poverty rates 2004-2008 nss nss nss 
3. Annual variation in drinking 
water coverage 2004-2008 nss nss nss 
4. Annual variation in sanitation 
facilities at home 2004-2008 nss nss nss 
5. Annual variation in rate of school 
attendance 3-5 years old 2004-2008 nss nss nss 
6. Annual variation in rate of school 
attendance 12-16 years old 2004-2008 nss nss (+++) 
a This summary only reports as significant those results that are robust according to alternative specifications (see 
Appendix VII). 
b These variable are lagged one year in the models testing the dependent variables nº 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
c This variable is lagged one year in the models testing the dependent variables nº 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.  
(nss) the variable does not have a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable 
 (+++) positively significant at 1% level. 
 
During my field research I learnt that local economies can provide neither a highly 
skilled workforce nor the sophisticated technology demanded by the mines. Very 
few local people hold the qualifications required to be hired by the mining 
companies. Moreover, modern miners tend to keep their families and their homes 
in the big cities, away from the mining areas. They typically work for two weeks and 
then have a break, and live in the mining areas only when working. Often even the 
food supplies for mining staff are sourced from companies in the big cities because 
local foodstuffs do not meet the quality standards fixed in labour agreements.164 
This means that in most cases the outsourcing of some marginal tasks to small 
community enterprises is the only direct linkage to the local economy.165  
My statistical analysis unearthed only a single trace of any impact of annual 
changes in the mining-related (independent) variables on indicators of material and 
social welfare. While correlating with no other welfare indicators, changes in the 
                                                            
164 I confirmed this information for Antamina, Pierina and Cuajone with the managers of the 
mines.  
165 There are some exceptions such as the communities of Rancas and Huaraucaca in Pasco, 
which have important community enterprises (see Chapter 6).  
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level of canon minero transfers to sub-national governments did have a positive 
effect on the rate of school attendance of children between 12 and 16 years old.166 
There are two possible explanations. The first is that increased canon transfers 
lead to improved education provision, e.g. through the renovation of school 
buildings, the construction of new schools in remote areas, and the provision of 
better travelling and lodging services and training for teachers.  I am sceptical. Why 
do we not see similar positive effects on the school attendance of children aged 3-5 
years old? The alternative explanation is that the perceived vibrancy of the mining 
sector generated an increased demand for secondary education for young people 
hoping for a job in the mining business. A local researcher in Cerro de Pasco called 
this phenomenon the ‘dream of the white helmet’ (Ramos, 2005). The government 
and the mining companies reinforce these ideas through public campaigns 
highlighting the importance of education. My interaction with local people during my 
travels in the mining regions leads me to think that both supply and demand side 
factors were at work simultaneously.  
But, overall, these results indicate mining has had very little positive local impact 
Might I be wrong? 
Most defenders of the development potential of mining would argue that the impact 
of increased activity and of canon transfers is likely to show up in the figures only in 
the long term. That is a plausible argument, but one would still expect to see some 
positive effects from the big increase in profits over the period I am considering. A 
second caveat relates to the fact that I have done the analysis at regional level. Any 
positive effects of mining highly concentrated in the immediate vicinity of mines 
might be so diluted in regional figures that they would not show up in a statistical 
analysis. I shift in Section 7.3 to a more local level and longer term analysis. As I 
explain below, this does not significantly change the conclusions.  
7.3 Municipal level analysis 
Lack of systematic data is the main limitation when undertaking comparative 
economic and political analysis at municipal level. Fortunately, my research 
coincided with the detailed publication of the national census of 2007, which 
contains demographic and social data aggregated at municipal level for the entire 
population of the country (INEI, 2008a). The methodology used in this census was 
                                                            
166 According to the Peruvian political constitution of 1993, secondary education is compulsory 
and free for teenagers between 12 and 16 years of age.  
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similar to the previous one carried out in 1993. The existence of homogeneous 
information for 1993 and 2007 permits a neat comparison of the change in some 
welfare indicators over this period. I used this information to analyse differences 
between canon-poor and canon-rich municipalities through  change in the following 
indicators:167 (i) percentage of people between 15 and 24 years old who finished 
secondary education;168 (ii) percentage of households with drinking water at home; 
(iii) percentage of households with sanitation facilities at home; and (iv) percentage 
of households with an electricity supply at home.169  
Municipal governments have responsibility for the provision of water supply and 
sanitation infrastructure, while they share responsibility with other levels of 
government for the provision of education and electricity.170 Assuming that the 
increase in canon transfers after 2003 was the most important single factor 
influencing the capacity of municipal governments to deliver services to their 
citizens, it is reasonable to think that municipalities receiving a high volume of 
canon transfers per capita should have improved their welfare indicators more than 
the others in the period 1993-2007. Moreover, considering that canon-rich 
municipalities are the closest to the mines and the gas and oil wells, they could also 
benefit from any positive spill over effects of mining activity.   
The results of the comparison show that most of the welfare indicators did not 
improve more in municipalities receiving large amount of canon transfers than in 
their comparables ‘poor’ municipalities. On the contrary, access to drinking water at 
home tended to worsen in canon-rich municipalities in comparison to other 
municipalities. In the rest of this section first, I present briefly how I have used 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methods to undertake the comparison; second, I 
discuss the results of the analysis; and third, I check the robustness and some 
regional variations in the results. 
 
                                                            
167 I incorporate into the analysis all types of canon transfers because a few municipalities 
received substantial transfer relating to the exploitation of oil and gas. The municipalities spend 
these revenues in the same way as canon minero transfers. 
168 I analyse the change in the population between 15 and 24 years old because this indicator 
has been more sensitive to any improvement in the quality of services in most recent years, 
minimising the inertia of the indicators when older generations are taking into consideration.   
169 Appendix IX presents a summary of the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the 
analysis.  
170 I discuss more widely the distribution of responsibilities among levels of government in 
Chapter 8.  
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7.3.1 The application of propensity score matching methods 
 Comparing the change in welfare indicators from 1993 to 2007 in canon-rich and 
canon-poor municipalities is not a straightforward task. The 1,834 Peruvian 
municipalities are highly diverse. The existence of extraction activities is only one of 
the multiple features that might generate differences between them, so I need to 
compare canon-rich municipalities with those that are similar in all other ways 
except the level of canon transfers. Among the available data I chose to match 
canon-rich and canon-poor municipalities that have the following similar features:  
(i) A similar population size in 1993 because this might correlate with different 
economic and institutional factors affecting any improvement or decline in the 
indicators.  
(ii) Percentage of the rural population in 2007. Usually it is more difficult to 
improve the coverage and the quality of public services in rural settings.  
(iii) Percentage of literate population in 1993 as a general indicator of education 
level at the beginning of the period.  
(iv) Percentage of indigenous population in 2007 (i.e. those whose mother tongue 
is not Spanish) to control for ethnical bias in the provision of services.  
(v) Altitude of the district capital because different authors have hypothesised 
altitude has an effect on economic and social development in Peruvian 
municipalities (Escobal & Torero, 2003; Santillana, 2006: 54-55). 
In addition, I controlled for the initial level of the indicators whose changes I wanted 
to evaluate: 
(vi) Percentage of people between 15 and 24 years old that had finished 
secondary education in 1993. 
(vii) Percentage of households with drinking water at home in 1993. 
(viii) Percentage of households with sanitation facilities at home in 1993. 
(ix) Percentage of households with an electricity supply at home in 1993. 
I use PSM to make the comparison. PSM is a relatively new econometric tool that 
finds within a large group of ‘non-treated’ individuals those who are similar to the 
‘treated’ group in all relevant pre-treatment characteristics (Guo  & Fraser, 2010).171 
In this case, the treatment is ‘receiving high levels of canon transfers’.  
                                                            
171 Rosenbaum and Rubin pioneered this method in 1983. The basic logic behind the method is 
to use any standard parametric regression (for example, logit or probit) to calculate the 
probability of being in the treatment group given that an observation has a determined set of 
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I undertook the following steps in the analysis. First I compiled a data set for all the 
Peruvian municipalities for the four welfare indicators whose changes I wanted to 
analyse, and the group of control variables that define the similarity between the 
municipalities.172 I also included data on canon transfers to the municipal 
governments during the period 2001-2007. I ‘cleaned’ up this data set by deleting 
the municipalities that were created after 1993 and those whose boundaries 
changed after that year because their results in the two censuses were not 
comparable.  I also deleted those municipalities that did not have information about 
canon transfers for three or more years between 2001-2007, and those that did not 
have the same information for two years during the period 2005-2007.173 I also 
excluded from the comparison the districts of Lima, and municipalities over 200,000 
or below 1,500 inhabitants in 2007. 174 After the clean up, the set contained data for 
1,350 municipalities out of the 1,834 in the whole country.  
The selection of the ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ municipalities was the second step in 
the analysis. I selected as ‘treated’ municipalities that received canon transfers per 
capita above PEN 2,100 between 2001 and 2007. There were 97 municipalities. 
Figure 7.1 shows a map with the municipalities included in the analysis according 
to the level of canon transfers that they received.  
Finally, I compared  these 97 municipalities and the other 1,253 using four different 
matching algorithms (Becker & Ichino, 2002): (i) the nearest neighbour algorithm 
matches each canon-rich municipality to the canon-poor municipality with the 
closest propensity score; (ii) the radius method uses a tolerance level of the 
maximum propensity score distance (calliper) to match each canon-rich 
municipality to all canon-poor municipalities within the calliper, in this case 0.001; 
(iii) the Kernel algorithm compares each canon-rich municipality to a weighted 
average of all the canon-rich municipalities according to the distance of their 
propensity scores; the closer their score, the greater the weight; and, (iv) the 
stratification method divides all the propensity scores into a set of strata and 
                                                                                                                                                                              
values for the N variables to be controlled for. The parametric regression reduces the covariates 
of all the control variables to a scalar propensity score valued between 0 and 1. The closer this 
propensity score is for two observations, the greater their similarity to the set of control 
variables.  
172 All this data comes from the national censuses of 1993 and 2007.  
173 These differences are due to the importance of the period 2005-2007 in which canon 
transfers increased dramatically.  
174 I excluded municipalities with less than 1,500 inhabitants because they had very large 
changes in the indicators over time but these affected relatively few people.   
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compares canon-rich and canon-poor municipalities belonging to the same strata. 
These four methods differ in their trade-offs between quality and quantity of the 
matches. None is a priori superior to the others, and the joint consideration of the 
four offers a way to assess the robustness of the estimates (Becker & Ichino, 
2002:361-362).  
Figure 7.1 Map of Peruvian districts according to different levels of total canon 
transfers per capita during the period 2001-2007 
Elaboration: the author 
 
Without reliable data or excluded
Transfers per capita 2001-2007 < PEN 2,100
Transfers per capita 2001-2007 > PEN 2,100
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I computed the PSM in STATA using the pscore, attnd, attr, attk and atts 
programs.175 For each of the four different algorithms, the software calculates the 
average effect on the treated – in this case the average difference in the change in 
welfare indicators between canon-rich and canon-poor municipalities –, the 
standard error, and the t-statistics.176  
I selected the common support region option to restrict the analysis of the 
balancing property177 to all the canon-rich municipalities plus the canon-poor ones 
in the region of common support.178 In this case, this restriction excluded only 49 
canon-poor municipalities.  
7.3.2 The results: canon transfers had very little impact 
The change between 1993 and 2007 in the percentage of people between 15 and 
24 years old who finished secondary education is the first indicator that I used to 
test the impact of canon transfers. Focusing on 15 to 24 years captures the 
tendency in recent years because it minimises the importance of the historical stock 
of uneducated people over 24 more likely to be found in rural areas. 
For the whole country, the indicator went up by 9 percentage points, from 75 to 84 
per cent. However, differences between municipalities varied widely. The average 
change in the 1,350 municipalities under consideration was 20 points, from 53 to 73 
per cent, a drop of 19 points and an improvement of 60 percentage points at the 
extremes of the spectrum. The comparison of the four PSM algorithms reveals that 
this indicator went up only by between 0.5 and 1.7 points in canon-rich 
municipalities than in their comparable canon-poor municipalities (Table 7.3). This 
minimal change was not statistically significant.179 This result shows that mining 
neither directly nor by means of the canon transfers had a significant positive 
impact on the percentage of youngsters that completed secondary education.  
                                                            
175 These programs were written by Becker and Ichino, and can be freely downloaded within 
STATA from http://www.stata-journal.com/software/sj2-4 
176 The standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 replications.  
177  For a given propensity score, the exposure to treatment is random and therefore treated and 
control cases should be - on average - similar regarding the variables on which the matching is 
based (Becker & Ichino, 2002: 359). I have used a significance level of .01 to test the balancing 
property. 
178 The common support region is the range of values of the propensity score where the 
probability of finding treated and non-treated cases is similar.  
179 Given that I am working not with a sample, but with all the Peruvian municipalities fulfilling a 
set of conditions, the t- statistics is, in fact, a quantifier of the variance of their results and not a 
sign of the capacity of the results to represent a wider population.    
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Table 7.3 Estimate of the average effect of high canon transfers to Peruvian 
municipalities (2001-2007) on the change in the percentage of people between 15 
and 24 year old with secondary education over the period 1993-2007 
Matching 
estimation method 
Nº of canon-rich 
municipalities  
(Treated) 




on the treated 
Bootstrapped 
standard error t statistic 
Nearest neighbour 97 85 .520 1.639 .317 
Radius (.001) 92 730 1.775 1.165 1.523 
Kernel 97 1204 .663 .811 .818 
Stratification 97 1204 .527 1.295 .407 
 
The change in the percentage of households with drinking water supply at home is 
the second indicator under scrutiny. The provision of water and sanitation facilities 
lies more clearly within the remit of the municipal governments in Peru. The correct 
functioning of these services requires not only the initial investment to build the 
physical infrastructures but the existence of local institutional arrangements that 
assume responsibility for the management and maintenance of the systems.  
At national level, the indicator improved 12 percentage points, from 43 per cent in 
1993 to 55 per cent in 2007. The average of the improvement aggregated at 
municipal level for the 1,350 municipalities in the data set was similar, increasing 
from 20 to 32 per cent. The range was from a deterioration of 83 points to a 
maximum improvement of 90 points. According to the PSM analysis, canon-rich 
municipalities tended to improve less in this indicator than their comparable canon-
poor ones (Table 7.4). However, the estimates for the average effects and the 
standard errors vary quite widely depending on the method of calculation. 
According to the nearest neighbour method, canon-rich municipalities improved 
almost 8 points less than their comparable poor group, with relatively high t-
statistics. These results are not robust because the other three methods show 
significantly lower effects – between -2 and -4 points – with proportionately larger 
standard errors. Nevertheless, the results of the four methods are consistent 
regarding the average negative effect of canon transfers on the expansion of water 
supply services at municipal level, although it seems that variations between the 
municipalities are very important. An examination of the nature of these variations 
demands a complementary test of robustness (see next subsection).  
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Table 7.4 Estimate of the average effect of high canon transfers to Peruvian 
municipalities (2001-2007) on the change in the percentage of households with 
drinking water supply at home over the period 1993-2007 
Matching 
estimation method 
Nº of canon-rich 
municipalities  
(Treated) 




on the treated 
Bootstrapped 
standard error t statistic 
Nearest neighbour 97 85 -7.735 4.183 -1.849 
Radius (.001) 92 730 -3.906 3.044 -1.283 
Kernel 97 1204 -2.826 2.773 -1.019 
Stratification 97 1204 -1.9651 2.545 -.772 
 
The percentage of Peruvian households with sanitation facilities at home is the third 
indicator. This increased from 36 to 48 per cent between 1993 and 2007. The 
change was lower in the 1,350 municipalities considered in this analysis, as the 
coverage increased from 10 to 18 per cent. The change in these municipalities 
ranged from a deterioration of 31 point to an improvement of 63 points.  
The PSM analysis shows that canon-rich municipalities improved their access to 
sanitation facilities slightly less than the other municipalities between 1993 and 
2007. However, these results are neither important nor statistically significant 
(Table 7.5).  
Table 7.5 Estimate of the average effect of high canon transfers to Peruvian 
municipalities (2001-2007) on the change in the percentage of households with 
sanitation facilities at home over the period 1993-2007 
Matching 
estimation method 
Nº of canon-rich 
municipalities  
(Treated) 




on the treated 
Bootstrapped 
standard error t statistic 
Nearest neighbour 97 85 -1.469 1.980 -.742 
Radius (.001) 92 730 -.903 1.217 -.742 
Kernel 97 1204 -.425 1.178 -.361 
Stratification 97 1204 -.037 1.219 -.030 
The change in the percentage of households with an electricity supply is the last of 
the indicators under examination. Private companies are usually the providers of 
electricity, although sometimes they develop partnership with governments – 
national, regional and municipal– to facilitate the extension of the national grid to 
rural areas. Once the grid is in place, the electricity supply requires neither high 
operational costs nor complex institutions for its management. As the mining 
companies are the main consumers of electricity, their mere presence facilitates the 
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supply to neighbouring municipalities because the grid is already very close to 
them. Not surprisingly, electricity supply is the only service that improved 
comparatively more in canon-rich municipalities. 
In 1993, 53 per cent of Peruvian households enjoyed their own electricity supply. 
The figure had increased to 74 per cent by 2007. The average increase in the 
1,350 municipalities in my database was slightly more important, from 26 to 53 per 
cent. According to the PSM analysis, receiving a large amount of canon transfers 
had a positive impact on the expansion of the service (Table 7.6). The average 
improvement in canon-rich municipalities is between 3 and 7 points higher than in 
the comparable canon-poor municipalities, and at least in three of the methods, the 
results are statistically significant or close to being significant. 
Table 7.6 Estimate of the average effect of high canon transfers to Peruvian 
municipalities (2001-2007) on the change in the percentage of households with 
electricity supply at home over the period 1993-2007 
Matching 
estimation method 
Nº of canon-rich 
municipalities  
(Treated) 




on the treated 
Bootstrapped 
standard error t statistic 
Nearest neighbour 97 85 2.549 3.477 .733 
Radius (.001) 92 730 6.964 2.776 2.508 
Kernel 97 1204 4.675 1.874 2.495 
Stratification 97 1204 4.436 2.768 1.603 
 
Summarising, so far, the analysis reveals that there were no important differences 
in the improvement of education and sanitation indicators between canon-rich and 
canon-poor municipalities during the period 1993-2007. However, canon-rich 
municipalities tended to perform worse in term of drinking water supplies to the 
home, and better regarding the expansion of electricity supplies.  
These results can be refined. Would the results be different if I chose another 
benchmark to decide what a canon-rich municipality is? Do municipalities in all the 
regions behave similarly or are there some region-specific differences?   
7.3.3 Checking the robustness of the results 
I ran two new specifications of the four PSM algorithms to answer these two 
questions. In the first new specification I raised the canon transfer benchmark 
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identifying the canon-rich municipalities to PEN 3,500, thus reducing the number of 
canon-rich municipalities from 97 to 53. In the second specification, I excluded from 
the analysis the canon-rich municipalities of Ancash to see whether the results of 
this important mining region somewhat drive the results of the overall 
comparison.180 I kept the other parameters of these new models similar to the 
original PSM specification. These new tests show the robustness of the results, but 
introduce a twist in the history (see tables with the results of the complementary 
PSM analyse in Appendix X).  
Raising the threshold for becoming canon-rich municipalities has no important 
effect on the results. The sign and the statistical significance of the average effect 
of high canon transfers on the change in welfare indicators remain stable. The 
intensity of the effect varies slightly in the case of the education and electricity 
coverage indicators, whose positive effect is reinforced – although in the case of 
change in the percentage of people with secondary education, it is not statistically 
significant –. This means that the top 53 canon-rich municipalities behaved more or 
less like the wider group of the 97 richest.   
The results vary more appreciably when the canon-rich municipalities from Ancash 
are excluded from the analysis. There are no differences regarding the change in 
the completion of secondary education and the coverage of sanitation facilities but 
the performance in the other two indicators worsens notably. The percentage of 
households with drinking water at home increased between 8 and 10 percentage 
points less in canon-rich municipalities outside Ancash than in their comparable 
municipalities in the country as a whole. Moreover, the strong statistical 
significance of the result signals a high degree of consistency across the 
municipalities. Regarding the extension of the electricity supply, the positive effect 
reported by the original PSM analysis disappears when the canon-rich 
municipalities of Ancash are not taken into account. This means that the 
overachievement of municipalities in Ancash drove the original results for the 
change in these two indicators. Once the Ancash effect is discounted, the results 
for the whole country can be regarded as clearly negative.  
                                                            
180 I choose Ancash because it has more canon-rich municipalities larger than 1,500 inhabitants 
– 23– and because some studies report that mining has generated positive social outcomes 
there (ICMM, 2007; Sanborn et al., 2007). 
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The main findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows: 
(i) At regional level, canon minero transfers did not have any significant 
beneficial effect on either economic growth or the improvement of welfare 
indicators over the period 2002-2008.  
(ii) At local level, municipalities receiving the highest volumes of canon 
transfers between 2001 and 2007 failed to improve their welfare indicators 
in the period 1993–2007 to any significantly greater degree than their 
comparable counterparts. This finding has two corollaries:  
a. Considering that these municipalities are the closest to large mines or oil 
and gas wells, the notion that proximity to profitable operations 
generates positive effects on population welfare can be ruled out.  
b. Municipal governments receiving a high volume of canon transfers have 
not translated substantial increases in capital investment budgets into 
well-being for local people.   
How can these puzzling results be explained? Chapter 8 addresses directly this 
question. Given the greater concentration of resources at the municipal level (Table 
7.1), the analysis focuses on how municipal governments spent canon transfers 
revenues.  
  




Why has the New Extractive Industries Strategy (NEIS) failed? 
 
The results discussed in the last chapter present a puzzle: how is it possible that 
regions and municipalities receiving high volumes of canon transfers do not 
improve the living standards of their inhabitants more than the rest of the country? 
Why, despite the implementation of the NEIS policy, together with government and 
company assurances, does the presence of highly profitable mines – and oil and 
gas wells – not benefit the people living closest to them? 
A lack of capacity at sub-national government level to spend canon revenue wisely 
is the prevailing explanation (ICMM, 2007; McPhail, 2008) with the corruption of 
municipal authorities often cited as a complementary cause.181 Accordingly, 
capacity building programmes and the promotion of transparency at the local level 
have become the fashionable response. Mining companies, International Financial 
Corporation (IFC) and some bilateral aid agencies have bought into these ideas 
and put forward joint proposals (Aguilar, 2008; MIM, 2010). Some private 
companies have invested heavily in capacity building. For example, in 2008 alone, 
Antamina spent USD 4.6 million on capacity building for five municipal 
governments – Huaraz, Huari, Huarmey, San Marcos and Chavin de Huantar – 
(Antamina, 2009).  
In general, the lack of capacity to spend money wisely is true for most 
municipalities in the country. But the relevant question here is whether differences 
in the ways in which sub-national governments spend money correlates with 
different levels of canon transfers. If differences can be shown to really exist, then it 
is important to understand the causal mechanisms behind them.  
The results of my research show a clear divergence from the typical ‘lack of 
capacity’ narrative. In this chapter, I propose an alternative and, to my mind, more 
plausible explanation of the poor use of public money. I shall argue that it is the 
                                                            
181 These were the main arguments employed by central government officials, senior mining 
company managers, international donor representatives and governance consultants in the 
following interviews: 2008-004 (Lima, 07-04-2008); 2008-023 (Lima, 16-04-2008); 2008-035 
(Pasco, 28-04-2008); 2008-83 (Lima, 09-06-2008); 2008-086 (Lima, 11-06-2008); 2008-152 
(Lima, 08-08-2008).  
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combination of high volume of canon transfers, centrally imposed unhelpful 
regulations, pressure for quick spending coming from national government and 
mining companies, and new forms of participatory governance that provide 
incentives for municipal authorities to pursue short-term spending strategies. The 
immediate redistribution of canon transfers among the population through the 
generation of employment in public sector jobs has become the main outcome as 
well as the main criterion for judging the performance of municipal authorities. 
Efficient spending for long-term goals has been relegated to secondary importance.  
In my analysis I focus on the municipal level, where the largest amounts of canon 
transfers are received. I present the results of my research in four steps. First, I 
provide an overview of the official decision-making mechanisms for public capital 
investment in sub-national governments. The difficulties in implementing these 
centrally imposed regulations at municipal level provide an important background 
for understanding the processes leading to short-term spending. Second, I analyse 
the effect of canon transfers on actual expenditure patterns across Peruvian 
municipalities in the period 2005-2008. This demonstrates that canon transfers 
were associated with a lower proportion of expenditure in social sectors and greater 
spending on stadiums, monuments, decorative pavements, and street furniture. 
These results suggest that the pattern of revenue allocation lies behind the lack of 
improvement in welfare indicators in canon-rich municipalities. Third, I report on my 
attempt to check the accuracy of the ‘lack-of-technical-capacity’ argument. I used 
data collected during my visits to 18 canon-rich municipalities to build a Municipal 
Capacity Index (MCI) and then compared the MCI with data of the percentage of 
actual budget spending in the same municipalities. I found no correlation between 
technical and spending capacity. Finally, in the fourth step I sketch out an 
alternative explanation for the lack of positive results in canon-rich municipalities, 
drawing on case studies from Ancash and Moquegua to show that canon transfers, 
in combination with other local political factors, promoted short-term spending 
decisions.  
8.1. Decision-making mechanisms for public capital investment in sub-
national governments    
The manner in which municipal and regional governments spent canon minero 
transfers during the period 2003–2008 was strongly influenced by the institutional 
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framework generated by the decentralisation policy promoted by the Peruvian 
state. Following the reform of 2002, Peru has three tiers of democratically elected 
government: the national administration, 25 regional and 1,834 municipal 
governments.182 The process of decentralisation transferred financial resources 
and functional responsibility from the centre to sub-national governments but there 
was very little devolution of political power. The centre retained legislative 
capacity183 and the national government imposed strict and detailed regulations on 
how municipal and regional governments could administer their resources. These 
centrally designed regulations conflict with both the highly diverse local contexts 
and the central administration’s lack of technical and political capacity to effectively 
enforce them. Hence, the theoretically ideal institutions and policies have been 
informally adapted to fit the needs, capacity and interests of the sub-national 
authorities. In the next subsections, I discuss five areas in which these regulations 
were especially influential in determining how sub-national governments spent 
canon transfers. 
8.1.1 Rules for the utilisation of different types of revenue  
Municipal government revenue sources may be grouped into two main categories: 
locally collected revenues and transfers from central government.184 Locally 
collected revenues comprise municipal taxes (mainly property levies), 
administration fees, fines, and profits from the sale of goods and provision of 
services. Municipal governments can devote these revenues to both current and 
capital spending. 
Transfers from the central government consist of the Municipal Compensation Fund 
(Foncomun),185 canon transfers, and other minor earmarked transfers.186 Municipal 
governments can utilise Foncomun transfers freely to finance both capital and 
                                                            
182 I provide more information on the administrative structure of the Peruvian state in chapter 1. 
183 Regional and local councils only have the capacity to regulate their own functional structure 
and some minor administrative procedures (Consejo Nacional de Descentralización, 2004). 
184 Borrowing from commercial banks or international institutions is a third source that is seldom 
used by most sub-national governments. However, the Law of Fiscal Decentralisation indicates 
that sub-national governments may access loans to finance the execution of investment 
projects, but not for current expenditure.  
185 The Foncomun is financed from 2/19 of the total Value Added Tax (VAT) revenue and is 
distributed among all municipal governments according to a predefined formula that 
incorporates criteria for population size, poverty indicators and percentage of rural population.  
186 For example, the Vaso de Leche (Glass of Milk) initiative that municipal governments are 
expected to implement in order to provide nutritional support to children and senior citizens.  
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current expenses. In contrast, the last modification of the Canon Law (Law Nº 
28,077) stipulated that canon transfers should be entirely devoted to capital 
expenditure. From 2006, the central government relaxed the application of the law, 
allowing municipal governments to spend up to 20 per cent of their canon transfers 
on the maintenance of local infrastructure, and an additional 5 per cent on the 
development of capital investment projects.187 Regional governments have a 
slightly different revenue structure and do not have the authority to collect taxes. 
Most of their revenue is sourced from transfers from the national government, 
which are earmarked for financing education and health services. 
Municipal and regional governments alike depend heavily on transfers from the 
central government. During the period 2004–2008, central government transferred 
to regional and municipal governments financial resources in excess of 96 and 90 
per cent, respectively (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2010).188 In the case of 
mining jurisdictions, this dependency has an additional challenging twist: they are 
forced to administer a disproportionately large budget for capital expenditure 
without being able to draw upon additional resources to increase current expenses.   
8.1.2 The budgeting schedule 
The budgeting schedule also has important implications for the management of 
municipal and regional governments. The fiscal year runs from January to 
December, and the preparation of the annual budget starts almost a year in 
advance. The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) makes forecasts of central 
government revenue for the following year and the volume of transfers to be made 
to each sub-national government. Municipal and regional governments then use 
this information to initiate their own budgetary processes (including participatory 
budgeting, which I will explain later in this section). At the end of each fiscal year, 
the Opening Institutional Budget (OIB)189 for the following year is approved by the 
MEF. It defines how much sub-national governments can spend on each line item 
and traditionally has a very conservative estimate of revenue. However, during the 
fiscal year, once the corporation tax and VAT revenue figures from the previous 
year are officially known, the MEF updates the volume of transfers to be allocated 
                                                            
187 Through the annual budget law.  
188 The figure for municipal governments excludes Lima.  
189 The original Spanish is presupuesto institucional de apertura (PIA).  
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to sub-national governments; these are invariably higher than the earlier OIB 
calculations. Armed with these revised figures, in June–July, each sub-national 
government draws up a Modified Institutional Budget (MIB), which becomes the 
final version of the budget.  
During the mineral price boom, this system made budget management extremely 
difficult for sub-national governments receiving high volumes of canon transfers. 
Frequently, the actual transfers amounted to more than double the figures forecast 
in the OIB. Thus, in the middle of the fiscal year, these governments had to come 
up with new proposals to spend the money. Although sub-national governments 
could have decided to reserve this additional funding for the following fiscal year, 
both central government and the population would have regarded such a measure 
as lack of capacity.  
8.1.3 Distribution of functions among levels of government 
The failure to clearly distribute functions and expenditure responsibilities between 
the three levels of government is a major shortcoming of the current 
decentralisation process (Ehtisham Ahmad & Garcia-Escribano, 2006). The 
Framework Decentralisation Law of 2002 (Law Nº 27,783) defines three different 
types of function: those that are exclusive to each level; those shared between 
levels; and those delegated from one level to another through an explicit formal 
agreement.190 The decentralisation of exclusive and delegated functions did not 
generate any significant problems during the period 2004–2008. However, those 
functions that were shared by two or more levels of government, such as the 
management of public services, promotion of economic activities, and provision of 
basic infrastructure, were made problematic due to a lack of coordination between 
the different levels. 
Public capital investment in the education and health sectors illustrates this lack of 
coordination. All three levels of government are involved in building new facilities 
and refurbishing old ones, training personnel, and undertaking investment to 
improve the quality of service. In order to coordinate the efforts at the three levels, 
the Organic Law of Regional Governments (Law Nº 27,867) specifies that regional 
                                                            
190 Consejo Nacional de Descentralización (2004), and Calderon & Friz (2005) provide good 
summaries of different functions by level of government according to the legal framework of the 
Peruvian decentralisation process.  
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governments should only undertake capital investment projects with a regional 
perspective, while the national government should only invest in nationwide 
projects. However, the different levels of government interpreted these 
prerequisites very loosely during the period 2004–2008. 
Two additional factors undermine coordination between government levels. First, 
intergovernmental transfers are sent directly from the centre to each sub-national 
government’s account. Accordingly, municipal governments in a given region do 
not need to coordinate with or report to their corresponding regional government 
with regard to the management of their capital investment budget. Second, the lack 
of institutional relations between national, regional and municipal planning severs 
municipal capital investment projects from the implementation of national policy, 
and from the strategies of neighbouring jurisdictions. The result is a patchwork of 
juxtaposed strategies that lack any kind of synergy. To make matters worse, the 
national ministries implement projects at sub-national level using different criteria 
and without any coordination with the sub-national governments. For example, at 
national level there are four agencies responsible for (i) investment in rural 
electrification, (ii) rural roads, (iii) telecommunications, and (iv) water and sanitation. 
Each has its own planning mechanisms, criteria for the distribution of funds among 
territories, and even its own definition of what constitutes a rural area (Peltier-
Thiberge, 2006: 294). They operate completely independently from regional and 
municipal governments, which, in addition, often invest a significant proportion of 
their resources in electrification, roads, and water and sanitation. Some regional 
and municipal governments try to overcome these problems by drawing up 
collaborative agreements. But these are done on an ad hoc basis and transaction 
costs make them unviable.  
The negative impact of these factors on the coordination of different government 
levels operating in the same territory is more serious in mining jurisdictions than in 
the rest of the country. In municipalities without significant canon transfers, mayors 
are obliged to negotiate with the regional government or relevant ministries in Lima 
for the allocation of funding for specific projects in their municipalities. This 
demands a development plan whereby each level of government assumes 
responsibility for a specific part. The incentive to negotiate and coordinate does not 
exist in mining jurisdictions, where mayors and regional presidents have ample 
resources to spend. On the contrary, they face the opposite problem of generating 
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sufficient feasible projects on which to spend the canon transfers. Municipal and 
regional governments often compete to ‘buy’ viable projects from consultants.191 
Managers in the regional governments of Pasco and Ancash reported that on 
various occasions, they found the consultant had cheated them by selling the same 
project twice. Thus when a regional government tried to register its project with the 
National Public Investment System (NPIS),192 it was rejected because another 
municipal government had got there first.193 
8.1.4 Participatory mechanisms for decision-making at sub-national level 
The return to democracy after the Fujimori era went hand in hand with the 
promotion of participatory citizenship and the adoption of different mechanisms to 
increase transparency.194 Participatory planning and budgeting were made 
compulsory for all sub-national governments. In addition, municipal and regional 
authorities have to incorporate civil society organisations into advisory bodies 
known as coordinating councils, and are required by law to give an account of 
budgetary spending in open public meetings. Even more radically, citizens can 
force authorities to become more responsive to popular demands by setting a recall 
election in motion to remove mayors and councillors from office when 25 per cent 
of the electorate in the jurisdiction approve the proposal.195 Recent experience 
demonstrates that this is easy to do in small rural districts.196   
Popular participation in the generation of regional and municipal development plans 
was intended to be the keystone for the allocation of resources at sub-national 
level. However, as I discovered from many interviews I held with mayors and 
municipal managers, this ideal policy of popular involvement in decision making is 
                                                            
191 Most of these consultants are freelance civil engineers and economists specialised in 
designing investment projects for municipal and regional governments. They tend to work only 
in one or two regions as their professional success depends on developing good relationships 
with managers in sub-national governments. In some cases NGOs and small firms also offer 
this type of service.  
192 The NPIS was initiated in 2000 with Law Nº 27,293 and its Spanish name is Sistema 
Nacional de Inversión Pública.  
193 Interviews 2008-039 (Pasco, 24-09-2008) and 2008-097 (Huaraz, 18-06-2008). 
194 Remy (2005:23-31) provides an interesting analysis of how divergent ideological groups 
supported the introduction of participatory mechanisms.  
195 According to the Law of Participation and Citizens’ Control (Law Nº 26,300), once this 
requirement is met, the National Office for Electoral Processes should call a plebiscite in the 
municipality to confirm or remove the authorities. 
196 In 2008, there were recall elections in 242 municipalities, involving 240 mayors and 999 local 
councillors. Ultimately, 92 mayors and 423 councillors were removed from office (ONPE, 2009).  
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frequently by-passed. Most mayors consider it to be an annoying process and are 
not convinced of its usefulness. Municipal governments resort to hiring external 
consultants who, after calling some preliminary public meetings to comply with the 
legal formality of ‘participation’, draw up municipal strategic plans themselves. 
Suspiciously, these documents are often strikingly similar from municipality to 
municipality as consultants habitually recycle the same document for their different 
clients.  
Some municipalities are fortunate in that mining companies help them to hire 
competent professionals to draw up a plan tailored to local needs.197 But 
unfortunately, independent of the quality of the product, the practical results are 
similar in all the municipalities. Mayors’ lack of interest in plans aimed at regulating 
their decisions makes these documents little more than colourful decorations for 
mayors’ office walls.  
Participatory budgeting is the other key mechanism intended to facilitate the 
allocation of resources for investment at sub-national level. In 2002, Parliament 
approved a law (Law Nº 27,680) that made participatory budgeting compulsory as a 
public practice for all governments at sub-national level. The objectives of this 
measure were: (i) to reinforce democracy and good governance by means of civil 
society participation, (ii) to promote non-state investment through the involvement 
of the private sector in the budgetary process, (iii) to improve the quality of public 
spending, (iv) to foster downward accountability and, (v) to encourage the 
contribution of the general public in projects that benefit them (Shack, 2006: 69-70).  
Each year, the MEF publishes detailed guidelines on how sub-national 
governments should carry out participatory budgeting. They introduce small 
changes in the procedures, although the main features do not change. First, 
potential participants must register to take part in the process. In most 
municipalities I visited, all the citizens were invited to take part and in some cases 
special status was conferred on civil society organisations and neighbourhood 
associations to allow them to present their proposals more extensively and to hold 
private meetings with municipal officials. After the governments’ identify the 
participants and their training needs, the main exercise is carried out in workshops, 
which constitute a crucial stage of the budgeting process. Government officials, 
                                                            
197 This was the case in municipalities around Antamina. 
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representatives of municipal governments (at the regional budgeting level) and 
local communities, members of civil society, and, in a few cases, business-people 
review the territory’s challenges and opportunities and fix the criteria for the 
prioritisation of projects. Following this process, a technical committee analyses the 
economic and practical feasibility of the different proposals. Finally, the president of 
the regional government or the mayor of the municipality presents the technical 
analysis to the participants who, after deliberation, approve the projects that have 
been prioritised. This general procedure has multiple local variations. 
After the first few years of compulsory participatory budgeting, Shack (2006:78) 
was able to identify some clear shortcomings: (i) a high degree of fragmentation of 
investment due to excessive popular expectations, which made it impossible to 
focus resources on strategic projects; (ii) lack of technical rigour at the sub-national 
level in the implementation of the process; (iii) dislocation between development 
strategies and participatory budgeting, and between municipal and regional levels; 
(iv) limited representation of participants; and, (v) the absence of effective 
mechanisms for monitoring and controlling agreed plans. As I shall show in 
subsequent sections, these deficiencies are exacerbated in the case of mining 
regions, where increasing resources have flowed.  
8.1.5 Quality control of capital expenditure 
All public investment projects – including those prioritised through the participatory 
budgeting process – must be examined and approved by the NPIS. This body 
initially operated within the MEF and was in charge of setting out technical criteria, 
methods and procedures aimed at guaranteeing the technical feasibility, and 
economic and social profitability of public investment. It was staffed by a body of 
civil servants who remained in Lima and were responsible for the evaluation of 
projects according to these criteria.  
In 2006, the NPIS became a bottleneck in the expansion of public capital 
expenditure at sub-national level. Mayors and regional presidents blamed the 
system for their failure to meet annual investment targets, raising two separate 
objections. First, a centralised system could not cope with the growing number of 
projects presented for evaluation and this led to unnecessary delays. Second, the 
application of centrally designed criteria meant that local contexts were ignored and 
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viable or important projects rejected. In 2007, once the escalation of social conflict 
was apparent, President Garcia bowed to pressure from the municipal authorities 
and ordered the decentralisation of the NPIS. The MEF retained the authority to 
define the criteria for the evaluation of projects and had a general monitoring role, 
but other functions were delegated to regional and municipal levels to make the 
procedure quicker and more flexible. Regional and municipal governments are now 
permitted to set up their own Units for Investment Programming, which assume 
responsibility for the evaluation of investment projects according to NPIS criteria 
and procedures.  
The new arrangement introduces greater flexibility into the system, but it also 
lowers the technical standards governing project approval. The decentralisation of 
the NPIS means that regional presidents and mayors are granted the authority to 
hire and fire the personnel responsible for evaluating their proposals. An 
independent evaluation of the projects approved at regional and municipal level in 
2007 shows that a high percentage did not fulfil the necessary criteria (Ministerio de 
Economía y Finanzas, 2009b).  
From this one can gauge the influence of institutional mechanisms on the way in 
which sub-national governments spend their financial resources, especially those 
intended for capital investment, including canon transfers. On this basis, I shall now 
examine the extent to which higher canon transfer levels influenced capital 
expenditure patterns in Peruvian municipalities during the period 2005-2008.  
8.2 Influence of canon transfers on municipal capital expenditure patterns  
Does the volume of canon transfers shape in a specific and consistent fashion the 
way in which municipalities spend their budgets? To answer this question, I used 
regression analysis to test whether higher canon transfer levels led to specific 
patterns of spending in Peruvian municipalities in the period 2005-2008. This is a 
first approximation to understanding local dynamics in canon-rich municipalities. 
8.2.1 Variables and method specification 
The first stage of the analysis was to determine how municipalities spent their 
money. I therefore compiled a data set containing official information on budget 
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implementation for all Peruvian municipalities from 2005 to 2008.198 It contained a 
very detailed account of capital investment expenditure disaggregated into 48 sub-
programmes by sector. After examining the nature of each sub-programme, I 
regrouped them into eleven sectoral categories: (i) education, (ii) water and 
sanitation, (iii) health, (iv) electrification, (v) agriculture promotion, (vi) promotion of 
other economic activities, (vii) transport infrastructure, (viii) urban infrastructure, (ix) 
conspicuous construction, (x) internal functioning, and (xi) other.  
The first seven categories are self explanatory as to the sectors they belong to. 
They predominantly encompass infrastructure, although in some cases, training 
activities are also included. The contents of the following three categories – urban 
infrastructure, conspicuous construction, and internal functioning – require further 
explanation because this categorisation has methodological consequences. I 
included in urban infrastructure only the construction and renovation of streets, 
pavements, and public gardens. Conspicuous construction refers to stadiums, 
leisure centres, monuments, theatres and community buildings. It is important to 
note that I incorporate the construction of simple sports facilities into the ‘education’ 
category because they often serve the local school. Finally, I put under internal 
functioning the construction and refurbishment of town halls, investment in IT 
services for the municipal government and any other capital expenditure directly 
aimed at improving municipal services. To determine the variable, I calculated the 
proportion of capital spending allocated to each expenditure category by 
municipality and year.  
In the regression analysis, I tested whether the volume of canon transfers received 
by each municipality correlated with the percentage of total capital investment 
devoted to the different sectors. More specifically, I chose to test the influence of 
canon transfers on the top seven sectoral categories, which, on average, 
represented more than 90 per cent of total actual capital expenditure in 
municipalities with between 3,000 and 200,000 inhabitants located outside the 




198 Data provided by the MEF. 
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Table 8.1 Percentage of actual capital expenditure by sector and year in 
Peruvian municipalities with between 3,000 and 200,000 inhabitants 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 N = 1,051 N = 1,060 N = 1,072 N = 1,113 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Education 10.7% 14.0 12.7% 13.3 15.5% 14.1 15.8% 13.9 
Water and 
sanitation 10.0% 14.0 12.7% 14.7 13.7% 15.2 14.2% 16.0 
Electrification 5.8% 12.8 7.8% 14.2 5.9% 11.0 4.0% 7.9 
Agriculture  4.3% 9.5 6.2% 10.8 8.2% 12.8 9.3% 13.1 
Transport  10.2% 15.0 11.6% 14.8 12.2% 15.0 12.2% 14.9 
Urban 
infrastructure 17.4% 21.5 21.1% 21.5 18.5% 19.3 17.3% 18.3 
Conspicuous 
constructions 19.1% 19.5 22.3% 17.9 20.4% 15.8 20.7% 15.7 
Source: MEF; adaptation: the author.  
In addition to the level of canon transfers that I used in the previous analyses, in 
this case, I controlled for other variables that could also influence the allocation of 
financial resources to specific sectors:  
(i) The ratio of actual capital spending to capital budget. Assuming that municipal 
governments aim to spend the whole budget, this variable controls for their 
actual capacity to fulfil their plans. This control is important because it is 
possible that municipalities lacking the capacity to fulfil their budget allocation 
prioritise ‘easy’ sectors in which projects are technically simpler to implement.  
(ii) The ratio of current spending to capital spending. This variable controls for the 
potential capacity of municipalities in terms of the availability of personnel and 
other resources to implement the capital spending plan (Aragón & Casas, 
2009).  
There are five supplementary variables that might correlate with specific 
necessities shaping municipal governments patterns of spending during the period: 
(iii) size of the population, (iv) level of poverty in 2007, (v) percentage of the 14–24-
year old population with secondary education in 2007, (vi) percentage of the rural 
population in 2007, and (vii) percentage of the indigenous population in 2007. I also 
included year dummies to control for year-specific processes affecting all 
municipalities. These dummies are especially important because municipal 
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government budgets increased significantly from 2005 to 2008 and this general 
tendency may have influenced their priorities (see Appendix XI for a summary of all 
variables). 
To compute the multiple regressions, I used OLS analysis with robust standard 
errors to correct heteroskedasticity.  
8.2.2 Results: less spending on basic services and more on concrete 
The analysis shows that the level of canon transfers negatively correlates with the 
proportion of the capital spending budget allocated to the provision of basic social 
services and transport infrastructure. In contrast, canon transfers positively 
correlate with expenditure in agriculture, urban infrastructure, and conspicuous 
constructions. In the next paragraphs I discuss separately the results for each one 
of these sectors (Table 8.2 summarises the seven regression analyses).  
Basic social services 
First, canon transfers negatively correlate with the percentage of capital 
expenditure allocated to education services, construction of water and sanitation 
infrastructure, and electrification. In the case of investment in education and water 
and sanitation, this negative correlation is statistically strongly significant – at 1 per 
cent. This coincidence notwithstanding, the following discussion clarifies why the 
reasons behind these results could be different in each case.  
Municipal governments’ capital investment in education is mainly restricted to the 
provision, renovation, and maintenance of physical facilities, limiting the amount of 
money that canon-rich municipalities can allocate to this sector. Even if canon-rich 
municipalities rebuilt all the schools under their jurisdiction – which in fact they 
frequently do – the requisite expenditure would consume a relatively small 
proportion of the available budget.  
Investment in water and sanitation infrastructure is a different case. This basic 
service is far from adequate in most canon-rich municipalities, and municipal 
governments could well invest more in the expansion of these services. Before 
elections and at every annual public hearing, virtually every mayor promised to 
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deliver in this area.199 Yet a combination of factors - the greater technical 
sophistication of this type of project, the longer time needed for implementation and 
prevalence of incentives to prioritise short-term, more visible works, contribute to 
the neglect of projects in this sector.  
Electrification is a relatively minor line item in the municipal government budget, a 
situation that has become even more apparent in recent years (see Table 8.1). As 
the previous chapter notes, electricity coverage has improved markedly throughout 
the whole country, and most dramatically in canon-rich municipalities. Therefore, 
given the nature of investment and the current level of coverage, it is logical to 
assume that canon-rich municipalities with higher overall budgets expend a lower 
proportion on the expansion of this service – because it is there already or 
connection to the grid is relatively simple as mines in the area are already 
electrified. 
Transport infrastructure 
Second, spending on transport infrastructure negatively correlates with canon 
transfers. This result is difficult to explain because improvement of the rough tracks 
connecting rural communities was a constant demand in the participatory budgeting 
workshops that I attended in canon-rich municipalities. In some workshops the 
municipal officials blamed the strict NPIS regulations for lack of further investment 
in the sector. The NPIS did not allow road improvement without clear evidence that 
enough cars and trucks were already using them regularly. For the population it 
was a chicken and egg situation: they needed more cars circulating to be allowed 
to improve the tracks, but they needed better roads to get more cars circulating.  
                                                            
199  The population demanded the fulfilment of these promises in different public meetings I 
attended: Cerro de Pasco (15-04-2008); Ninacaca (21-05-2008); Huaripampa (5-07-2008); and 
urban nucleus of San Marcos (6-07-2008). 
Table 8.2 Regression of canon minero transfers and other socio-economic variables on the allocation of capital investment in 
municipalities with more than 3,000 inhabitants, by sector according to annual budget execution (2005–2008) 
Time frame Panel data 2005–2008 
Model specification OLS regression with robust standard errors and year dummies 
Dependent variable: percentage of 
capital investment  
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R2 .11 .05 .08 .23 .16 .31 .03 
N 4,025 4,025 4,025 4,025 4,025 4,025 4,025 
Notes:  intercept calculated although not reported; standard errors in parenthesis; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. 




Third, in contrast to the previous sectors, investment in the promotion of agriculture 
strongly correlates with high volumes of canon transfer. Moreover, both the 
regression coefficient and the proportion of variance explained by the model are 
higher than in most other sectors. The convergence of two dynamics seems to 
account for this correlation. On the one hand, in most rural municipalities there is 
very little capital expenditure and local authorities use it almost exclusively for the 
provision of basic services. Thus, it is to be expected that the higher the canon 
transfers, the more likely the municipality will have outstanding resources to invest 
in sectors other than those covering basic services. On the other hand, greater 
expenditure in agriculture promotion constitutes a mechanism for the resolution of 
tensions between different groups in canon-rich municipalities. In recent years, 
peasant communities in the rural areas of mining municipalities have claimed that 
they do not benefit from canon transfers. They accuse the mayors of being mainly 
responsive to the demands of the population in the urban nucleus of the 
municipality. However, given sufficient financial resources, scaling up investment in 
irrigation projects or in the acquisition of improved animal breeds to distribute to 
farmers is quite a popular way of appeasing the rural population. 
Urban infrastructure and conspicuous construction 
Fourth, investment in urban infrastructure and conspicuous construction strongly 
correlates with the level of canon transfers. This is not surprising, as the capacity to 
invest in these sectors is almost unlimited and construction works have the political 
advantage of being labour intensive. Thus, disproportionate numbers of stadiums, 
monuments, and decorative pavements and street furniture are common in canon-
rich municipalities. In this case, the fact that the variable is a proportion of the total 
capital spending budget makes the differences between canon-rich and canon-poor 
municipalities even greater in terms of per capita investment in these two sectors.  
These results provide an initial though incomplete insight into the pattern of public 
spending in canon-rich municipalities. But the analysis has three limitations. First, 
the comparison of spending in each category across municipalities only measures 
the relative effort of each municipality. In other words, given the huge differences 
between municipalities in terms of per capita budget, it is very likely that in per 
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capita terms, canon-rich municipalities spend more in all sectors than the rest of the 
municipalities. Second, some of the models do not explain the observed variation in 
spending patterns (see values of R2 in Table 8.2), meaning that they capture only a 
part of the history; and third, the results do not clarify the reasons behind the 
investment decisions of municipal authorities.  
In the previous two chapters I argued that sub-national governments spend canon 
transfers inefficiently, at least, in terms of welfare achievement (Chapter 7). This 
lack of results is probably due to the allocation of revenue that does not prioritise 
improvement in basic services. This preliminary explanation needs to be 
substantiated with grassroots evidence. In the following sections, I examine data 
collected during my visits to 18 canon-rich municipalities in three Peruvian mining 
regions in order to gain a better understanding of local processes accounting for 
the lack of social benefits. I undertake the analysis in two steps. First, I examine the 
extent to which lack of technical capacity within municipal governments is 
responsible for the inefficient use of canon transfers. I discovered that although lack 
of capacity is an important issue, it alone cannot explain the use that municipal 
governments made of canon transfers (Section 8.3). Second, I present my own 
diagnosis of the problem through the analysis of some case studies (Sections 8.4 
and 8.5).  
8.3 Lack of technical capacity does not explain everything  
In Lima, the official discourses on the shortcomings of service delivery in canon-rich 
municipalities were unanimous: lack of capacity within municipal government was 
to blame. In a context of conflict escalation in mining regions, this was a convenient 
explanation as far as both the national government and the companies were 
concerned.  The explanation diverted popular attention from their own functioning 
to the poor performance of local authorities.  
What did people mean when they pointed to lack of capacity as the main problem 
in municipal government in canon-rich municipalities? Most of my interviewees in 
Lima cited the inability of municipal governments to implement a large proportion of 
their capital investment budgets as both a major proof of this lack of capacity and 
the reason for the only small improvement in social indicators (Aragón & Casas, 
2009). They signalled a lack of skilled professionals and poor municipal planning as 
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the principal factors behind the inability to spend the budget appropriately.200 The 
argument was simple:  
Lack of results 
Inability to spend 
the capital 
spending budget 
Lack of technical 
capability and good 
professionals 
 
This diagnosis had two practical consequences. First, some of the mining 
companies, the IFC, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) decided to 
spend money on capacity building programmes for canon-rich municipal 
governments (Antamina, 2009; Programa Canon, 2010). Second, the national 
press  constantly monitored  the performance of municipal authorities (El Comercio, 
2008c; La República, 2008).  
To check the accuracy of this lack-of-capacity argument I compare the ‘technical 
capacity’ of 18 canon-rich municipalities in three different Peruvian regions with 
their ability to spend their budget. If these two variables correlated, the causal link 
between lack of capacity and municipal governments’ poor performance would still 
be plausible. On the contrary, if these two variables did not correlate then the 
causal explanation lay elsewhere. 
8.3.1 The technical capacity of municipal government: putting the concept into 
action 
Measuring the ‘capacity’ of the 18 municipalities was not an easy task. I had to 
overcome two interrelated difficulties: the conceptualisation of ‘capacity’ and access 
to the relevant information. Regarding conceptualisation, my main task was to 
determine which measurable factors accounted for an aggregate indicator of 
municipal ‘capacity’. Fortunately some authors have undertaken similar task in 
recent years (Fiszbein, 1997; Grindle, 2006, 2007). Their studies provided me with 
a sound methodological foundation, but I needed to face a second, very practical, 
problem. I had a fixed itinerary for visiting each municipality and from my previous 
                                                            
200 Interviews 2008-023 (Lima, 16-04-2008); 2008-83 (Lima, 09-06-2008); and 2008-086 (Lima, 
11/06/2008). 
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experiences in the field, I knew that I would need to spend a good deal of time 
chasing up officials in order to interview them. Moreover, I soon realised that the 
authorities in canon-rich municipalities who felt uneasy at being under scrutiny were 
not happy at the prospect of a researcher digging deeply into the intricacies of their 
operations. Therefore, it was not realistic to think that I could conduct a thorough 
and systematic analysis of all the elements that might account for their capacity – 
or lack of it. 
To solve the problem, I decided to design a Municipal Capacity Index (MCI)201 
comprising a basic checklist that municipal officials and authorities would regard as 
relatively ‘inoffensive’. The intention was not to capture all possible factors 
contributing to the technical capacity of a municipality or provide the most accurate 
measure of municipal capacity. I was interested in building an index that captured 
the basic set of procedures and policies that a municipal government needs to put 
in place to ensure it spends its capital budget efficiently. I selected three factors 
that according to the literature, influence both the quality of investment and 
efficiency in allocating resources (Fiszbein, 1997:1031-1032): (i) municipal 
planning; (ii) management of information; and (iii) personnel policy.  
These three factors were equally weighted with scores ranging from zero to ten. 
Thus, each municipality could score up to a maximum of 30 points according to the 
following criteria:  
(i) Municipal planning: Is there a Medium-term Municipal Plan (MMP) that is 
actually used as the basis for making decisions about capital investment? The 
score for this factor ranges from zero to ten according to the following criteria:  
a. The municipality has an MMP: 3 points 
b. The MMP reflects municipal realities and needs: up to 2 points 
− The MMP has a clear understanding of the issues involved: 1 point 
− The MMP identifies specific solutions: 1 point 
c. The MMP is actively used for the approval of projects via participatory 
budgeting: up to 3 points 
− Used marginally: 1 point 
                                                            
201 This type of index was inspired by Grindle’s work on performance indicators for municipal 
governments (2007:56-61). 
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− Central to the process: 3 points 
d.  A mechanism is in place to review the MMP: 2 points  
(ii) Management of information: Extent to which the municipal manager is able to 
provide documentary proof of management: up to 10 points: 
a. The complete MMP: 1 point 
b. Statistics for staff employed by the municipality during the previous two 
years: 1 point 
c. Municipal budget and economic performance reports for the last four 
years: up to 4 points (1 point per year) 
d. List of investment projects executed in the last four years: up to 4 points 
(1 point per year). 
(iii) Personnel policy: stability and professionalism of municipal personnel 
according to the following criteria:  
a. Percentage of civil servants replaced after the most recent election: up to 
6 points 
− <50 per cent: 5 points; 50–60 per cent: 4 points; 60–70 per cent: 3 
points; 70–8 per cent: 2 points; 80–9 per cent: 1 point 
− An additional point if there has been no systematic turnover of staff in 
the previous two years  
b. Recruitment policy prioritises professional capacity over political loyalty: 
up to 2 points 
− A  human resources team is responsible for recruitment according to 
clear job descriptions: 2 points 
− The mayor take responsibility for recruitment and relevant line 
managers are also consulted: 1 point 
− Sole responsibility for recruitment rests with the mayor: 0 points 
c. Employee training: up to 2 points 
− Explicit and independent municipal policy on training: 2 points 
− Municipality responds to offers from the national government: 1 point 
− Municipality does not consider training to be important: 0 points 
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The first column in Table 8.3 shows the results of this indicator for the 18 
municipalities under study and their average score aggregated by region. The 
results reveal that in most municipalities, there was effectively plenty of room for 
capacity building. However, they also indicate that capacity varied widely among 
the 18 municipalities.  
Table 8.3 Municipal capacity index (MCI) for 18 municipalities and comparative 
proportional execution of the capital investment budget (2007–2008) 
Municipality Municipal Capacity Index (MCI) 
Percentage of capital 
investment budget used 
(average 2007–2008) 
Per capita capital 
investment budget in PEN 
(average 2007–2008) 
ANCASH 
Regional average 12 51%  9,284 
Jangas 12 56% 3,561 
Huari 16 53% 6,407 
Cajay 14 80% 8,462 
Chavin de Huantar 22 41% 8,238 
Huachis 3 69% 7,430 
Ponto 4 51% 8,422 
San Marcos 14 7% 22,471 
MOQUEGUA 
Regional average  15.8 53% 7,590 
Moquegua 15 55% 4,205 
Carumas 17 46% 9,212 
Samegua 18 51% 3,382 
San Cristobal 11 54% 4,779 
Torata 18 60% 16,373 
PASCO 
Regional average 14 39% 3,169 
Huachon 19 62% 2,920 
Huayllay 15 35% 3.728 
Ninacaca 10 29% 3,261 
S. Fco de Yarusyakan 15 31% 2,848 
Simon Bolivar 21 45% 2,469 
Tinyahuarco 4 30% 3,769 
Source for columns 2 and 3: MEF; adaptation by the author 
The aggregation of the MCI by region reveals some tendencies. Municipalities in 
Moquegua had the highest average institutional capacity rating (15.8), while those 
in Ancash had the lowest MCI (12); and Pasco was somewhat in the middle (14).202 
                                                            
202 It is important to note that at the time of my field research in Ancash, Antamina was 
implementing a vast programme of capacity building in Huari, Chavin de Huantar and San 
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These regional averages are consistent with the wider trends I observed during my 
research. Given that municipal governments were not staffed by a stable group of 
officers, the institutional capacity of the municipalities was frequently determined by 
the regional level presence of a pool of professionals with technical expertise in the 
management of sub-national governments. The next brief characterisation of 
municipal features at regional level is of help in making sense of the average 
scores, and provides a background for the subsequent analysis of local dynamics. 
The higher capacity of municipalities in Moquegua was not a chance occurrence. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, Moquegua was the cradle of a national policy of municipal 
management renovation. The experience of the municipality of Ilo in participatory 
governance and excellent record in the provision of services attracted attention and 
inspired national legislative reform in the 2000s (Diaz Palacios, 1990; García de 
Chu & Piazza, 1998). Ilo and Moquegua − the provincial municipality − were also 
promoters of a new generation of public servants. In 2002, the ideological line of 
Ilo’s municipal government changed. The new conservative mayor rejected the 
political stance of the previous administration and fired most of the public servants 
employed. These officials subsequently sought reinstatement in the regional 
government and other municipalities, helping to improve the technical capacity of 
these institutions.  
Pasco was an intermediate case. Canon transfers to the region had increased 
substantially, but were still far lower than transfers to Ancash and Moquegua. Most 
professionals in the municipalities came from the city of Cerro de Pasco or 
Huancayo, the capital town of the neighbouring region. Lower salaries in the region 
– in comparison to Ancash and Moquegua – meant that its municipalities were able 
to recruit two different types of people as managers. The first group comprised 
mature bureaucrats who had worked for different public institutions in the past but 
had not enjoyed a sufficiently successful career to secure a permanent job or 
migrate to a more attractive area of the country. The second group consisted of 
young professionals who considered their appointment to be the door to a 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Marcos, the three municipalities that scored the highest in the region. Even if this programme 
cannot in any way be regarded as a success (see discussion in Section 8.4), it is clear that the 
external consultants hired by Antamina were instrumental in providing managers with the 
municipal planning documentation I was asking for. Their scores – and consequently, the 
regional average – would have been even lower without this last minute superficial fix.  
 
− 192 − 
 
 
professional career in public administration. For example, the high MCI scores for 
Huachon (19) and Simon Bolivar (21) were due to the work of two brilliant recent 
graduates of the regional university. The mayors trusted them and the youngsters 
were keen to use the opportunity as a springboard to higher profile jobs in Pasco 
or, if possible, Lima.203 However, not all managers could afford the level of 
professional dedication these two young managers showed. Low public sector 
salaries frequently prompted municipal managers to supplement their earnings with 
consultancies in the design of investment projects for other municipalities – and 
sometimes, even for the one that employed them.   
The context was different in Ancash. All the municipalities under study with the 
exception of Jangas were in the Conchucos Valley, traditionally one of the most 
impoverished territories in Peru. Until the recent boom in canon transfers, the 
average municipality had barely two or three employees to carry out all basic 
administrative duties. Even when canon transfers did start to flow into the municipal 
coffers, mayors were still unable to recruit sufficient professionals locally to manage 
the municipalities in this novel situation. Thus, hiring skilful advisors with the 
capacity to navigate the welter of regulations governing Peruvian municipal life was 
the top priority of all mayors after the 2006 election. However, their most urgent 
concern was not to improve the overall capacity of the municipality, but to 
accelerate public spending and win popular support.  
Not surprisingly, the whiff of money attracted an array of shady characters to 
Conchucos. Municipal managers of dubious reputation proliferated, some of them 
convicted of mismanagement during previous tenures in other municipalities in the 
country. Often, the attraction was not so much the official salary as the opportunity 
to strike lucrative deals with contractors and consultants.  
8.3.2 The non-correlation between capacity and quick spending 
In a second step, I wanted to compare the MCI with the popular narrative that 
highlights the inability of municipal governments to spend a larger proportion of 
their capital investment budget as the main indicator of lack of capacity. The 
second column of Table 8.3 shows the average proportion of the annual capital 
                                                            
203 Personal interviews 2008-052 (Simón Bolivar, 21-05-2008), and 2008-082 (Huachón 4-06-
2008). 
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expenditure budget that was actually used in each municipality in 2007–2008.204 
The same table also provides figures for the per capita capital investment budget of 
each municipality in order to make the comparison meaningful.  
The lack of correlation between the MCI and the percentage of the budget that was 
actually spent is immediately apparent. The figures do not correlate either when 
they are considered separately for each municipality or when aggregated by region. 
Municipalities with very low MCI scores, such as Huachis and Ponto, reached high 
degrees of budget implementation, while some municipalities at the top of the MCI 
ranking e.g. – Chavin de Huantar and Simon Bolivar – were not so effective in 
terms of spending. The aggregation at regional level shows a similar 
counterintuitive tendency: the fact that they had low MCI scores notwithstanding, 
municipalities in Ancash − except San Marcos − spent a greater percentage of their 
budgets than their counterparts in the other two regions.  
These puzzling results indicate the need to look for alternative factors in these 
canon-rich municipalities not included in the conventional paradigm of capacity, but 
which determine the ability of the governments to put in place their investment 
budgets more comprehensively. Moreover, the existence of municipalities with 
quite different levels of capacity plays down the importance of the lack-of-capacity 
argument for explaining the general difficulty canon-rich municipalities have in 
translating canon transfers into improved welfare, as indentified in the indicators.  
Based on my discussions with local actors in the 18 municipalities of my field 
research, and attendance at seven participatory budgeting workshops, in the 
following two sections I propose an alternative explanation for the lack of positive 
results in canon-rich municipalities and lack of positive correlation between capacity 
and ability to spend. 
8.4 Political survival, canon transfers, jobs, mafias, and popular 
participation in Conchucos Valley (Ancash) 
Before the 2006 elections, the municipalities of Conchucos Valley in Ancash had 
already started to receive a substantial volume of canon transfers generated by 
Antamina’s corporate taxes. The use of canon minero revenue subsequently 
                                                            
204 I have taken 2007-2008 to capture the performance of the governments that were elected in 
2006 and were in office, when I calculated the MCI. 
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became a central issue in the electoral campaign. People voted those candidates 
who promised public works to improve the infrastructure, job creation being the 
salient point. After popular frustration caused by lack of employment opportunities 
in the Antamina mine in the early 2000s, this time, people hoped that the revenue 
accruing to municipal governments would provide better job prospects. Thus, the 
new mayors who took office enjoyed strong popular support, but the onus was on 
them to deliver on their promises.205  
The mining companies and central government also put pressure on canon-rich 
sub-national governments to deliver in a timely fashion. In a context of conflict 
escalation in the mining regions, the central government held municipal 
governments responsible for popular discontent due to their inability to execute 
their budgets promptly (La República, 2008). Both municipal authorities and the 
general public felt that such accusations signalled a covert strategy to recentralise 
the management of mining revenues (La Primera – Huaraz, 2008). Therefore, they 
felt compelled to demonstrate their competence. Simultaneously, mining 
companies also demanded quicker implementation of development projects in 
order to show that mining could benefit the people living close to their operations.206  
Two years later, in 2008, the situation of the municipal governments in Conchucos 
was perplexing. In the words of the regional anticorruption prosecutor, “Conchucos 
has become a mafia-territory.”207 Disreputable businessmen seeking lucrative 
contracts infiltrated town halls; mayors took to carrying guns;208 ‘conspicuous 
construction’ and decorative pavements proliferated; and rumours of 
mismanagement were widespread. However, the majority of the population turned 
a blind eye because they could count on coveted jobs in public works.  
To comprehend this situation, I analysed how the abundance of canon transfers 
has generated corruption, distorted mechanisms for popular participation and 
rendered attempts to generate institutional capacity at municipal level futile.   
 
                                                            
205 See Table 6.3 for the percentage of votes received by the mayors of these municipalities. 
206 Interviews with senior managers of mining companies: 2008-083 (Lima, 9-06-2008), and 
2008-084 (Lima 10-06-2008). 
207 Interview 2008-092 (Huaraz, 17-06-2008). 
208 Interview 2008-133 (Huachis, 11-07-2008). 
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8.4.1 The tolerance of corruption 
The recent history of the Conchucos Valley leaves very little doubt as to the 
alarming extent of corruption in municipal government. Leaders of minority 
opposition groups frequently recounted stories of dishonesty and mismanagement 
during my visits to the various municipalities;209 indeed, corruption had become a 
serious problem for them. Yet, the local drivers, peasants, and small traders I met 
during my journeys by public transport across the valley were more cynical: 
corruption had always existed but it was tolerated if it meant that the authorities 
could bring benefits to the people.210  
As I went about my fieldwork, it was difficult to assess how accurate these 
accusations were. Some people provided me with strong evidence of corruption in 
San Marcos, but I did not get similar confirmation from other municipalities. 
Ironically, a few months later, clear evidence of dishonesty in these municipal 
governments came to light. In June 2009, the Front for the Defence of Cajay 
published official reports revealing the existence of irregularities in the municipal 
government concerning purchasing processes and bids for construction contracts 
(La Primera – Huaraz, 2009). Soon after this, the mayor of the neighbouring 
municipality of Huachis was arrested and thrown into jail, accused of contracting 
out excessively remunerated public works to his own family (Peru21, 2009). 
Furthermore, in 2009, the National General Comptroller launched ‘Operation 
Condor’, whose brief was to verify popular accusations, which led to the mayors of 
Huari, Chavin de Huantar and San Marcos being charged with various counts of 
corruption for offences committed in 2007 and 2008 (Contraloría General de la 
República, 2010).  
Having personally listened to the mayors’ side of the story, I tend to believe that 
plundering the coffers of the municipality had not been uppermost in their minds 
when they decided to stand for election. Of course, they aspired to make some 
money out of their position, but they also genuinely hoped to improve public 
services in their respective municipalities. But soon after taking office, they became 
                                                            
209 Personal Interviews 2008-123 (San Marcos, 7-07-200), and 2008-124 (San Marcos, 8-07-
2008). 
210 Huber (2008) found similar popular reactions in other Peruvian regions. 
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entangled in a web of vested interests. How did it all go so wrong? The history of 
San Marcos sheds some light on the course of events. 
The district of San Marcos has 14,000 inhabitants and hosts the Antamina mine. 
Felix Solorzano – nicknamed ‘the Fox’ – won the 2006 municipal election with 38 
per cent of the vote (ONPE, 2007), an achievement due to his previous job as a 
taxi driver, whereby he enjoyed a good rapport with the rural population. Felix 
started his political career at the local branch of the American Popular 
Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), teaming up with Glicerio Mauricio, the previous 
mayor. However, before the election he split with his former mentor and put forward 
a radical platform endorsing popular grievances against the incumbent mayor and 
Antamina. The rural population of San Marcos perceived that this was an historic 
opportunity to break the traditional domination of two well-off families that had 
alternately controlled the municipal government for the previous decade. However, 
once in power, Felix was less critical of Antamina, arguing that collaboration with 
the company would help improve the lot of the population. His critics claimed that 
jobs at the mine for relatives and friends had been the main motivation for his 
change of view.  
When it came to the use of canon transfers, the new mayor championed the direct 
execution of investment projects without contracting the work out to private 
companies.211 According to Felix, direct management had two main advantages. 
First, it allowed the municipal government to save the fee it would have paid to the 
contractor and also the accompanying value added tax related to the hiring of a 
workforce by the contractor. Second, and more importantly, it gave the mayor the 
power to hire the workforce directly. However, the municipal government did not 
have the personnel or the expertise to manage the equivalent of a large 
construction business and the venture failed. In 2007, the municipality of San 
Marcos only used four per cent of its total capital investment budget (Ministerio de 
Economía y Finanzas, 2010). That year, the mayor hired three different general 
managers in an attempt to speed up budget implementation. One after the other, 
the three failed to hired competent professionals and to set up the structure 
                                                            
211 This direct management involved (i) contracting a consultant to design an investment project 
that met NPIS criteria; (ii) ensuring all the administrative requirements for the formal approval of 
a given project were in place; (iii) putting a contract for the acquisition of materials out to tender; 
(iv) hiring engineers to manage the project; (v) hiring the workforce; and finally (vi) coordinating 
the jobs of the various actors involved.  
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necessary to implement directly the large amount of investment projects budgeted 
for. 
At the end of 2007, under growing popular pressure, the mayor decided to hire a 
more experienced general manager. When asked about the job description, the 
mayor confessed that he had been looking for “a brainy guy who could help me find 
my way around the law”.212 As the candour of this confession implies, the job 
specification did not suggest any deliberate intention to commit a crime; he simply 
wanted to take advantage of any loopholes in the law and strict regulations in order 
to run the municipal government in a more flexible and effective manner.  
Hiring experienced managers was in itself a substantial challenge. In a populist 
move, President Garcia introduced a governmental decree aiming to regulate – in 
fact, reduce – the remuneration of municipal employees.213 Consequently, salaries 
were capped in accordance with the size of the municipality’s population, 
regardless of the size of the municipal budget. Thus, in 2008, the official monthly 
salary of the mayor of San Marcos was PEN 1,700 (USD 575). According to the 
decree, no other municipal employee could earn a higher salary than this. This 
meant that mayors were faced with the challenge of trying to recruit skilled 
municipal managers willing to move to a remote and poor corner of the country in 
return for an insubstantial salary. Not surprisingly, this unfortunate combination of 
restrictions attracted applicants who looked for other ways to profit from the position 
in addition to drawing a salary. In the case of San Marcos, at least two general 
managers hired in 2007 and 2008 respectively had previously been indicted for 
mismanagement in other municipalities (Primera Página, 2009). 
The municipal managers’ ideas of interpreting the law flexibly went too far. They 
had a predilection for swelling their basic salaries on the pretext of having been 
recruited as consultants to the municipality.214 They took bribes in return for hiring 
architects and engineers to design investment projects that were frequently blatant 
copies of similar proposals submitted to other municipal governments. And, finally, 
                                                            
212 Interview 2008-111 (Ancash, 02-07-2008). 
213 Supreme Decree Nº 025-2007-PCM. 
214 The revision of investment projects in the 18 municipalities under study revealed that the 
heading ‘institutional strengthening’ systematically concealed significant recurrent budget items 
for the payment of municipal officials’ salaries. 
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they rigged tendering processes in favour of contractors who, in return, shared part 
of their profits with them. 
Obviously, these managers paid little heed to institutional capacity building in San 
Marcos, being preoccupied with keeping the wheels of their own businesses rolling. 
Thus, they gave their cronies jobs in certain key positions in the municipality, 
leaving the mayor to hire as many of his supporters as he could cram into the 
municipal departments.215 This resulted in a situation in which the bad technical 
quality of projects and lack of professionalism in the municipality made it impossible 
to improve the rate of budget allocation to projects to any great extent – just ten per 
cent in 2008 (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2010). Surprisingly, almost 45 
per cent of this budget went to education projects. But the seemingly high priority 
given to the sector was not the result of a well thought out plan, but of short-term 
convenience. The construction of new schools in different villages and municipal 
suburbs was technically the easiest kind of project to implement because it relied 
on standard buildings that could easily be replicated in different neighbourhoods.  
In May 2008, the town clerk and one counsellor in the municipality on the mayor’s 
electoral list publicly denounced the corrupt practices in the municipality and 
accused the mayor and general manager of mismanagement. Assessing the 
evidence, a majority of the councillors – three out of five – asked the National 
General Comptroller to launch a formal inquiry into the municipal accounts. The 
non-appearance of substantial public works together with these accusations 
galvanised public discontent. Some local groups called for a demonstration to be 
held on the 26th of June demanding the mayor’s resignation.  
At the same time, the municipal management team dreamt up a crude but effective 
response. Taking advantage of a supreme decree allowing the use of up to 20 per 
cent of canon transfers for the maintenance of public infrastructure, the municipality 
organised a ‘pilot scheme’ popularly dubbed the ‘messing about scheme’ (el plan 
hueveo). The popular nickname of the scheme indicated its lack of substance: 
teams of labourers scattered across the district engaged in extremely minor, often 
completely unnecessary jobs. Through this policy, the municipality hired between 
1,000 and 1,500 unskilled labourers in cycles of 15-day shifts. This meant that 
                                                            
215 In 2008, San Marcos had around 120 management and administrative staff, although the 
number varied quite widely from month to month owing to a high turnover.  
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everyone in the municipality had the chance to earn a wage through work offered 
by this programme for 15 days every two months. The basic wage was PEN 450 
(USD 150) for the two weeks, and the foremen earned PEN 600 (USD 200), which 
was quite good pay in the local context.216 Not surprisingly, the majority of the 
population welcomed the initiative.  
In the days leading up to the demonstration planned for 26th June, municipal 
employees spread the rumour that opposition groups intended to stop the ‘pilot 
scheme’, and asked those employed on it to demonstrate their loyalty to the mayor. 
Consequently, on the 26th, people from the rural areas poured into town to defend 
the mayor’s policies. The opposition had to withdraw its protest and appeal to the 
police for protection. Thus, in spite of poor local governance and unquestionable 
evidence of mismanagement, the mayor whipped up sufficient popular support to 
stay in office until his tragic death in a road accident in November 2009.   
There were similar situations in the other five municipalities under study around 
Antamina – Huari, Chavin de Huantar, Cajay, Huachis and Ponto. Although in a few 
municipalities I found some honest and genuinely dedicated officers, it seemed that 
most mayors and municipal managers had become entrapped in similar ways to 
San Marcos; they were involved in the same corrupt practices and also resorted to 
clientelistic strategies in order to hold on to their posts. However, in contrast to San 
Marcos, these municipalities were more successful in executing their capital 
investment budgets. The mayors did not manage public works directly and 
subcontracted them out to private firms. This proved to be a more effective way of 
spending the money and, apparently, presented even more opportunities for private 
gain. Usually, the mayors would arrange with the company implementing the 
project for an unskilled labour force to be hired locally, but the mayors tacitly 
reserved the right to propose the job applicants themselves.  
In 2008, the majority of the population in these municipalities worked for the 
municipality. As in San Marcos, the populace did not show any great interest in 
tackling corruption, and most mayors maintained their positions without any 
significant opposition.217 As noted in Chapter 6, when the people occasionally 
                                                            
216 Information provided by the mayor and the general manager of the municipality and 
contrasted with people working in the scheme.  
217 Cajay was a relative exception. The mayor won the election with only 23 per cent the vote 
and faced strong opposition from the candidate that came second. In 2008, the opposition 
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showed signs of discontent, the mayors were able to direct their grievances 
towards the incompetence of the regional government.  
Finally, the canon transfers gave municipal authorities the chance to silence the 
critics in the local media. The general literature on decentralisation and corruption 
emphasises the importance of an independent press able to monitor the activities 
of bureaucrats (Lessmann & Markwardt, 2010). Unfortunately, the few radio 
stations broadcasting in the Conchucos Valley were quickly ‘bought off’ by the 
municipal authorities with the aid of publicity contracts. In some cases, as in San 
Marcos, the municipality directly recruited the most outspoken local radio presenter 
to the mayor’s team of advisors and provided new equipment for his station. As the 
mayor enjoyed good relations with Antamina – the only alternative source of 
publicity – none of the other local radio stations could risk criticising the 
management of the municipality.  
8.4.2 The distortion of participatory mechanisms 
It is widely accepted that participatory mechanisms at municipal level tend to 
reinforce downward accountability and foster responsiveness to the needs of the 
population (Cabrero, 2007; Cheema, 2007). Research on Peruvian 
decentralisation has reached similar conclusions (Brinkerhoff, Brinkerhoff, & 
McNulty, 2007; Grompone & Glave, 2009; McNulty, 2006). Without denying the 
general validity of these findings, my research indicates that in canon-rich 
municipalities, the high volume of mining rents combined with widespread distrust 
in public institutions has distorted the aims and practice of participation. In the next 
paragraphs I review how two mechanisms, the right of citizens to demand a recall 
election and participatory budgeting, have been instrumental in shortening the 
planning horizon of municipal governments, promoting quick spending irrespective 
of the quality of the projects, and loosening the social control over corruption.   
The right to demand a recall election has made it more difficult to implement some 
of the policies conventionally recommended for the effective use of mining revenue 
in canon-rich municipalities. Economists advise that the decentralisation of mining 
and oil revenues to sub-national governments should incorporate a mechanism to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
collected signatures to organise a recall election, but the mayor was victorious and stayed in 
office.  
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operate the expenditure of windfalls, so improving the efficient use of the revenue 
(E. Ahmad & Mottu, 2003; Brosio, 2003). In the Peruvian case, the most obvious 
way to do this would be to defer part of the canon transfer for use in subsequent 
years, a measure which would help improve both the planning process and the 
quality of investments.  
Three reasons made the introduction of this type of policy politically unfeasible in 
canon-rich municipalities during the last mineral price boom. First, people did not 
trust public institutions or believe that they would keep the revenue set aside for 
future use in a responsible manner. Moreover, they feared that the central 
government would eventually appropriate any portion of the canon transfer that the 
municipality had not spent within the fiscal year. Second, given that employment in 
public works was the population’s top priority, any attempt to slow down the rate of 
expenditure would have been highly unpopular. Third, the previous two obstacles 
might have been overcome if the mayors had had sufficient time to demonstrate 
that better planned expenditure improved the quality of investments. But this was 
not the case: the citizens’ right to demand a new election of municipal authorities 
was a constant threat that narrowed the planning horizon of municipal 
governments. As the mayors of three of the municipalities under study − Cajay, 
Carumas and San Cristobal − realised in 2008, winning a municipal election no 
longer guaranteed a full four-year term of office; they had to win a recall election to 
stay in post (ONPE, 2009). This meant that they needed to deliver results in a 
timely fashion in order to appease a population that was not willing to wait until the 
end of an incumbent’s official term to evaluate his performance. 
The increasing popular pressure to deliver as quickly as possible and the priority 
given to the creation of jobs also distorted participatory budgeting in canon-rich 
municipalities. Shortly after being made compulsory, Remy (2005: 140-143) pointed 
out that the regulation of the budgeting process afforded municipal authorities 
substantial discretion in the final decisions about which projects were to be 
executed. Popular participation focused on suggesting proposals for projects and 
prioritising them. However, people were required to vote before information was 
available about the technical constraints or cost of a project. According to municipal 
managers, providing this information would have been very costly and held up the 
process. Consequently, general ideas about projects that might be implemented 
were passed on to municipal bureaucrats who made the final decision about which 
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initiatives should be implemented. This technical phase of the process became a 
‘black box’ that selected from and filtered out popular proposals with no 
transparency concerning the criteria employed. When municipal authorities had to 
account for their decisions, they usually hid behind statements about their 
compliance with national legislation, and the requirements of NPIS and other 
regulatory bodies were used to justify decisions made the previous year.  
Participatory budgeting in canon-rich municipalities suffered from these general 
shortcomings. Yet, as I found out in my fieldwork, there were also other features 
that shaped the outcome of the process in these municipalities. First, the 
availability of financial resources allowed canon-rich municipalities to hire 
consultants and NGOs to design and implement the participatory phase of the 
budgeting process. This ‘privatisation’ of the procedure had two main 
consequences. On the one hand, municipal authorities and officials were largely 
absent from participatory workshops, making accountability for the implementation 
of previous years’ agreements impossible. Even when some low-ranking municipal 
officials attended, they were invariably unable to answer participants’ questions, 
since, due to high staff turnover, they knew nothing about the expenditure in 
previous years. On the other hand, these external facilitators tended to increase 
the number of participatory workshops held in the different communities and 
neighbourhoods of each municipality – according to their own accounts, to 
enhance participation; according to sceptical local opinion, to raise their incomes 
(they were usually paid according to the number of workshops they organised).218 
This multiplication of workshops led to the dissolution of demands and loss of the 
wider municipal perspective. Participatory processes tended to wind up in 
ridiculously long wish lists, for which each small group of the populace put forward 
its own demands. In 2007, the municipality of San Marcos prioritised more than 
400 projects by means of this participatory budgeting process.219 Indeed, the 
longer the list, the easier it was for municipal authorities to select those projects 
that were the most attractive to them.  
                                                            
218 For example, the mayor of Ninaca – with a population of 4,000 – hired an NGO called 
Munired to organise participatory budgeting in 2008. Munired facilitated 16 decentralised 
workshops and compiled a ‘bank of ideas for projects’. The municipality finally selected 20 
projects, amongst which there was at least one from each workshop (Information from personal 
participation in workshop; interviews 2008-036 (Ninacaca 29-04-2008);  2008-041 (Ninaca, 04-
05-2008).  
219 Information given to the general public in a participatory budgeting workshop held in the 
peasant community of Huaripampa (San Marcos, 05-07-2008).  
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Second, although the authorities often failed to respond to the population’s most 
pressing concerns, people would finally accept second or third best options if the 
allocation of resources provided job opportunities. For example, participants in 
budgeting workshops in 2007 and 2008 in the rural areas of Huari, San Marcos 
and Chavin de Huantar prioritised investment in the expansion of drinking water 
coverage and irrigation infrastructure. Those attending workshops in 2008 vented 
their frustration because their priorities from the previous year had been ignored 
completely. At the beginning of a meeting in Huaripampa – a peasant community 
in San Marcos – one of the participants protested, “We are tired of answering the 
same questions year after year. We give you our opinion, but you do nothing for 
the whole year; then you come back the following year, and all we do is to give you 
the same answer as before.”220 After debating the usefulness of the process, they 
proceeded with the workshop as usual; and, once again, the participants prioritised 
investment in drinking water and irrigation facilities. 
After the meeting, one municipal government officer confided that the municipality 
had not even begun the administrative procedure for contracting the design of 
these types of projects. Apparently, the obstacle was one of complexity, as they 
demanded the deployment of engineers to design infrastructure specifically 
tailored to the local environment. Then, the alternative was the implementation of 
less demanding projects that offered jobs to the population. In the case of 
Huaripampa, the implementation of the pilot scheme eased local discontent. In 
Cajay, Chavin de Huantar, Huachis, Huari and Ponto, investment in the 
refurbishment of schools, the development of urban infrastructure; and the 
construction of stadiums, municipal halls, and different kinds of monuments 
claimed the lion’s share of the capital investment budget in 2007 and 2008.221 





220 Huaripampa (San Marcos, 05-07-2008).  
221 See figures in appendix XII. 
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8.4.3  The limitations of transparency and capacity building222 
The introduction of the Mining Programme of Solidarity with the People (MPSP) in 
2007 meant that Antamina had USD 65 million to spend in social development in 
the Ancash region, investment that was concentrated, to a great extent, in the 
municipalities more directly impacted on by the operation’s activities.  
The mine created a separate organisation, Antamina Mining Fund (AMF), to 
implement these social activities. AMF decided to spend some of its resources on a 
capacity building programme in three municipalities of the Conchucos Valley –  
Huari, San Marcos, and Chavin de Huantar. Its idea was to help the municipal 
governments to use canon minero transfers effectively. The organisation selected 
three different types of initiatives: the development of the Municipal Management 
Plan (MMP); the design of investment projects to be implemented by the 
municipality; and the strengthening of some municipal departments through the 
design of administrative procedures, training and mentoring.  
AMF hired two renowned Peruvian consulting firms – Macrogestion and Governa – 
to do the job. Macrogestion – a subsidiary of Macroconsult – prepared investment 
projects and developed the MMP for the municipalities of Huari and San Marcos. 
The objective was to improve the quality of municipal interventions and speed up 
their allocation of the budget to projects. Given the challenges, this seemed to be a 
clever approach. In the case of San Marcos, AMF proposed a very flexible contract 
whereby the municipality could ask Macrogestion to prepare any kind of project free 
of charge as AMF covered the expenses. Macrogestion opened an office in San 
Marcos with 18 specialists in different fields, hiring additional experts on an ad hoc 
basis to work on specific projects.  
In 2007, the municipality asked Macrogestion to design 85 out of a total of 400 
investment projects managed by the municipal government. The manager of 
Macrogestion in San Marcos identified some common features in the 85 projects: 
they were complex interventions that demanded an inordinately large volume of 
                                                            
222 The information used in this subsection derives from the following personal interviews: 2008-
083 (Lima, 09-06-2008); 2008-086 (Lima, 11-06-2008); 2008-114 (San Marcos, 03-07-2008); 
2008-115 (San Marcos, 03-07-2008); 2008-117 (San Marcos, 03-07-2008); 2008-121 (San 
Marcos, 06-07-2008); 2008-123 (San Marcos, 07-07-2008); 2008-114 (San Marcos, 03-07-
2008); 2008-124 (San Marcos, 08-07-2008); 2008-136 (San Marcos, 13-07-2008); 2008-139 
(Huari, 15-07-2008); 2008-143 (Lima, 22-07-2008). 
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work in relation to their total budget.223 As consultants’ fees were usually a 
percentage of the total budget, this meant that these projects were not profitable 
enough for the consultants who ordinarily worked for the municipality and with 
whom the managers habitually colluded.  
Surprisingly, once these 85 projects had passed all the technical and administrative 
checks, the municipality decided not to implement 35 of them. Apparently, they 
were too complex for the municipal government to implement them quickly. In July 
2008, AMF started to evaluate the real usefulness of this service. However, it 
continued with the programme until May 2009.  
The jobs of the three Governa employees posted in San Marcos were less 
demanding. They were to identify the organisational needs of the municipality and 
provide training and mentoring to improve its capacity. However, their counterparts 
in the municipality were not willing to allow Governa to meddle in the way they ran 
affairs. Governa concluded that they had too much to hide.224 Thus, municipal 
managers were only interested in Governa drafting documents for the 15 
administrative procedures that each Peruvian municipality had to have to comply 
with MEF requirements. The programme lasted until June 2009. 
In the event, neither Macrogestion nor Governa succeeded in improving the rate of 
budget use and the public services that the municipal government of San Marcos 
provided to its citizens. Antamina showed good will and the consulting firms were 
first class, but municipal politics were not open to improvement. In fact, the 
behaviour of these two consulting firms promoted a negative reaction in the 
population, turning it against external interventions in general. The employees of 
these two firms came from Lima, and only worked in San Marcos a few days a 
week. The journey between Lima and San Marcos took around 12 hours. These 
employees had won a contractual clause allowing them to start working on Monday 
afternoon and leave for Lima on Thursday night. This policy set a precedent and 
the section of the municipal staff that came from other towns started to enjoy the 
same flexible schedule.  
                                                            
223 Interview 2008-115 (San Marcos, 03-07-2008) 
224 Interview 2008-117 (San Marcos, 03-07-2008). 
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The population of San Marcos adopted a cynical view of the work of these 
outsiders, considering them to be more interested in money than in the quality of 
the services they offered. The Front of Defence of the interest of San Marcos 
demanded that Antamina stop funding consulting firms and NGOs, and channel the 
money directly into the hands of local people.  
Capacity building programmes have frequently gone hand in hand with the 
promotion of transparency in an attempt to improve municipal government 
accountability. In 2007, the IFC, in collaboration with the United Kingdom 
Department for International Development (DFID), USAID and CIDA were 
especially active in setting up the Organisations for the Improvement of Municipal 
Investment (OIMI). The OIMIs were coalitions of regional civil society organisations 
that aimed to analyse and disseminate information about the canon transfers 
received by municipalities and the manner in which they were spending the 
revenues. These activities were to improve the oversight capacity of local 
populations and increase municipal government responsiveness to the demands of 
the public. The first OIMI was formed in Cajamarca in 2005, while branches in 
Ancash, Moquegua and Tacna were set up in 2007. The OIMI coalition in Ancash 
included the regional chamber of commerce, industry and tourism; the professional 
association of engineers; the public university; and Caritas, the Catholic NGO.  
From the outset, monitoring the performance of the municipality of San Marcos was 
part of the OIMI’s brief in Ancash, but its work had no significant impact there. First, 
although the population was already aware of the existence of problems in the 
municipality, the majority of people tolerated inefficiency and corruption in 
exchange for jobs in the public works. Second, the OIMI published official 
information about mining revenues, the percentage of actual spending of this 
particular budgetary item, and, occasionally, the percentage allocated to different 
sectors. However, it did not deal with how decisions about the allocation of these 
resources were made. As was the case with the EITI (Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative) at national level, the focus on revenue details downplayed 
the analysis of expenditure as the critical strategy in tackling corruption (Kolstad & 
Wiig, 2009). Moreover, the importance that the OIMI accorded to the percentage of 
capital budget actually spent reinforced the incentive for municipalities to spend 
quickly, independent of the quality of the projects. Finally, OIMI dependence on the 
IFC reined in its freedom and the scope of its mission. The IFC actively supports 
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the mining industry in Peru and was keen to get the financial support of the main 
mining companies to finance the functioning of OIMI, which hindered the capacity 
of OIMI to publish information that was critical of the political allies of the 
companies. In 2008, the OIMI in Moquegua conducted a survey of popular opinion 
of the performance of the mayors of Ilo and Moquegua. The mayor of Ilo, a close 
ally of the SPCC, was portrayed in a very bad light, and the office of the IFC 
responsible for the OIMI in Lima decided not to publish the results.225 
The analysis in this section reveals that canon-rich municipal governments of 
Ancash had difficulty spending mining revenues on the projects citizens wanted, 
like water and sanitation, and that local authorities were frequently involved in 
corruption. However, the analysis also shows that these problems were not at the 
root of the misuse of mining revenue. The vast amount of canon transfers, in 
combination with popular lack of trust in institutions, and the proliferation of 
nationally imposed regulations were the reasons for both mining revenue misuse 
and the persistence of corruption and limited institutional capacity. External 
attempts to overcome such challenges through the provision of technical support 
and traditional transparency programmes failed because they did not take into 
account the system of incentives at work. Mayors maintained their popularity by 
demonstrating efficiency in a very narrow range of specific tasks, mainly quick 
spending for the generation of jobs. This strategy contented the local population in 
a way that distorted the institutional mechanisms for the efficient allocation of 
revenue and reduced the public’s motivation to challenge the corrupt practices of 
municipal authorities. Nevertheless, capacity building and transparency 
programmes were politically expedient for the mining companies because they 
tended to divert popular scrutiny away from corporate practices towards municipal 
government performance.  
8.5 Variations on the same theme: higher technical capacity and the 
promotion of clientelism in Moquegua 
Municipalities in Pasco and, more evidently, in Moquegua had higher capacity 
levels than those in Ancash. However, municipal governments in Moquegua spend 
their money in similar ways to those in Ancash. The quick redistribution of canon 
                                                            
225 Personal interview 2008-187 (Moquegua, 05-09-2008). 
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transfers through the generation of jobs in the public works determined the nature 
of the expenditure. 
In this section, I discuss some specific features of the allocation of resources in 
Moquegua. I do not attempt to make a detailed analysis of the processes but to 
point out the similarities and differences with Ancash. The comparison exposes the 
potential for high levels of mining rents to promote clientelism and to promote the 
pursuit of short-term benefits independent of the technical capacity of the 
municipality. 
The municipalities of Moquegua and Ancash were similar in terms of the per capita 
volume of canon transfer received during recent years (see Appendix XII). 
However, municipalities in Moquegua had higher MCI scores. In fact, they were 
able to implement a high proportion of their investment projects directly without 
resorting to outsourcing. This system required higher levels of institutional capacity 
but also had distinct political advantages because it gave mayors direct control over 
the recruitment of employees.  
From 2007 to 2008, most adults in Carumas, San Cristobal, Samegua and Torata 
worked for their respective municipalities. Mayors recruited their closest allies to 
staff the municipal bureaucracy, while a high proportion of the remainder of the 
population was employed in carrying out public works. In 2007, the municipality of 
Torata employed 650 administrative officers and 1,200 labourers, who were 
regularly employed in public works financed by canon transfers.226 This 
represented more than 90 per cent of the total employable population.227 Similar 
employment levels were found in neighbouring municipalities. In most cases, 
mayors had a direct say in deciding who should be hired.  
Regulations for the use of canon transfers prohibited such revenue financing 
recurrent expenditure and, therefore, the hiring of workers not directly employed to 
carry out investment projects. Municipal managers in Moquegua were experienced 
enough to find a way around the law. They contrived sophisticated mechanisms to 
                                                            
226 According to information provided by the mayor and the general manager of public works in 
interviews 2008-186 (Torata, 05-09-2008) and 2008-192 (Torata, 10-09-2008). The number of 
administrative officers was confirmed by the National Registry of Municipalities (INEI, 2009e). 
227 According to the census, the total employable population of Torata was 3,493 (INEI, 2008a), 
but approximately 1,500 of them were employees of Cuajone based at the company’s mining 
camp (according to figures from the own company).  
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enhance flexibility in the use of cannon transfers. The incorporation of recurrent 
expenditure into capital investment projects implemented by the municipality was 
the easiest and most common method. But, they went one step further and crafted 
mechanisms to turn canon transfers into autonomously generated revenue that 
could be used more flexibly. These mechanisms are built around the purchase and 
use of municipal machinery. The municipalities designed capital investment 
projects to purchase heavy machinery, arguing that the initial outlay would reduce 
the cost of future public works. Once they had acquired the equipment, they 
adopted one of two alternative strategies. If the municipality contracted a company 
to carry out the public works, the terms stipulated that the company had to hire the 
necessary machinery from the municipality. Conversely, municipal governments 
that wanted to do the work directly without hiring a company tended to cross-hire 
the machinery with a neighbouring municipality: municipal government X hired 
municipal government Y’s machinery and vice versa.  
Such hiring arrangements were frequently overpriced and, moreover, maintenance 
of the machinery was not a priority as it was simpler to buy a new machine than 
attempt to budget for proper servicing. The practical result of such subterfuge was 
that money was transferred from one line item of the budget – canon revenue – to a 
wholly flexible line item through the purchase and accelerated depreciation – 
almost depredation – of material assets.  
Such creative accountancy lent itself to further opportunities for corrupt practices. 
Popular claims of mismanagement by municipal authorities abounded in 
Moquegua. Some of them were substantiated. In March 2008, the National 
Elections Board dismissed the mayor of Torata.228 He had been accused of 
nepotism by two of the municipal counsellors after hiring his own brother. He also 
faced charges of mismanagement, and, in 2010, the court imposed a two-year 
sentence on him. The other mayors learnt their lesson and, from that moment on, 
hired out their relatives to adjacent municipalities – as they did with the machinery – 
to avoid the accusation of nepotism. Although local people knew about the 
mismanagement of municipal authorities, they did not want to risk losing their jobs. 
Thus, similar to the situation in Ancash, widespread clientelism hindered the 
implementation of effective social control.  
                                                            
228 Decree N º 076-2008-JNE. 
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There were some differences between Moquegua and Ancash in terms of the type 
of project implemented. In the two predominantly urban municipalities − Moquegua 
and Samegua − the authorities together with the general public prioritised 
investment in urban infrastructure and ‘conspicuous construction’, while in rural 
municipalities, irrigation projects and the construction of roads were the main 
concerns (see Appendix XII). This greater spending in productive projects in rural 
municipalities seemed to be a clear improvement in comparison to Ancash. 
However, according to municipal managers, mayors were more interested in 
providing jobs for the people than in the quality of the initiatives. They confessed 
that the policy of hiring local people slowed down the construction of projects, 
adversely affected their quality, and raised total costs. In contrast to other regions 
in Peru, labourers in public works were protected by the Civil Construction 
Collective Labour Agreement in Moquegua. Unskilled employees of the municipality 
earned a monthly salary close to PEN 1,800 (USD 600),229 the equivalent of 
experienced workers in this kind of job. This situation had a paradoxical side effect: 
tance of the mere increase in mining activity – and its associated negative 
onmental impacts – as a detevour of working for the municipality.  
This brief comparison of Moquegua and Ancash throws up a further puzzling 
element. Surprisingly, the change in welfare indicators between 1993 and 2007 
was smaller in the municipalities of Moquegua than in those of Ancash. In fact, 
various indicators reveal a deteriorating situation from 1993 to 2007 in several of 
Moquegua’s municipalities (see Appendix XIII). Considering that municipalities in 
Moquegua have historically enjoyed higher levels of administrative and technical 
capacity than those in Ancash, this comparatively negative performance suggests 
the existence of factors related to a variation in behaviour between different mining 
companies. Some scholars have highlighted the attempts of Antamina to promote 
development (Sanborn et al., 2007) and there is no doubt about the large scale of 
its CSR operation. Yet, Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC) has neither 
historically enjoyed a reputation as a good neighbour  nor has it been the most 
generous of benefactors (Balvín, 1995; Bauch, 1985; Boon, Alexaki, & Herrera 
Becerra, 2001). Although corporate behaviour might affect changes in welfare 
                                                            
229 Information provided by the human resource manager of Carumas,  and confirmed by an 
official communication of the regional government of Moquegua (Gobierno Regional de 
Moquegua, 2008b) 
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indicators, a rigorous examination of such a hypothesis is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  
8.6 Conclusion  
I started Chapter 7 by asking if the implementation of the NEIS had led to 
detectable changes in indicators of social and material welfare in the Peruvian 
mining regions. The analysis of Chapters 7 and 8 confirms that the NEIS has failed 
to improve the situation of the population living close to the mines. Lack of capacity 
and corruption does not fully explain the misuse of mining revenue in canon-rich 
municipalities. Municipalities with different levels of capacity present similar 
problems in using their budget productively and resort to the same type of short-
term, clientelistic spending that gives precedence to job creation over effective 
social investment.  
Although I have focused the analysis on the institutional use of canon transfers, the 
importance given to job creation begs the question of what families did with the 
income earned. If a proportion of the income had been used for individual social 
expenditure, as in education, it would have compensated to an extent for the 
inefficient spending of public institutions and would reinforce recent arguments for 
the direct distribution of mining and oil revenue to the citizens (Moss & Young, 
2009; Sandbu, 2006; Segal, 2009). The analysis of how families used these new 
incomes would require an extensive research that is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Based on my observations during the field research, I can only provide 
some basic information that is far from conclusive.  
Peasants’ abandonment of their work in agriculture is the most salient social 
feature in canon-rich municipalities. This means that families then use a significant 
proportion of their earned income in the new public jobs to buy foodstuff. They 
perceive earning money to buy the food that they previously produced has three 
advantages: (i) they can widen their diet through more expensive products such as 
rice, sugar, pasta, biscuits, etc.; (ii) buying food represents a higher social status 
than producing it; and (iii) it renders a surplus that they can use to buy other goods; 
for example, it was also very apparent that local shops sold more crockery, pans, 
radios, televisions, and other household goods. Undoubtedly, people value the new 
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possibilities generated by their income. It is less clear to what extent the increase in 
options available to them lead to real improvements in their living standards. 
The impact of income on education is also unclear and would need further 
research. On the one hand families can spend more money on books, school 
uniforms, transport, and have more room to delay their children’s need to earn a 
living. But on the other hand, the abundance of public jobs has been an important 
incentive for teenagers to abandon education.  
What the last two chapters reveal is that the NEIS has generated new forms of 
deprivation in mining areas. Historically, big mines have deprived local communities 
of valuable assets such as water, land and a clean environment, making them more 
vulnerable to droughts and other natural events, health problems, and changes in 
the market for their products (Bury, 2002, 2007). The NEIS has tried to compensate 
for these negative effects by enhancing social spending in mining areas and 
providing new economic opportunities outside the agriculture sector. The analysis 
shows that social spending has been quite ineffective and that the NEIS has made 
local economies increasingly dependent on the canon transfers. Deprivation of 
crucial assets for the peasant economy has not been compensated for by the 
generation of stable new economic opportunities but with temporary jobs that are 
only viable in the context of high mineral prices. As diversification of the family 
income is crucial for escaping poverty in the rural communities of the Andean 
region (Krishna et al., 2006) increasing dependence on the historically volatile flows 
of mining revenue seems to be a risky strategy.  
Moreover, this increasing dependence on the income provided by public jobs has 
generated political deprivation. Citizens in mining areas perceive that they have the 
power to appoint the authorities and to hold them to account, however, municipal 
and regional authorities in canon-rich jurisdictions operate with considerable 
political autonomy from the citizenship insofar as they provide enough jobs and 
have the political ability to satisfy different groups. The implementation of the NEIS 
has also given more political power at local level to mining companies. First, the 
growing dependence on canon transfers makes local authorities and populations 
alike moderate, at least in the short term, their demands concerning environmental 
issues and to facilitate the expansion of activities. Second, the direct management 
of the MPSP gives companies the opportunity to use these financial resources to 
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buy compliance with their plans. Finally, high volumes of canon transfers have 
attracted the interest of mafia groups that have captured part of the resources in 
collusion with the municipal and regional authorities. The incursion of these groups 
into local politics is likely to have a long-lasting effect because they now have 
incentives to influence the electoral processes by supporting candidates favouring 
their interests.   
  






In this chapter, after summarising the main findings of my analysis of the Peruvian 
case study, I set out to complete the thesis by putting forward some conclusions 
that those interested in the extractive industries and development elsewhere might 
find useful.  
9.1 What does this study say about the implementation of the NEIS?  
Canon minero transfers to sub-national governments in jurisdictions where mines 
are located, and the active involvement of mining companies in local development 
constitute what I have labelled the New Extractive Industries Strategy (NEIS). 
Companies have different policies in different countries to reduce the incidence of 
social unrest and persuade the local people living around their operations of their 
beneficial role as promoters of local development.  
I argue that Peru is a testing ground for the NEIS. After years of decline in mineral 
production, Fujimori’s government reinstated mining as one of the pillars of 
economic development. The enactment of the General Mining Law in 1992 was the 
first step in promoting foreign investment in the sector. The strategy worked well 
and in the late 1990s, international mining companies started to explore mineral 
deposits and construct modern mines. However, by the early 2000s, successful 
popular opposition to new mines in different regions alarmed both the mining 
companies and the Peruvian government.  
They reacted by increasing the proportion of mining revenue devolved to mining 
jurisdictions (the canon minero) and by concentrating it in the municipalities closest 
to the mines. They hoped that increased amounts of transfer would improve living 
standards and convince the local people of the advantages of mining. The policy 
had the virtue of satisfying the demands of other important actors: (i) it fitted 
perfectly into the IFI-promoted good governance agenda for the democratisation of 
Peru after the fall of Fujimori’s regime; and (ii) it fulfilled the ambitions of political 
leaders and local populations in mining regions that for many years had been 
demanding an increase in canon transfers. 
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The escalation in corporate profits in 2004–2008 provided a new opportunity for the 
mining companies to reinforce their presence at local level. After the presidential 
elections of 2006, the companies faced the almost certain introduction of a new 
windfall tax, a proposal that was supported by all the main candidates during the 
campaign. However, the companies stopped this move by coming to an agreement 
with President Garcia to set up the Mining Programme of Solidarity with the People 
(MPSP), a voluntary financial contribution funded by the mining companies aimed 
at promoting local development.  
9.1.1 The main argument 
In this thesis, I have argued that the implementation of the NEIS has increased the 
number of social conflicts while failing to show any improvement in the economic 
and social welfare indicators in mining regions. Although large scale anti-mining 
increased to a lesser extent than investment in the mining sector in 2004–2008, the 
proliferation of disputes over the distribution of mining rents more than 
counterbalanced this achievement (Chapter 5).  
I identified two different types of the more frequent ‘distribution’ disputes (Chapter 
6). In the first type, peasant communities use social conflict to enhance their 
bargaining power in negotiations with mining companies over financial 
compensation and jobs in the mines. Extraordinary corporate profits; popular belief 
that companies pay less tax than they should; the new image of mining companies 
as actors with a moral duty to promote local development; and suspicion of 
collusion between the government and the mining companies all combine to 
stimulate this type of conflict.  
In the second type, local populations and sub-national authorities engage in 
disputes over the control and use of canon minero transfers. I identified three 
different sub-types: (i) the population uses social conflict to encourage swifter 
expenditure of transfers; (ii) sub-national authorities use conflict as a means of 
diverting pressure about the use of resources to other levels of government, and to 
gain control over additional canon transfers; and (iii) municipalities and regions fight 
amongst themselves in an attempt to win jurisdiction over territories with mineral 
deposits and water sources, as such resources guarantee future mining revenues.  
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The implementation of the NEIS could still be constructive if the higher frequency of 
conflicts were tempered by a lower degree of violence or greater capacity to 
generate long-term settlements and positive institutional innovations. Unfortunately, 
this is not the case; rather, both types of ‘distributional’ social conflicts frequently 
result in several serious and even fatal casualties. Moreover, they tend to have little 
impact on the improvement of the regulations and governance of the mining sector 
because they focus on immediate local benefits and not on wider policy changes. 
Neither has the NEIS made a positive impact in mining jurisdictions on welfare and 
economic indicators. I found that regions and municipalities receiving high volumes 
of canon transfers did not improve their indicators more than the rest of the country 
(Chapter 7). The Peruvian government and the mining companies tend to blame 
sub-national governments’ lack of managerial capacity for this striking dearth of 
positive outcomes. The importance of managerial capacity notwithstanding, my 
research reveals that municipal authorities have strong political incentives to 
prioritise short-term quick spending over better planned long-term investment in key 
public services (Chapter 8).  
An analysis of the political dynamics leading to such short-termism in the 
expenditure of canon transfers also calls into question the conventional argument 
of the linear relationship between lack of development and conflict. The Peruvian 
government and the mining companies assume that lack of development and poor 
quality public services cause social conflict in mining areas. Therefore, they think 
that increased spending on development projects organised by mining companies 
and sub-national governments should reduce the incidence of social unrest. 
Although this strategy clearly does not work, they remain convinced, putting the 
blame for failure on the inability of sub-national governments to make the best use 
of canon transfers.  
In my research into canon-rich municipalities, I found that the government’s claim 
that there is a relationship between lack of development and conflict is flawed. 
Such a relationship doubtless exists, but it is more complex than the promoters of 
the NEIS anticipated. The causal link between conflict and development also runs 
in the opposite direction: ‘distributional conflicts’ generated by the implementation 
of the NEIS have exacerbated the inefficient use of canon transfers by sub-national 
governments irrespective of their managerial capacity.  
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Central government and the mining companies’ response to the escalation of 
conflict has been to divert popular attention towards the performance of sub-
national authorities. Mining companies widely advertise the amount of canon 
transferred to regional and municipal governments to demonstrate their contribution 
to local development through the payment of taxes. They have also been quite 
active in promoting local authorities’ accountability to their citizens, using the 
percentage of canon transfers actually spent as the main indicator of sub-national 
government performance. The national government has also resorted to the same 
tactic of highlighting the lack of capacity of sub-national governments in order to 
counteract demands for additional resources from mining regions.  
Company and national government officials’ comments about the low level of 
budgetary expenditure in mining jurisdictions tend to prompt quick public spending 
through two different mechanisms. First, such expenditure becomes the benchmark 
of political capacity; mayors and regional presidents feeling compelled to 
demonstrate that they are able to spend the money. Second, the population 
demands quicker spending on account of its apprehension that central government 
might otherwise confiscate some of the canon transfers. 
The result is that regional and municipal governments are under pressure to spend 
their canon transfers quickly. This obligation is especially strong in small 
municipalities where it is relatively easy to collect the necessary number of 
signatures to demand a new election. Mayors in these localities are well aware that 
if they do not satisfy popular demands in a timely fashion they will be removed from 
office without the chance to complete their term of office. Therefore, they try to 
appease the population by resorting to creating jobs in public works irrespective of 
the quality and usefulness of such projects. This widespread clientelism renders 
externally imposed capacity building and anti-corruption programmes ineffectual 
because neither local authorities nor the population have the incentive to make 
them work.   
9.1.2 Limitations of the analysis 
I have used a combination of methods to enhance the reliability of my analysis. Yet, 
the scarcity of data disaggregated at regional and municipal level and the short 
time that has passed since the implementation of the NEIS impose some 
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limitations. They do not challenge the validity of the results, but demand to be 
placed in context. 
Lack of data at municipal and regional levels is the first limitation. Two examples 
illustrate this. First, I found that canon-rich municipalities had not improved their 
welfare indicators more than other municipalities; however, it is very likely that the 
massive generation of public jobs has increased household income in these same 
municipalities, at least in the short-term. This income effect cannot be measured 
because there are no available data on household income at municipal level and 
the effect disappears when income data is aggregated at regional level. 
The second example relates to the impact of different corporate strategies. The 
analysis of the change in welfare indicators at municipal level (1993–2007) reveals 
that some of these indicators improved significantly more in canon-rich 
municipalities in Ancash than in similar municipalities in the rest of the country. 
However, analysis of the allocation of resources in Ancash and Moquegua indicate 
that the performance of municipal governments fails to explain these differences. 
Local authorities in both regions resorted to the same kind of clientelistic strategies, 
but municipalities in Ancash improved their welfare indicators more than those in 
Moquegua did (Chapter 8). This lack of correlation between the performance of 
municipal governments and changes in welfare indicators would appear to signal 
the possible existence of a ‘company effect’. The examination of this hypothesis 
would require the analysis of detailed information on corporate involvement at local 
level, but there is no data available. 
The short time frame of the investigation is the second limiting factor. The policies 
that constitute the NEIS were first implemented in 2002, when the canon minero 
increased from 20 per cent to 50 per cent of corporation tax paid by mining 
companies. However, it was not until 2004 that substantial volumes of canon 
transfers started to flow to regional and municipal governments. Thus, the 
discouraging results of the implementation of the NEIS that I have described in this 
thesis apply to a very short period of time. This raises the question of to what extent 
these results are valid in the longer term.  
There is no clear answer. Some analysts argue that the negative effects I have 
identified are time-bound. The introduction of the NEIS coincided with the 
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unprecedented generation of mining revenues, and neither local authorities nor 
their populations could adjust to this new situation quickly enough. They anticipate 
that the experience of these early years will help improve the process of allocation 
of resources in the future, and the populations of canon-rich regions and 
municipalities will eventually realise that they need to focus on the long term.230   
I would be happy to see this optimistic scenario materialise, but there are signs that 
contradict the existence of such a linear learning process. I present three of them.  
First, the political system at local level is not conducive to the assimilation of 
historical lessons. The lack of political parties that have longer term policies to 
provide some continuity, the lack of a professional body of civil servants and an 
extremely low rate of re-election of the incumbents all mean that regional and 
municipal governments have to begin again almost from scratch after each 
election. Furthermore, electoral preferences are generally shaped by the personal 
appeal of the candidates rather than by programme proposals. Candidates and the 
electorate alike believe that efficient management depends on the skills and moral 
values of the authorities. They do not realise that if a system of perverse incentives 
remains in place, newly elected authorities tend to reproduce the short-sighted 
policies of their predecessors. 
Second, popular participation mechanisms have lost their original political 
inspiration as promoters of ‘deliberative’ democracy (Avritzer, 2002). They do not 
provide space for the different actors to reflect on the process of decision-making, 
the criteria they employ in such a process, or the results of previous decisions. 
When popular participation is organised by municipal or regional governments it is 
reduced to a managerial technique that has to comply with strict regulations. 
Alternatively, the population uses legal provision for the promotion of participation 
as a last resort in order to demand accountability or directly remove the authorities. 
Unfortunately, neither of these processes commonly leads to reflection or learning.     
Finally, the implementation of the NEIS has generated distortions that tend to 
replicate themselves. One of the most striking is the way in which mafia-style 
groups have infiltrated regional and municipal politics. In Chapter 7, I described the 
interaction between these mafia and some municipal governments in Ancash. In 
                                                            
230 Interview 2008-200 (Lima, 29-09-2008). 
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2010, the scale of the problem became even more evident when, on the 12th of 
July, the interim president of the region was murdered; and only a few days later, a 
regional councillor was shot and his son-in-law killed.  
The reasons behind the assassination of the interim president remain obscure, but 
there are some clues to the motivation for the attack on the councillor. Immediately 
after the assault, the victim accused Cesar Alvarez – the former regional president, 
who had resigned to stand for re-election. The councillor accused Alvarez of 
wanting to block his appointment as the new interim president because he feared 
revelations of evidence incriminating him in corruption (El Comercio, 2010). In 
September 2010, the police concluded that the former general manager of the 
region and close ally of Alvarez had hired an assassin to dispatch the councillor (La 
República, 2010). This grim tale illustrates the fact that the capture of part of the 
canon minero by mafia groups will make it difficult for new incumbents to change 
the way in which resources are allocated.   
9.2 Lessons from the Peruvian case 
In the introduction to this thesis, I argued that the implementation of the NEIS in 
Peru is a testing ground for a strategy that the mining industry could adopt where 
extraction increases in developing countries. My research reveals that this strategy 
has not been successful in Peru.  
I have also found that context matters, and that three features of the political 
economy of contemporary Peru are crucial to any understanding of the lack of 
positive results of the NEIS: (i) the capture of the Peruvian central state by private 
business and its limited capacity to represent other interests; (ii) the weak 
participation of local political leaders in national political structures, which motivates 
them to pursue independent strategies and objectives, and to maximise resource 
transfers to their own localities; and (iii) the inability of the weak, ‘captured’ central 
state to enforce the law and to control and arbitrate between conflicts of interest 
between mining companies and a variety of competing local social and political 
groups.  
These features are common to several developing countries. Thus, although we 
cannot automatically conclude that the same policies will generate the same 
problems elsewhere, it is reasonable to assume that the Peruvian experience can 
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provide some lessons for countries with similar political features trying to make the 
most of their mineral endowments.  
I summarise these lessons in two basic propositions: (i) the NEIS is no substitute 
for a wider revision of key aspects of the mining regime and the political system; 
and (ii) if the NEIS is used as a quick fix, it may hinder the long-term viability of the 
mining industry.  
First, the NEIS was implemented in Peru in order to maintain radical market-friendly 
mining policies, without addressing some of the main problems behind the original 
anti-mining conflicts. The mining companies and the government wanted to avoid 
undertaking a complete revision of the industry that might have included a greater 
say for local populations and authorities in the process of granting mining rights, 
and the reinforcement of regulatory and monitoring bodies. They assumed that 
throwing money at the problem would ease local resistance.  
To some extent, the strategy worked and raised the threshold of discontent for the 
outbreak of new anti-mining conflicts. In Chapter 6, I discuss the case of 
Quellaveco, the new Anglo American mine in Moquegua, in which the inflow of 
canon minero transfers to the municipalities there changed people’s perceptions of 
the benefits of mining and facilitated popular acquiescence to the operation.231 
However, the implementation of the NEIS did not halt anti-mining conflicts. At the 
beginning of this thesis, I told the story of the struggle of my friend Santiago and his 
Awajun companions against the presence of oil and mining companies in their 
territory. Communities around the Rio Blanco project in Piura and peasant 
organisations in Islay (Arequipa) also resisted the construction of new mines, 
genuinely believing that the industry would destroy their sources of livelihood. In all 
these cases, only true recognition of people’s right to prior and informed consent to 
activities affecting their lives (Mackay, 2004), and the introduction of ecological 
zoning (Bebbington & Bury, 2009) will reduce the incidence of conflict.   
The mining companies and the Peruvian government oppose the introduction of 
these institutional innovations because they think that such initiatives will give local 
                                                            
231 Yet, it is also clear that Anglo American did not rely exclusively on the implementation of the 
NEIS but also significantly modified its original proposal in order to incorporate local demands 
for improved water management. 
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communities the right to veto mining activities; which they fear will obstruct the 
national development of the industry. My investigation into mining regions reveals 
that this perspective is not helpful. In a few places only – and generally with good 
reason – do people radically oppose the presence of mines. In most cases, people 
demand a more open dialogue, assurances about their livelihoods, improvements 
to the design of the mines, and job opportunities. Moreover, the introduction of 
these institutional innovations can also help reduce – or at least manage more 
easily – conflicts over the distribution of mining rents, the most frequent type of 
contentious dispute in recent years.  
As I illustrate in the analytical framework (Section 4.3) and in my analysis of 
different types of conflict (Chapter 6), the popular perception of mining legislation 
as being imposed by the government in collusion with the companies fans the 
flames for local communities to employ radical anti-mining discourses to gain 
political leverage in their claims for material compensation.   
For example, in the case of type 2 conflicts – those that I have dubbed ‘enhancing 
bargaining power’ – local communities strengthen their negotiating position by 
combining claims for material compensation with complaints about the environment 
and intimations of growing opposition to mining. Such a mechanism is effective 
because the companies cannot risk the emergence of a strong anti-mining 
movement and are thus willing to keep at bay the most provocative threats in 
exchange for payment. However, this is only a quick-fix solution because the 
claimants’ successful outcome provides them with the incentive to pursue new 
objectives.  
The recognition of people’s right to prior and informed consent to extractive 
activities would improve the situation in at least two ways. First, once the population 
had accepted the existence or expansion of a mine they would not be able to 
employ the threat of an anti-mining movement. Although this would not resolve 
social tensions around the distribution of rent, it would clarify the situation and help 
to manage it more appropriately. Second, if people’s opinions and interests were 
really taken into consideration, they would weigh the practical implications of 
serious opposition to mining more carefully. In some mining regions, it is not 
unusual to find groups that express opposition to the industry although this is not 
the real bone of contention. Confronted with the total shutdown of an operation, 
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most of them would say that they did not oppose mining per se but the way in 
which the companies went about it. However, as they are aware that their 
opposition will not bring the industry down since the government unreservedly 
supports the companies’ operations, they adopt radical discourses in order to gain 
leverage and influence company policy, no matter how marginally.232  
Of course, the effective implementation of the right to prior and informed consent 
and the introduction of ecological zoning would mean that some corporate projects 
could not be developed. There would be cases of genuine opposition to mining in 
which people thought that they would be better off without a mine in the 
neighbourhood. However, the mining companies and the government should weigh 
this theoretical ‘loss’ against the greater political stability they would gain for the 
sector as a whole.  
Given the government’s compulsion to please the mining companies, the 
introduction of these institutional innovations depends on the calculations of the 
main operations. The big transnational firms, which are usually more concerned 
about political instability and more sensitive to the reputational cost caused by 
protracted conflict, are in the best position to play a prominent role in bringing about 
these changes.  
In addition to the reduction of conflicts, the mining companies and the national 
government had other objective. They believed that in returning some of the profits 
to producer municipalities and regions, they could bypass the historical inability of 
the centralised Peruvian state to reach the rural areas of the country, without 
reforming the whole public apparatus. This shortcut has not worked either. 
Populations in mining regions feel that although the state might send them money, 
it does not really care about their plight: “The government is only interested in the 
mine not in the people.”233 The absence of the central state in the provision of 
public services; the imposition of centrally designed regulations aimed at tightly 
controlling the activities of sub-national governments; and the simultaneous lack of 
interest of the judiciary and the central government in stopping cases of blatant 
corruption have  reinforced popular distrust in the state.  
                                                            
232 Interviews 2008-030 (Pasco, 29-04-2008); 2008-050 (Pasco, 10-05-2008); 2008-189 
(Moquegua, 08-09-2008). 
233 Public meeting in Cerro de Pasco (2008-005; Cerro de Pasco, 20-05-2008). 
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The second lesson makes reference to a trade-off between maximising the short-
term profits of the mining companies and generating an appropriate environment 
for the future of the sector. The Peruvian government has tried to attract further 
investment in mining by bowing to the demands of companies already operating in 
the country. Central government decision not to impose a windfall tax, and its 
tendency to minimise the importance of the official requirement to obtain a social 
licence from the local community before starting exploration activities are examples 
of these pro-mining policies.   
I argue that these policies are short-sighted. They erode the legitimacy of the state 
by portraying the image of a government in collusion with the mining companies; 
yet, they also damage the mining companies’ public image, and fuel the more 
radical discourses for either the nationalisation of natural resources or the 
imposition of severe restrictions to new mining operations.  
Something similar occurs in the tendency of mining companies to play a more 
state-like role at the local level. The MPSP has reinforced this tendency by 
empowering them to run parallel development planning systems. Such power 
makes people suspicious of the real intentions of the companies, placing them at 
the forefront of popular discontent. Bypassing public institutions through the 
implementation of social programmes can yield positive results in the extremely 
short term, but it generates more instability in the long term.  
In summary, the implementation of the NEIS has not been successful in either 
reducing social conflict or promoting development in mining jurisdictions. The 
translation of mining into development has been historically problematic and it 
seems that the NEIS is not an effective short cut to overcoming these difficulties. If 
the Peruvian government really wants to make mining a central pillar of the 
country’s development, it needs to undertake the revision of both its policies for the 
promotion and management of the mining sector and the way in which the state 
responds to rural populations.  
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APPENDIX I: Change in production and international prices for principal 
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APPENDIX II: Poverty levels and income per capita in different 
geographical regions of Peru  
 
Table A II.1 Percentage of the population below the poverty line in different
geographical regions of Peru, 2001–2008  
Area 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Whole country 54.3 53.8 52.2 51.6 48.7 44.5 39.3 36.2 
Lima 31.8 34.2 33.7 36.6 32.6 24.2 18.5 17.7 
Rest of the country 63.3 61.8 59.6 57.7 55.2 52.8 47.8 n/a 
Urban 42.0 41.0 39.5 40.3 36.8 31.2 25.7 23.5 
Rural 77.1 77.7 75.7 72.5 70.9 69.3 64.6 59.8 
Coastal region 39.0 39.8 37.8 38.4 34.2 28.7 22.6 21.3 
          Urban* n/a n/a n/a 37.1 32.2 29.9 25.1 23.4 
          Rural n/a n/a n/a 51.2 50.0 49.0 38.1 34.8 
Andean sierra 70.6 70.0 68.6 67.7 65.6 63.4 60.1 56.2 
          Urban n/a n/a n/a 44.8 44.4 40.2 36.3 33.5 
          Rural n/a n/a n/a 75.8 77.3 76.5 73.3 68.8 
Amazon rainforest 69.8 64.9 64.1 59.5 60.3 56.6 48.4 40.9 
          Urban n/a n/a n/a 50.4 53.9 49.9 40.3 31.3 
          Rural n/a n/a n/a 63.8 65.6 62.3 55.3 49.1 
Notes: * excluding Lima. 
Source: INEI. 
 
Table A II.2 Per capita average monthly incomes in different geographical 
regions of Peru, 2004–2008 (Peruvian Nuevos Soles at 2001 rates) 
Area 2004 2006 2008 Variation 2008/2004 
Whole country 371.5 396.7 452.2 80.7 
Lima 604.3 640.9 703.0 98.7 
Urban 479.3 513.8 580.1 100.8 
Rural 171.9 178.9 214.7 42.8 
Coastal region     
          Urban* 403.1 430.5 481.9 78.8 
          Rural 266.3 269.5 334.3 68 
Andean sierra     
          Urban 387.3 427.6 504.9 117.6 
          Rural 155.9 156.8 185.2 29.3 
Amazon rainforest     
          Urban 298.3 328.0 430.5 132.2 
          Rural 155.9 179.9 223.8 67.9 
Source: INEI. 
 
APPENDIX III: Summary of principal mining companies in the field research regions 

















2001 Open pit Cu, Zn Very large 
Over 25 years 
 
1,700 2,500 










Cuajone Grupo Mexico 1976 Open pit Cu Large Over 20 years 1,500 500 







Cerro de Pasco Volcan 1903 
Underground 
Open pit (1956) 
Zn, Pb, Ag Large Long term**** 1,230 1,990 
Brocal El Brocal 1956 Open pit (1993) Zn, Pb, Ag Medium Long term 275 600 
Huarón Pan American Silver 1912 Underground Ag, Zn Medium 15 years 812 570 
Atacocha Atacocha 1937 Underground Zn, Ag, Pb, Cu Medium 8–10 years 390 --- 
Milpo Milpo 1949 Underground Zn, Pb, Cu Medium 8–10 years 300 600 
Notes: * in some locations, mining activities commenced before the involvement of the present company; ** according to direct company information or estimated through reserves 
and production; *** according to company information; **** dependent on current negotiation with population and authorities. 
Sources: company annual reports and personal interviews with employees.  
APPENDIX IV:  Main features of municipalities included in the field study 

























Jangas Pierina 2,809 4,506 1,017 1,780 71.9% 59.9% 54.6% 
Huari Antamina 3,110 10,024 1,008 2,638 66.4% 50.4% 56.5% 
Cajay Antamina 3,175 3,107 0.983 3,896 94.2% 78.9% 79.2% 
Chavin de Huantar Antamina 3,141 9,355 1,001 3,240 83.3% 76.8% 79.1% 
Huachis Antamina 3,243 3,868 0,992 4,012 93.9% 66.0% 80.5% 
Ponto Antamina 3,115 3,574 0,996 3,718 93.9% 77.9% 80.3% 










Moquegua Cuajone 1,417 50,424 1,025 1,847 17.0% 5.8% 22.1% 
Carumas Cuajone 3,043 4,914 1,023 4,264 33.9% 42.5% 49.7% 
Samegua Cuajone 1,558 6,647 1,004 1,699 16.3% 10.1% 22.7% 
San Cristobal Cuajone 3,458 3,590 1,019 3,788 53.1% 16.7% 54.8% 







Huachon --- 3,407 4,825 1,014 1,209 7.1% 40.0% 74.1% 
Huayllay Huarón 4,348 11,188 1,021 1,416 5.9% 32.7% 56.8% 
Ninacaca --- 4,141 4,024 0,998 1,157 11.7% 46.8% 74.2% 
San Fco.de Asis Yarusyakan Atacocha & Milpo 3,814 1,1812 0,996 1,145 3.5% 63.7% 84.2% 
Simon Bolivar Cerro de Pasco 4,191 1,4416 0,995 1,085 3.9% 11.2% 44.5% 
Tinyahuarco Brocal 4,270 6,282 1,016 1,345 2.8% 3.1% 47.3% 




APPENDIX V: Criteria for the definition of categories in the three different 
classifications of conflict 
Category Description of relevant features 
Classification 1: Relation to mining (extractive industries) 
1. Mining 
Involves claims against mining companies; the regulatory or 
legislative power of the state regarding extractive industries; 
the distribution of mining revenues; or the control of natural 
resources crucial to the industry. 
2. Other Remaining conflicts. 
Classification 2: Actors 
1. Indigenous groups and 
rural population 
Includes indigenous and peasant communities and their 
organisations.  
2. Urban population 
Citizens living in urban areas acting in their capacity as 
inhabitants of such areas, which frequently include small urban 
centres that are the principal towns  of rural districts.  
3. Local and regional 
political authorities 
Elected local and regional authorities who promote and lead 
social mobilisation. 
4. Trade unions and 
workers’ organisations Workers acting in defence of their rights or interests. 
5. Business associations Informal groups and formal associations of small entrepreneurs acting in defence of their interests. 
6. Students University students. 
7. Other Remaining conflicts. 
Classification 3: Motives 
1. National legislation or 
state policy Conflicts with national legislation or state policy. 
2. Sub-national authorities 
behaviour Conflicts with local or regional authorities. 
3. Behaviour of companies 
Conflicts that target the behaviour of companies. Includes 
demands with regard to social expenditure and/or claims for 
financial compensation.  
4. Environment 
Conflicts aimed at halting environmental degradation (codified 
in the previous category if there is a clash over this kind of 
dispute that ends in agreement on social or financial 
compensation). 
5. Labour issues Conflicts between employers and employees.  
6. Delimitation of territories  Conflicts in which some actors claim their jurisdiction over disputed territory or riparian rights.  
7. Other Remaining conflicts. 
 
 
APPENDIX VI:  Summary of variables used in the regression analysis of conflicts 
Variable Variable type Description Source Obs. Mean Std. d. Min. Max. 
1. Log of canon minero per 
capita 
Scale 
Annual data for per capita transfers of canon 
minero to regional and local governments of the 
region. 
MEF 96 1.357 1.134 0 3.557 
2. Territory under mining 
concession 
Scale Annual data for the percentage of the area of the 
region for which companies hold mining rights.  
MEM 96 16.3 11.8 0.07 50.9 
3. Log of per capita 
investment in mining 
activities 
Scale Annual data for the investment of mining 
companies by region. 
MEM 96 1.295 0.869 0 2.919 
4. Percentage of poverty Scale 
Annual index of population below the poverty 
line. 
NICS 96 47.7 20.7 15.1 90.3 
5. Mining as a percentage 
of GDP (constant prices) 
Scale 
Annual mining production as a percentage of 
total regional GDP calculated at constant 1994 
prices; represents material production. 
NICS 96 12.4 13.8 0 56.2 




Percentage of the population affirming that in 




96 22.1 23.1 0.4 71.0 
7. Migration to the region 
in the last five years 
above 12% 
Scale transformed 
to dummy  
Percentage of the population affirming that in 
2007 it had lived in the same region for at least 




96 11.3 4.7 4.5 23.1 
8. Percentage of workforce 




Percentage of the population affirming that in 




96 34.6 16.6 3.8 64.8 
9. Percentage of workforce 




Percentage of the population affirming that in 




96 2.2 2.6 0 10.4 
10. Electoral participation 
greater than 85% 
Scale transformed 
to dummy 
Percentage of electorate voting in regional 
elections. 
ONPE 96 85.6 3.8 75.0 91.2 




Percentage of the electorate supporting the 
radical candidate in the first round of the 2006 
national elections. 
ONPE 96 38.2 13.2 15.9 62.7 
12. Percentage of the vote 
captured by the winner 
in regional elections 
Scale 
Percentage of total vote cast captured by the 
winning party in regional elections in 2002 and 
2006.  
ONPE 96 27.5 6.8 15.6 50.9 
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APPENDIX VII:  Quantitative analysis of the impact of mining on economic 
and welfare indicators in Peruvian regions 
In this appendix, I present how far the amount of per capita canon transfers and 
other two mining-related variables that control for the weight of mining in the 
regional economy and the economic importance of the variation in mining 
production correlate with variations in economic growth; poverty reduction; changes 
in the coverage of drinking water and sanitation facilities; and school attendance at 
two different ages, across Peruvian regions in 2002–2008. A brief description of 
these dependent variables follows: 
(i) The annual rate of GDP growth at regional level excluding mining activities. 
This indicator is a proxy for the dynamism of economic sectors other than 
mining. I used the sectorally disaggregated data of regional GDP at constant 
prices of 1994 provided by the National Institute of Computing and Statistics 
(NICS) 234 to make the calculations. 
(ii) The annual variation in poverty measured as a percentage of the regional 
population below the poverty line.235  
(iii) The annual variation in the percentage of the population with access to drinking 
water according to the National Household Survey.236  
(iv) The annual variation in the percentage of the population with sanitation 
facilities at home, according to the NHS.  
(v) The annual variation in the school attendance rate of children between 3 and 5 
years old in relation to the total population of that age. Data from the NHS.  
(vi) The annual variation in the school attendance rate of children between 12 and 
16 years old in relation to the total population of that age. Data from the NHS.  
The three independent mining-related variables that I tested are as follow: 
(i) Mining as percentage of total regional GDP at constant 1994 prices is a proxy 
for the importance of mining in relation to the total regional economy. It is a 
broad indicator that helps to assess the general effect of mining activity.  
                                                            
234 The NICS used the value-added approach to calculate regional GDP by sectors.  
235  The poverty line is defined in terms of income according to a region-specific variable 
benchmark. In Peru, since 1995, the NICS has conducted household surveys that provide very 
detailed data on a wide range of issues. In 2003 a change in the methodology made that the 
annual compilation of this data meant there was statistical inference with validity at regional 
level. 
236 This indicator comprises people with drinking water at home and those who access some 
form of collective service. 
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(ii) Index of annual variation of mining GDP. I built this index by multiplying the 
annual variation of mining GDP at constant prices of 1994 by the rate of mining 
in relation to the total regional GDP in the previous year. This index captures 
the economic importance of the variation in mining activities. It helps to test the 
existence of spillover effects. If mining has the capacity to generate positive or 
negative spillover effects on the rest of the regional economy, this variable 
should explain variations in the rates of economic growth and, probably, on 
welfare indicators across regions.  
(iii) The logarithm of annual per capita canon minero transfers at current value 
going to the regional government and municipalities of each region is a proxy 
for the implementation of the NEIS.  
The first two help to test the direct influence of mining activities on economic and 
welfare indicators, while the third is a proxy for the implementation of the NEIS.  
Additionally, in the analyses of each of the six dependent variables, I used different 
control variables. I present these variables in the next sections of this appendix, 
while appendix VIII summarises all the variables used in the analyses. 
I use Random Effects (RE) panel regression specifications as the best possible 
way of dealing with the problems of the serial correlation and heteroskedasticity of 
the panel. I use the XTREG command in STATA with the option ‘r’ to correct these 
problems. I ruled out the use of the more conventional Panel Corrected Standard 
Errors (PCSE) models because the number of regions in the panel is larger than 
the number of years (see discussion in section 5.3 of the main text for a more 
complete explanation).   
To ensure the robustness of the estimates, I also calculated an alternative 
specification for the models by running pooled OLS regressions with dummies to 
control for year effects. I assumed that serial correlation tended to cause less 
severe distortions in the case of panels with short temporal series (Wooldridge, 
2002:276). The estimate for robust standards errors corrects for the problem of 
heteroskedasticity. This new specification did not change either the sign or the 
statistical significance of the estimates.  
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In the following sections, I present the analysis of each of the dependent variables, 
introducing the different control variables I used in each case, and briefly discuss 
the results. 
A.VII.1 Testing the influence of mining on regional economic growth (2002–
2008) 
I took the annual rate of GDP growth – excluding mining activities – at regional 
level as the dependent variable to determine the influence of mining on economic 
growth. This indicator is thus a proxy for the dynamism of economic sectors other 
than mining. I used sectorally disaggregated regional GDP data at constant 1994 
prices provided by the National Institute of Computing and Statistics (NICS) to 
calculate it.237 From 2002 to 2008, the year-by-year average growth rate for the 24 
regions of the panel was 6.1 per cent, with a minimum value of -4.6 per cent for 
Lambayeque (2004), and a maximum value of 20.9 per cent for Ica (2008).238 
I introduced into the model the three mining-related explanatory variables that I aim 
to test. Additionally, I controlled for the six following variables that might also 
influence the rate of economic growth.239 
(i) The percentage of the regional population below the poverty line in the 
previous year.  
(ii) Government services as a percentage of total regional GDP at constant 1994 
prices. 
(iii) Manufacturing as a percentage of total regional GDP at constant 1994 prices. 
(iv) Trade as a percentage of total regional GDP at constant 1994 prices. 
(v) Agriculture as a percentage of total regional GDP at constant 1994 prices. 
(vi) Construction as a percentage of total regional GDP at constant 1994 prices. 
To check the robustness of the estimates, I used year dummies to control for year-
specific factors that could affect economic growth rates across the whole country; 
                                                            
237 The INEI employed a value added technique to calculate regional GDP by sector.  
238 The extremely high level for Ica in 2008 is due to massive investment in the reconstruction of 
the region after an earthquake in August 2007.  
239 See the end of this appendix for a complete description of all the dependent and 
independent variables used in the analysis. 
− 253 − 
 
 
taking 2002 as the base year. Thus, Table A.VII.1 presents the results of the two 
different specifications.   
The models show that neither the relative importance of mining in relation to the 
total regional GDP, variations in mining-related GDP, nor canon minero transfers 
accruing to sub-national governments significantly correlate with the variation in 
economic growth rates across the regions during in2002–2008. I also tested a 
further specification, whose results are not represented in the tables, lagging the 
three mining-related variables to capture the probable delay in their effect on the 
dynamism of other economic sectors. However, the three lagged mining-related 
variables had no statistical significance. 
Among the other control variables, the poverty level of the region during the 
previous year has a statistically significant negative effect on the rate of economic 
growth in all the models. However, the regression coefficients denote that this 
influence is quantitatively small. By contrast, the relative size of the agriculture 
sector positively relates to the rate of economic growth in a statistically significant 
fashion, and its effect is quantitatively more important. The importance of the 
construction sector to the regional economy is statistically significant in the random 
effects specification, but the effect disappears when year dummies are included. 
None of the remaining variables are statistically significant.  
These results rule out both the existence of a positive spill over effect of mining into 
other economic sectors in the region, and the potential of canon minero transfers to 
promote economic development during the period covered by this study.  
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Table A VII.1 Regression of mining-related and other socio-economic variables 
on the rate of annual GDP growth in Peruvian regions (2002–2008). 
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R2 .20 .29 
N 168 168 
Standard errors in parenthesis;  a Standard errors are adjusted for clustering in regions;  
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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A.VII.2 Testing the influence of mining on changes in the level of poverty 
(2004–2008) 
The annual variation in poverty is the second dependent variable. This indicator 
captures the percentage of the population with an income below a region-specific 
benchmark of poverty. I used data for a period (2003–2008) when poverty levels 
had an average improvement of 2.8 percentage points per year.  
I introduced in the model three mining-related indicators as independent variables, 
but in this case, I lagged canon minero transfers per capita by a year to reflect the 
lapse of time between spending the money and the potential results in terms of an 
increase in the population’s income. In addition to these three variables, I also 
controlled for a set of socio-economic and political variables that shape the regional 
context:   
(i) Percentage of the regional population below the poverty line in the previous 
year controls for the departure level of the dependent variable. 
(ii) Percentage of indigenous population in the region measured in terms of mother 
tongue according to data from the 2007 national census.  
(iii) Percentage of the vote going to the radical candidate in the first round of the 
2006 presidential elections, as a proxy for disagreement with economic 
policies.  
(iv) Rate of GDP regional growth as a proxy for economic dynamism. 
(v) Government services as a percentage of total regional GDP.   
Table A.VII.2 presents the results of the analysis. The models explain little variance 
in the change in poverty level across Peruvian regions (6 and 16 per cent). In 
considering the importance of each variable in the models, the results contradict 
the official claims about the positive effects of mining. None of the three mining-
related variables have any statistically significant positive correlation with changes 
in the level of poverty. 
The percentage of the populations below the poverty line in the previous year and 
the number of indigenous people in the regions is statistically significant. Regions 
with high levels of poverty tended to improve more than those that were less 
afflicted. This result is clearer in model 2, which includes year dummies. By 
contrast, regions with a higher proportion of indigenous people advanced less than 
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the rest. However, this effect disappears in the second model.  Indicators of the 
rate of economic growth and the importance of government services as part of 
regional GDP are not statistically significant.  
Table A VII.2 Regression analysis of mining-related and other socio-economic 
variables on changes in poverty levels in Peruvian regions (2003–2008)  
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R2 .06 .16 
N 144 144 
Standard errors in parenthesis;  a Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on regions;  
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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A.VII.3 Testing the influence of mining on the annual change in levels of 
drinking water, and sanitation coverage (2004–2008) 
In this section, I tested the influence of the three mining-related variables and other 
control variables on two dependent variables that measure the annual change in 
levels of drinking water and sanitation coverage:  
(i) The annual variation in the percentage of the population with access to drinking 
water, according to the National Household Survey.240 The average percentage 
of people accessing drinking water at regional level dropped from 61.5 per cent 
in 2003 to 59.7 per cent in 2008, representing an average annual decrease of 
0.4 percentage points in coverage.   
(ii) The annual variation in the percentage of the population with sanitation facilities 
in the home, according to the National Household Survey. From 2003 to 2008 
the average sanitation coverage rate for the 24 regions of the panel increased 
from 36.9 to 42.8 per cent, with an average year improvement of 1.2 
percentage points. 
In this model, I lagged the three mining-related variables because I consider that 
any effect on changes in public service coverage involves a delay to allow time for 
project implementation. In addition, I controlled for four other variables:  
(i) Level of coverage of these public services in the previous year; these variables 
control for the departure level of the dependent variable.  
(ii) Percentage of the regional population below the poverty line in the previous 
year; this variable controls for the general level of poverty.  
(iii) Percentage of the indigenous population in the region measured in terms of 
mother tongue, according to the 2007 national census.  
(iv) Percentage of the rural population in 2007; this variable controls for 
characteristics of the regional population that might hinder the implementation 
of public services.  
Tables A.VII.3 and A.VII.4 present the results of the regression analysis. None of 
the mining-related variables have any influence on variance in annual changes in 
drinking water or sanitation coverage. The models have very low explanatory 
                                                            
240 This indicator includes people with drinking water at home and those who have access to 
water in collective facilities outside the house.  
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powers and only the initial levels of coverage of both drinking water and sanitation 
facilities are statistically significant.  
Table A VII.3 Regression analysis of mining-related and other socio-economic 
variables on changes in the level of drinking water coverage in Peruvian regions 
(2004–2008) 
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Percentage of the population with access 

































R2 .09 .11 
N 120 120 
Standard errors in parenthesis;  a Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on regions;  
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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Table A VII.4 Regression analysis of mining-related and other socio-economic 
variables on changes in the percentage of the population with sanitation 
facilities at home (2004–2008)  











Pooled OLS regression with 
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R2 .06 .08 
N 120 120 
Standard errors in parenthesis;  a Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on regions;  
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A.VII.4 Testing the influence of mining on the annual variation in school 
attendance at ages 3–5 and 12–16 (2003–2008). 
This last set of regressions analyses the influence of the three mining-related 
variables on the school attendance rate in two different age groups: 
(i) Annual variation in the school attendance rate of children between three and 
five years in relation to the total population of the age group. The average 
annual attendance rate at regional level increased from 48.5 per cent in 2003 to 
63.1 per cent in 2008, representing an annual improvement of 2.1 percentage 
points.  
(ii) Annual variation in the school attendance rate of children aged between 12 and 
16 in relation to the total population of that age group. The average annual 
attendance rates improved from 66 to 72.7 per cent in 2003-2008, with an 
average annual improvement of 1 percentage point.  
I used the same combination of independent variables as in the previous models, 
but introduced a control for the rate of school attendance in the previous year. The 
results are slightly different on this occasion (see Tables A.VII.5 and A.VII.6). As in 
previous cases, neither the level of mining activity nor any change in it had any 
significant influence on the rate of school attendance during the period. However, 
canon minero transfers do have a positive impact. Regarding the variation in the 
rate of school attendance of 3 and 5-year-olds, canon minero transfers are 
significant at the 10 per cent level. There is a caveat in terms of the robustness of 
the result, as the effect disappears in the alternative OLS specification (Table 
A.VII.5). The influence of canon minero transfers on the attendance of children 
aged between 12 and 16 is significant at a higher level (1%), and remains stable in 
the alternative specification.  
Two variables have a negative effect on the change in the rates of school 
attendance of 3–5 and 12–16 year olds. The school attendance rates for the 
previous year have a clear negative impact. This is a logical result because the 
higher the starting point, the more difficult it is to improve rates. The percentage of 
the rural population living in the region is the second variable that has a negative 
effect. This negative correlation is also to be expected, since the displacement of 
the population makes it more difficult to improve either coverage or quality of 
education provision. Moreover, relocation also raises parents’ cost of sending their 
children to school. 
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In contrast, the percentage of indigenous population in the region has a positive 
effect on the rate of school attendance of children between 12-16 years old.  
Table A VII.5 Regression analysis of mining-related and other socio-economic 
variables on changes in the school attendance of children between three and five 
years old (2003–2008)  
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R2 .20 .23 
N 144 144 
Standard errors in parenthesis;  a Standard errors are adjusted for clustering in regions;  
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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Table A VII.6 Regression analysis of mining-related and other socio-economic 
variables on changes in the school attendance of children between 12 and 16 
years old (2004–2008)  
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R2 .23 .25 
N 144 144 
Standard errors in parenthesis;  a Standard errors are adjusted for clustering in regions;  
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
 
 
APPENDIX VIII:  Variables used in the regression analysis of mining-related variables over changes in economic and 
welfare indicators at regional level 
A.VIII.1 Dependent variables 





















1. Annual GDP growth rate 
excluding mining activities Scale 
Annual change in sectoral GDP at constant 1994 
prices. 2002–2008 NICS 168 6.1% 3.5% -4.6% 20.9% 
2. Annual change in poverty Scale 
Annual change in the index of the population 
below the poverty line. 2003–2008 NICS 144 2.8 5.2 -11.4  17.6 
3. Annual change in the rate of 
drinking water coverage Scale 
Annual change in the rate of people with access 
to drinking water at home or through community 
services.  
2004–2008 NICS  120 -0.4 5.7 -18.1 10.7 
4. Annual change in the rate of 
sanitation coverage Scale 
Annual change in the rate of people with 
sanitation facilities at home. 2004–2008 NICS 120 1.2 3.4 -15.6 9.3 
5. Annual change in the school 
attendance rate at 3–5-years  Scale 
Annual change in the school attendance rate of 
children between 3 and 5 years in relation to the 
total population of that age. 
2003–2008 NICS 144 2.4 7.6 24.1 28.3 
6. Annual change in the school 
attendance rate at12–16 years  Scale 
Annual change in the school attendance rate of 
children between 12 and 16 years in relation to 
the total population of that age. 
2003–2008 NICS 144 1.1 4.7 -10.9 13.5 
 
 
A.VIII.2  Mining-related independent variables 





































 1. Mining as a percentage of 
total regional GDP Scale 
Mining as a percentage of total regional GDP at 
constant 1994 prices. 2002–2008 NICS 168 12.4% 14.3% 0% 58.8% 
2. Index of annual variation in 
mining GDP 
Scale 
Multiplication of the annual variation of mining 
GDP at constant 1994 prices by the rate of 
mining in relation to total regional GDP in the 
previous year.  
2002–2008 NICS 168 0.74 2.87 -12.32 17.11 
3. Log of canon minero per 
capita  
Scale 
Logarithm of annual canon minero transfers per 
capita going to the regional government and 
municipalities of each region. 
2002–2008 MEF 168 1 1 0 3.56 
 
A.VIII.3  Other control independent variables 































 1. Percentage of poverty in the 
previous year  
Scale Percentage of the regional population below the poverty line in the previous year. 2002–2008 NICS 168 53.9% 19.1% 15.1% 90.3% 
2. Government services as a 
percentage of total regional 
GDP 
Scale 
Government services as a percentage of 
total regional GDP at constant 1994 prices. 
 
2002–2008 NICS 168 8.9% 4.1% 3.2% 23.2% 
3. Manufacture as a percentage of 
total regional GDP 
Scale Manufacture as a percentage of total regional GDP at constant 1994 prices. 2002–2008 NICS 168 13.2% 6.4% 25.9% 34.5% 
4. Trade as a percentage of total 
regional GDP 
Scale Trade as a percentage of total regional GDP at constant 1994 prices. 2002–2008 NICS 168 13% 4.8% 4.3% 27.7% 
5. Agriculture as a percentage of 
total regional GDP 
Scale Agriculture as a percentage of total regional GDP at constant 1994 prices. 2002–2008 NICS 168 15.8% 8.6% 3.4% 41.2% 
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6. Construction as a percentage of 
total regional GDP 
Scale Construction as a percentage of total regional GDP at constant 1994 prices. 2002–2008 NICS 168 5.7% 2.6% 1.2% 15% 
7. Percentage of the indigenous 
population in the region Scale 
Percentage of the population affirming that in 




144 22.1% 23.1% 0.4% 71% 
8. Percentage of the vote for the 
radical candidate in the 2006 
election 
Scale 
Percentage of the electorate supporting the 
radical candidate in the first round of the 
2006 national election. 
2003–2008 ONPE 144 38.2% 13.2% 15.9% 62.7% 
9. Annual regional GDP growth 
rate  Scale 
Annual change in total regional GDP at 
constant 1994 prices. 2003–2008 NICS 144 6.5% 4.3% -7.4% 21.9% 
10. Percentage of the population 
with access to drinking water in 
the previous year 
Scale 
Percentage of the population with access to 
drinking water at home or through 
community services. 
2004–2008 NICS 120 60.3% 18.2% 28.2% 94% 
11. Percentage of the population 
with access to sanitation 
facilities in the previous year 
Scale Percentage of the population with sanitation facilities at home. 2004–2008 NICS 120 39.4% 20.2% 7.6% 88.1% 
12. Percentage of the rural 
population  Scale 
Percentage of the population living outside 
district capitals in agglomerations of less 





144 33.1% 18.8% 2% 68.3% 
13. Rate of school attendance of 3–
5 year olds in the previous year Scale 
School attendance rate of children aged3 
and 5 in relation to the total population of 
that age. 
2003–2008 NICS 144 56.4% 12.9% 20.2% 87.7% 
14. Rate of school attendance of12–
16 year olds in the previous 
year 
Scale 
School attendance rate of children aged 12 
016 in relation to the total population of that 
age. 
2003–2008 NICS 144 70.1% 10.9% 45.3% 90.9% 
APPENDIX IX:  Summary of variables used in the analysis of differences in welfare indicators between canon-rich and 
canon-poor Peruvian localities (1993–2007)  
A.IX.1 Indicators of welfare improvement 











1. Volume of canon transfers per 
capita 2001–2007 
Scale 
Volume of canon transfers per capita 
accumulated 2001–2007 in PEN (the populace 
in each year being calculated through an 
interpolation of the population in 1993 and 
2007). 













































2. Change in the percentage of the 
population aged between 15 
and 24 completing secondary 
education 
Scale 
Change in the percentage of the population 
between the ages of 15 and 25 completing 





1350 19.6 11.1% -19.4 59.7 
3. Change in the percentage of the 
population with access to 
drinking water at home 
Scale 
Change in the percentage of the households with 





1350 11.9 21.9 -83.2 89.7 
4. Change in the percentage of the 
households with sanitation 
facilities at home 
Scale 
Change in the percentage of the households with 





1350 8.1 10.9 -30.9 63.5 
5. Change in the percentage of the 
households with electricity 
supply at home 
Scale 
Change in the percentage of the households with 





1350 26.6 20.9 -40.7 87.1 
A.IX. 2 Control variables for propensity score matching 




































































7. Population in 1993  Scale Population of the locality in 1993. 1993 
National 
census 
1350 9625 13925 438 121894 
8. Percentage of the rural 
population in 2007 
Scale 
Percentage of the rural population in the 




1350 54.8% 29.9% 0% 98.7% 
9. Percentage of the indigenous 
population in 2007 
Scale 
Percentage of the population affirming that in 




1350 32.6% 36.5% 0% 98.9% 
10. Altitude of the locality Scale 





1350 2224.3 1404 3 4660 
11. Percentage of the 15–24 year 
old population with secondary 
education in 1993 
Scale 
Percentage of the 15–25-year old population 




1350 53.3% 20.9% 8.3% 96.1% 
12. Percentage of the households 
with access to drinking water at 
home in 1993 
Scale 
Percentage of the households with access to 
drinking water at home in 1993. 
1993 
National 
census 1350 20.1% 21.5% 0% 96.1% 
13. Percentage of households with 
sanitation facilities at home in 
1993 
Scale 
Percentage of the households with sanitation 
facilities at home in 1993. 
1993 
National 
census 1350 9.9% 16.6% 0 93.6% 
14. Percentage of the households 
with electricity at home in 1993 
Scale 
Percentage of the households with electricity at 
home in 1993. 
1993 
National 
census 1350 26.3% 28.1% 0% 99.6% 
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APPENDIX X:  Robustness of PSM results 
A.X.1 Analysis of the effect of different canon transfer levels   
The following tables represent an estimate of the average effect of high volumes of 
canon transfer on changes in welfare indicators in Peruvian localities 1993–2007; 
comparing municipalities in receipt of canon transfers amounting to more or less 
than PEN 3,500 per capita respectively 2001-2007. 
Table A.X.1 Estimate of the average effect of canon transfers above PEN 3,500 
per capita (2001–2007) on changes in the percentage of people between 15 and 
24 years old with secondary education 1993–2007 
Matching 
estimation method 
Nº of canon-rich 
municipalities  
(treated) 










Nearest neighbour 53 49 3.817 2.508 1.522 
Radius (.001) 49 494 1.479 1.662 .890 
Kernel 53 1,248 1.046 1.140 .917 
Stratification 53 1,248 1.702 1.660 1.025 
 
Table A.X.2 Estimate of the average effect of canon transfers above PEN 3,500 
per capita (2001–2007) on changes in the percentage of households with a home 
drinking water supply 1993–2007 
Matching 
estimation method 
Nº of canon-rich 
municipalities  
(treated) 










Nearest neighbour 53 49 -5.728 5.721 -1.001 
Radius (.001) 49 494 -1.973 5.113 -.386 
Kernel 53 1,248 -3.032 3.898 -.778 
Stratification 53 1,248 -1.219 4.115 -.296 
 
Table A.X.3 Estimate of the average effect of canon transfers above PEN 3,500 
per capita (2001–2007) on changes in the percentage of households with 
sanitation facilities at home over the period 1993–2007 
Matching 
estimation method 
Nº of canon-rich 
municipalities  
(treated) 










Nearest neighbour 53 49 -1.837 2.608 -.704 
Radius (.001) 49 494 -.163 2.284 -.071 
Kernel 53 1,248 -.460 1.445 -.318 
Stratification 53 1,248 -.548 1.788 -.306 
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Table A.X.4 Estimate of the average effect of canon transfers above PEN 3,500 
per capita (2001–2007) on changes in the percentage of households with an 
electricity supply at home over the period 1993–2007 
Matching 
estimation method 
Nº of canon-rich 
municipalities  
(treated) 










Nearest neighbour 53 49 10.544 5.049 2.088 
Radius (.001) 49 494 9.474 4.021 2.356 
Kernel 53 1,248 6.508 3.049 2.134 
Stratification 53 1,248 4.404 4.142 1.063 
 
A,X.2 Analysis of regional effects   
Table A.X.5 Estimate of the average effect of canon transfers above PEN 2,100 
per capita (2001–2007) in municipalities in all regions except Ancash on changes 
in the percentage of people between 15 and 24 years old with secondary 
education over the period 1993–2007 
Matching 
estimation method 
Nº of canon-rich 
municipalities  
(treated) 










Nearest neighbour 74 67 1.904 1.902 1.001 
Radius (.001) 67 751 0.334 1.519 .220 
Kernel 74 1,187 .165 .913 .181 
Stratification 74 1,187 .884 1.171 .755 
 
Table A.X.6 Estimate of the average effect of canon transfers above PEN 2,100 
per capita (2001–2007) in municipalities of all regions except Ancash on changes 




Nº of canon-rich 
municipalities  
(treated) 










Nearest neighbour 74 67 -9.498 4.437 -2.141 
Radius (.001) 67 751 -10.016 3.133 -3.197 
Kernel 74 1,187 -8.722 2.583 -3.377 
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Table A.X.7 Estimate of the average effect of canon transfers above PEN 2,100 
per capita (2001–2007) in municipalities of all regions except Ancash on changes 




Nº of canon-rich 
municipalities  
(treated) 










Nearest neighbour 74 67 -1.584 2.218 -.714 
Radius (.001) 67 751 -1.873 1.600 -1.170 
Kernel 74 1,187 -1.489 1.341 -1.110 
Stratification 74 1,187 -1.209 1.468 -.823 
 
Table A.X.8 Estimate of the average effect of canon transfers above PEN 2,100 
per capita (2001–2007) in municipalities of all regions except Ancash on changes 
in the percentage of households with a home electricity supply 1993–2007 
Matching 
estimation method 
Nº of canon-rich 
municipalities  
(treated) 










Nearest neighbour 74 67 4.609 3.821 1.206 
Radius (.001) 67 751 -1.064 2.999 -.355 
Kernel 74 1,187 -1.693 2.044 -.828 





APPENDIX XI: Summary of variables used in the regression analysis of canon minero transfers and other socio-
economic variables for the allocation of capital investment in municipalities with more than 3,000 inhabitants  





















1. Percentage of budget allocated to education Scale 2005–2008 MEF 4,025 13.5% 13.7 0 92.2% 
2. Percentage of budget allocated to water and sanitation Scale 2005–2008 MEF 4,025 12.7% 15.0 0 99.1% 
3. Percentage of budget allocated to electrification Scale 2005–2008 MEF 4,025 5.9% 11.8 0 96.3% 
4. Percentage of budget allocated to agriculture promotion Scale 2005–2008 MEF 4,015 7.3% 11.9 0 93.5% 
5. Percentage of budget allocated transport infrastructure Scale 2005–2008 MEF 4,025 11.7% 15.0 0 93.6% 
6. Percentage of budget allocated to urban infrastructure Scale 2005–2008 MEF 4,025 18.5% 20.2 0 100% 
































8. Logarithm of canon transfers per capita Scale 2005–2008 MEF 4,025 1.816 0.824 0 4.524 
9. Ratio of actual capital spending to capital spending budget Scale 2005-2008 MEF 4,025 0.73 0.212 0 1.27 
10. Ratio of current spending to capital spending Scale 2005–2008 MEF 4,025 0.99 2.37 0 138.08 
11. Logarithm of population Scale 2005-2008 NICS 4,015 3.984 .379 3.477 5.304 
12. Poverty level in 2007 Scale 2005–2008 NICS 4,025 59.5% 23.0 1.4% 98.7% 
13. Percentage of 15-24 year olds with secondary education in 2007 Scale 2005–2008 National census 4,025 72.5% 17.7 10.9% 97.4% 
14. Percentage of rural population in 2007 Scale 2005–2008 National census 4,025 54.6% 31.5 0 98.7% 
15. Percentage of indigenous population in 2007 Scale 2005-2007 National census 4,025 31.9% 36.3% 0.3% 98.9% 
APPENDIX XII: Summary of the percentage of the capital investment budget allocated to main sectors in researched 















Percentage of capital investment budget allocated to main sectors 







Mean 05–08 1.780 2.257 71% 7.4% 11.9% 8.2% 4.2% 26.3% 32.4% 
2005 675 710 72% 3.0% 28.9% 5.2% 8.0% 22.2% 24.2% 
2006 937 1.194 100% 5.0% 8.5% 16.9% 2.4% 17.3% 31.7% 
2007 3.042 3.121 50% 9.6% 6.7% 9.4% 3.4% 25.8% 38.7% 
2008 2.465 4.000 62% 5.2% 3.4% 1.4% 3.1% 39.9% 35.0% 
Huari 
Mean 05–08 2.638 3.532 68% 12.9% 10.8% 9.4% 5.1% 16.2% 35.9% 
2005 32 176 80% 3.8% 5.8% 11.7% 0.0% 36.5% 28.9% 
2006 919 1.137 85% 10.1% 23.3% 12.9% 0.0% 9.5% 42.9% 
2007 5.735 5.930 41% 16.9% 8.4% 8.6% 14.4% 5.2% 30.2% 
2008 3.866 6.883 64% 20.9% 5.7% 4.4% 5.9% 13.7% 41.5% 
Cajay 
Mean 05–08 3.896 4.742 84% 6.8% 8.3% 6.8% 13.5% 25.0% 34.2% 
2005 55 125 78% 9.4% 0.4% 9.1% 2.4% 0.9% 77.8% 
2006 1.855 1.920 99% 11.4% 24.5% 3.0% 7.4% 43.9% 9.7% 
2007 7.798 8.013 51% 5.9% 6.6% 8.6% 31.1% 11.3% 34.9% 
2008 5.877 8.910 100% 0.3% 1.8% 6.6% 13.1% 43.9% 14.3% 

















Percentage of capital investment budget allocated to main sectors 







Mean 05–08 3.239 4.478 55% 10.6% 12.2% 13.3% 3.5% 34.1% 21.2% 
2005 42 79 81% 3.5% 11.3% 5.8% 2.8% 48.7% 21.6% 
2006 1.330 1.358 58% 7.6% 8.9% 22.3% 1.2% 41.3% 16.1% 
2007 6.296 7.040 41% 8.9% 14.1% 14.6% 5.6% 26.1% 29.2% 
2008 5.290 9.436 42% 22.3% 14.6% 10.6% 4.4% 20.1% 17.9% 
Huachis 
Mean 05–08 4.012 4.268 69% 19.9% 8.0% 5.3% 17.6% 14.1% 28.9% 
2005 47 157 58% 41.6% 9.4% 2.7% 1.2% 0.1% 32.4% 
2006 1.905 2.054 81% 4.5% 6.7% 13.0% 44.1% 13.5% 15.9% 
2007 7.918 8.056 75% 10.4% 8.9% 4.8% 10.6% 17.9% 43.2% 
2008 6.177 6.803 63% 23.1% 7.1% 0.7% 14.5% 24.8% 23.9% 
Ponto 
Mean 05–08 3.718 4.687 64% 18.0% 10.3% 9.8% 12.5% 16.7% 23.9% 
2005 44 111 77% 10.0% 12.0% 12.7% 32.8% 0.6% 16.7% 
2006 1.670 1.794 75% 11.0% 13.8% 14.2% 0.6% 15.7% 43.0% 
2007 6.986 7.569 35% 24.6% 6.8% 10.8% 8.1% 17.7% 21.5% 
2008 6.170 9.277 68% 26.5% 8.7% 1.3% 8.5% 32.8% 14.4% 
San Marcos 
Mean 05–08 7.663 12.048 20% 33.9% 9.6% 2.3% 7.9% 20.3% 16.8% 
2005 42 165 61% 31.4% 5.5% 2.9% 3.9% 6.8% 26.7% 
2006 2.981 3.084 7% 14.9% 6.8% 0.3% 0.5% 44.9% 20.9% 
2007 15.122 17.541 4% 45.8% 14.0% 0.3% 15.7% 13.3% 9.8% 
2008 12.507 27.403 10% 43.5% 12.2% 5.5% 11.6% 16.2% 9.6% 
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Mean 05–08 1.847 3.003 48% 2.9% 6.1% 2.7% 9.4% 21.8% 25.2% 
2005 991 1.047 32% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2006 1.915 2.554 51% 3.4% 11.4% 5.8% 13.0% 30.6% 26.9% 
2007 3.045 4.282 41% 4.6% 8.1% 2.4% 5.1% 37.0% 29.6% 
2008 1.437 4.127 70% 3.5% 4.8% 2.6% 19.4% 19.7% 44.1% 
Carumas 
Mean 05–08 4.264 6.777 42% 7.9% 11.6% 13.0% 26.0% 10.7% 23.4% 
2005 2.419 2.682 42% 8.0% 1.2% 22.2% 22.4% 2.8% 34.9% 
2006 4.296 6.000 34% 8.9% 3.1% 10.9% 0.3% 38.6% 37.5% 
2007 6.333 9.053 28% 4.9% 31.2% 0.1% 39.7% 1.1% 13.2% 
2008 4.008 9.371 64% 9.8% 10.8% 19.0% 41.4% 0.2% 7.7% 
Samegua 
Mean 05–08 1.699 2.559 59% 6.4% 11.9% 0.5% 2.7% 40.6% 33.7% 
2005 1.261 1.274 50% 15.6% 8.7% 0.8% 3.0% 23.8% 48.1% 
2006 1.628 2.198 83% 5.5% 6.2% 0.2% 0.6% 53.4% 32.3% 
2007 2.534 2.512 54% 3.3% 3.5% 0.1% 5.3% 62.3% 23.4% 
2008 1.373 4.251 47% 1.2% 29.1% 0.8% 1.9% 22.8% 31.1% 
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Mean 05–08 3.788 4.197 70% 13.8% 16.0% 40.0% 9.4% 0.5% 20.2% 
2005 2.364 2.453 79% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2006 4.207 4.775 93% 8.8% 6.3% 30.7% 8.3% 0.4% 45.5% 
2007 5.493 4.839 55% 19.1% 22.4% 39.5% 12.7% 0.0% 6.3% 
2008 3.087 4.719 53% 13.6% 19.3% 49.7% 7.4% 1.3% 8.8% 
Torata 
Mean 05–08 8.779 12.694 52% 3.8% 7.7% 35.4% 11.5% 8.7% 19.1 
2005 5.170 5.428 34% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2006 8.924 12.603 53% 4.6% 9.6% 31.8% 8.3% 5.8% 28.1% 
2007 12.930 16.979 48% 5.4% 7.7% 38.9% 11.0% 9.9% 14.1% 
2008 8.092 15.767 71% 1.7% 5.7% 35.6% 15.3% 10.4% 15.1% 
PASCO 
Huachon 
Mean 05–08 1.209 1.674 71% 20.5% 2.2% 4.8% 17.9% 9.5% 42.3% 
2005 152 202 82% 37.3% 2.4% 0.0% 13.6% 4.4% 42.3% 
2006 461 654 80% 13.2% 4.0% 17.0% 16.9% 28.1% 20.7% 
2007 2.317 2.616 46% 14.4% 1.9% 2.1% 17.3% 3.6% 52.8% 
2008 1.905 3.224 77% 17.1% 0.6% 0.2% 23.8% 2.0% 53.4% 
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Mean 05–08 1.416 2.138 40% 20.0% 18.4% 2.2% 2.7% 18.7% 17.7% 
2005 143 203 30% 29.3% 19.9% 0.0% 7.8% 5.9% 17.1% 
2006 608 893 60% 15.1% 15.5% 0.1% 0.6% 11.0% 26.7% 
2007 2.291 2.905 25% 20.3% 27.7% 7.7% 0.5% 20.0% 8.0% 
2008 2.621 4.550 45% 15.3% 10.4% 0.9% 1.9% 37.7% 18.8% 
Ninacaca 
Mean 05–08 1.157 1.848 37% 16.6% 3.9% 13.2% 3.7% 25.1% 27.4% 
2005 117 219 25% 18.6% 0.3% 8.1% 0.0% 19.7% 27.4% 
2006 389 651 65% 9.8% 2.6% 5.6% 6.9% 49.7% 21.8% 
2007 2.309 2.402 18% 13.9% 5.5% 3.7% 1.3% 26.2% 44.5% 
2008 1.814 4.120 39%  24.2% 7.1% 35.4% 6.7% 4.7% 16.1% 
San Fc de Asis 
de Yarusyacan 
Mean 05–08 1.145 1.694 42% 7.6% 8.4% 6.8% 21.9% 16.9% 23.6% 
2005 245 283 32% 2.5% 8.6% 0.0% 19.6% 49.4% 13.6% 
2006 549 796 75% 9.0% 10.8% 10.6% 7.3% 10.2% 28.1% 
2007 1.839 2.051 21% 13.0% 3.1% 10.7% 15.1% 3.5% 29.3% 
2008 1.947 3.645 42% 5.7% 11.3% 5.8% 45.8% 4.6% 23.2% 
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Mean 05–08 1.085 1.463 54% 13.3% 4.7% 0.9% 0.7% 51.1% 23.8% 
2005 179 217 31% 22.9% 6.9% 1.2% 0.0% 57.8% 7.5% 
2006 512 699 95% 3.7% 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 54.8% 35.8% 
2007 1.829 1.767 32% 17.1% 2.8% 0.0% 2.0% 35.6% 37.3% 
2008 1.821 3.170 58% 9.6% 6.9% 2.3% 0.9% 56.1% 14.6% 
Tinyahuarco 
Mean 05–08 1.345 2.138 33% 20.1% 15.8% 2.4% 0.2% 18.6% 19.4% 
2005 182 243 23% 39.9% 34.2% 3.1% 0.0% 10.8% 8.1% 
2006 531 772 51% 7.8% 6.2% 0.5% 0.0% 4.9% 20.6% 
2007 2.650 3.089 18% 8.6% 10.3% 4.4% 0.7% 21.3% 34.1% 

















































Mean 70% 43 % 16% 5% 10% 30 32 13 57 
Jangas 55% 41% 30% 4% 14% 31 -3 17 69 
Huari 56% 77% 32% 22% 25% 14 37 20 55 
Cajay 79% 33% 9% 0% 4% 31 56 10 55 
Chavin de Huantar 79% 29% 13% 7% 14% 30 55 15 51 
Huachis 80% 39% 5% 0% 1% 30 15 5 60 
Ponto 80% 40% 8% 0% 1% 39 7 3 57 
San Marcos 64% 45% 15% 5% 10% 35 57 18 55 
MOQUEGUA 
Mean 34% 77% 53% 39% 50% 15 -13 0 19 
Moquegua 22% 91% 74% 68% 79% 5 -6 -3 6 
Carumas 50% 64% 43% 9% 14% 24 -39 6 27 
Samegua 23% 93% 64% 61% 77% 4 10 11 6 
San Cristobal 55% 57% 22% 1% 12% 35 -18 1 60 
Torata 21% 83% 62% 56% 67% 8 -11 -12 -5 














































Mean 63% 79% 18% 12% 60% 10 1 7 15 
Huachon 74% 72% 15% 5% 39% 4 -14 4 44 
Huayllay 57% 77% 6% 7% 32% 16 -3 -2 39 
Ninacaca 74% 70% 8% 1% 47% 15 -7 12 15 
S. Fco de Yarusyakan 84% 81% 40% 40% 73% 13 -29 -29 0 
Simon Bolivar 44% 85% 20% 9% 82% 7 11 20 1 
Tinyahuarco 47% 91% 18% 11% 87% 4 48 37 -9 
 
 
 
